Paper 12

Koreans in the Soviet Union



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Koreans in the Soviet Union

DAE-SOOK SUH
Editor

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TO THE MEMORY OF
Chŏng-hŭi Paek

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Preface

On the banks of the Amur River in Khabarovsk, a small museum displays artifacts and relics depicting local history and the history of the Russian Maritime Province. Among the displays is one reflecting the role played by Koreans in Siberia during the turbulent years of the Russian Revolution. It is a photograph of a Korean armed contingent, and shows a group of about eighty soldiers who had fought on the side of the Bolsheviks. This Korean contingent was one of many minority groups that fought for Bolshevik victory during the Revolution. The caption indicates that this particular group was led by a Korean commander named Yi Yong. The photograph shows the Korean contingent carrying both the Soviet Red Flag and the Korean national flag, which today is the national flag of South Korea.

It is a bit strange to see the Korean national flag together with the Red flag, because in the divided Korea of today, North Korea and South Korea hoist different national flags. It is particularly strange because the fervor of anticommunism is now strong under the same South Korean banner. However, this photograph illustrates with great accuracy the history of many Koreans who migrated to Russia prior to the Revolution and fought for the cause of communism in Siberia, in the hope of eventually attaining the liberation of Korea from the Japanese. There is a street in Khabarovsk named after a Soviet Korean, Kim Yu Chen Street, and there are monuments in remote areas

of Siberia extolling the contributions of unknown and long-forgotten Koreans in the Soviet Union.

Under closer scrutiny, the commander Yi Yong can be identified. Like many of his compatriots, Yi was one of those who fled Korea after Japanese annexation in 1910, vowing to fight to regain Korean independence. Unlike many of his compatriots, however, Yi came from a prominent Korean family. Yi Yong was a son of the famous Korean emissary Yi Chun, who was secretly sent to the Hague Peace Conference in 1907 by King Kojong to plead the Korean case against Japan. After graduating from high school in Seoul, young Yi Yong was trained in the military arts in Zhejiang Province in China before joining the Bolsheviks in Siberia. Yi was eventually arrested and jailed by the Japanese, but was released when Japan was defeated after World War II. Yi Yong returned to Korea and joined the North Korean Communist government as Minister of City Management (1948–51), Minister of Justice (1951–53), and Minister without Portfolio (1953–55).

This photograph represents only a small part of the various activities of Koreans in the Soviet Union. Koreans have migrated to Russia, for both economic and political reasons, ever since the latter half of the nineteenth century, and more than half a million of their descendants still live in the Soviet Union in a vast region stretching from the Russian Maritime Province to Central Asia.

This volume is an effort to study Koreans in the Soviet Union. The five articles compiled here are selected from essays presented at a conference on Koreans in the Soviet Union which was sponsored by the Center for Korean Studies of the University of Hawaii and held in Tokyo in 1983. Because the subject is so vast, this is but an introductory inquiry into the life and history of Koreans in the Soviet Union. Although many of the participants in the conference visited the Soviet Korean communities in both the Russian Maritime Province and Central Asia, this work is not a travelogue. Nor is this an ethnographic study based on field research in the area. There are already a number of excellent ethnographic studies by Soviet scholars such as R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova and Iu. V. Ivanova. Because each scholar dealt with different aspects of the same subject, some

incidents and historical events are recounted in more than one article. Similarly some resource material has been referred to by several of the scholars. In particular the work of Kim Syn-hwa [Kim Sŭng-hwa], a Soviet Korean who wrote about Koreans in the Soviet Union and later participated in North Korean politics, is extensively used.

This study does not pretend to be comprehensive; for example, the problem of Korean laborers who were taken by the Japanese during World War II to the island of Sakhalin is not dealt with here. Thus this introductory inquiry suggests areas for further study, and points to issues beyond the scope of this volume.

The first two articles, by Teruyuki Hara and Haruki Wada, deal with Koreans and their revolutionary activities during and after the Russian Revolution. Hara's study examines Korean activities during the Revolution and analyzes for the first time the Korean independence movement in Siberia. He establishes the relationship between the growing Korean independence movement in the Russian Maritime Province and the changes in Japanese policy toward pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. Wada's study carries the subject further, to the mid-1930s and the relocation of the Soviet Koreans from the Russian Maritime Province to Central Asia. He compares the status of Koreans before and after the October Revolution, and examines the vast changes experienced by the Korean community under Stalin. Both authors shed much light on the origin of the Korean Communist movement, tracing it back to the activities of this period.

The next two articles, by Youn-Cha Shin Chey and Hidesuke Kimura, describe the Soviet Koreans and their current status. Chey investigates the impact of Soviet institutions on the patterns of socioeconomic development of Soviet Koreans, particularly in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. She focuses on the effect of Soviet government policy on the culture and social organization of the Soviet Koreans, and provides an appendix of short biographies of selected Soviet Koreans which indicates the variety of contributions they have made to the Soviet Union. Kimura concentrates on the Soviet Koreans in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, comparing them with other minority groups in the Soviet Union. He uses a statistical analysis to investigate the de-

velopment of Soviet Koreans from the 1920s to the 1980s, showing the increasing "Russification" of Soviet Koreans in comparison with other minority groups.

The last article, by Dae-Sook Suh, is an effort to analyze the role of Soviet Koreans during the first decade after the establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea. Many Soviet Koreans returned to North Korea after the Soviet army had liberated Korea, and a considerable number participated in North Korean politics. However, under the harsh rule of Kim Il Sung almost all were purged, and many Soviet Korean returnees have since gone back to the Soviet Union. This study finds that the role of the Soviet Koreans in North Korean politics fluctuated with the vicissitudes of Soviet-North Korean relations, and by the end of the Chinese occupation of North Korea in 1958 and the ensuing Sino–Soviet dispute, the Soviet Koreans had either been purged or ousted from their party and government positions. This recent history suggests in part a strained relationship between Soviet Koreans in the Soviet Union and Korean Communists in North Korea.

Koreans in the Soviet Union is indeed a modest beginning to the study of this unduly neglected subject. More ethnographic studies, as well as in-depth analyses, should be made of the Soviet Koreans, investigating their contributions to the building of socialism in the Soviet Union, their assimilation with other ethnic groups, and their prospects for improving their position in the Soviet Union. Prominent leaders among the Soviet Korean community should be recognized in all fields. As the Korean presence in Russia and the Soviet Union now enters its second century, additional issues emerge, such as the study of second and third generation Koreans, Soviet policy towards ethnic minorities, and the role of Soviet Koreans in Soviet-Korean relations. To these larger problems this is but an introduction.

Honolulu
June 1986

D.S.S.

Acknowledgments

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A Note on Transliteration

THE MCCUNE-REISCHAUER system has been used in transliterating Korean, except for a few well-established personal and place names, such as Syngman Rhee, Kim Il Sung, and Seoul.

For Russian, the Library of Congress transliteration system has been used, again except for a few geographic and personal names, where a *y* is used instead of *i* or *ii*, as in, for example, Valery.

The Korean Movement in the Russian Maritime Province, 1905-1922

TERUYUKI HARA

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP has not yet sufficiently dealt with an important factor in the history of Russo-Japanese relations in the first quarter of the twentieth century: the Korean anti-Japanese movement in the Russian Maritime Province.

In 1905 Korean immigrants to this region formed the *Hanin minhoe* [Korean People's Association]. This is regarded as the first organization for social and political activity formed by Koreans in Russia.[1] The Japanese domination of Korea during and after the Russo-Japanese War met with Korean protests both in Korea and abroad, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 lent additional impetus to the Korean movement for national emancipation. From 1905 to 1922, when Korean partisan units were disbanded by Soviet authorities, or at least until 1920, when the Korean communities were raided by Japanese expeditionary forces, the Russian Maritime Province was one of the main arenas for the Korean independence movement.

My purpose here is to attempt a brief survey of various aspects of the Korean movement in the Russian Maritime Province during the eventful period between 1905 and 1922 in light of Japanese policy toward pre- and post-revolutionary Russia.

I. Under the Tsarist Regime

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the Japanese established a protectorate over Korea, with the understanding of the Great Powers, especially of Russia. By Article 2 of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia acknowledged that Japan possessed in Korea "paramount political, military, and economic interests" and engaged not to obstruct or interfere with "the measure of guidance, protection, and control" that Japan might find necessary to take in Korea. Russia's recognition of Japanese special interests in Korea was reaffirmed by the secret Russo-Japanese Convention of 1907, and when the Japanese annexation of Korea was announced on August 22, 1910, Russia expressed no objection.[2]

The Russo-Japanese rapprochement was embodied, however, not only in Russia's consent to Japan's free hand in Korea proper, but also in her efforts to suppress the anti-Japanese movement among Koreans in her territory.

The Korean communities in Russia were concentrated in the Maritime Province [*Primorskaia oblast'*], where at the beginning of the twentieth century there were some 32,000 Koreans. Half of them were naturalized immigrants, subjects of Russia, and half nonnaturalized resident aliens. The latter group rapidly increased during the first decade of this century, because naturalization of Koreans was restrained by local authorities under the command of General Unterberger, the Governor General of Priamur, while at the same time the influx of refugees from Japanese-dominated Korea became more and more pronounced.

In 1921 the Koreans of both categories in the province were distributed as follows:[3]

		NATURALIZED	ALIEN	TOTAL
Urban:	Vladivostok	535	7,910	8,445
	Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii	1,105	3,355	4,460
	Khabarovsk	127	638	765
	Nikolaevsk-na-Amure	60	283	343
Rural:	Nikol'skii district [*okrug*]	11,168	12,847	24,015
	Ol'ginskii district	1,021	11,498	12,519
	Imanskii district	1,392	2,095	3,487

	NATURALIZED	ALIEN	TOTAL
Khabarovskii district	776	287	1,063
Udskii district	632	—	632
Primorskii mining region	660	990	1,560
Total:	17,476	39,813	57,289

In general the majority of the urban Korean population consisted of newcomers and refugees who had actually experienced Japanese suppression and whose anti-Japanese feeling was strong. In particular they concentrated in the northwestern outskirts of the city of Vladivostok, in a Korean section named Sinhanch'on [New Korean Village], or *Koreiskaia Slobodka.* Sinhanch'on was "the terminus of working-class compatriots from the homeland" and at the same time "the base for patriots residing abroad."[4]

The other important base was Novokievskoe, a village near the Russian-Korean border. In this village some *ŭibyŏng* [Righteous Army] units were organized by Yi Pŏm-yun, a veteran fighter who had served in the Russo-Japanese War as a Russian volunteer. Financial assistance was offered by Ch'oe Chaehyŏng, an early immigrant and influential figure in the two Korean communities.

It was a great shock to the Japanese when, in the summer of 1908, armed units of Koreans, who had been trained in Russian territory, advanced to Hamgyŏng Pukto, the northernmost province of Korea, and engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese forces. The Japanese government requested that the Russian authorities take strong measures against anti-Japanese activities. The Russians, desiring to maintain friendly relations with Japan, agreed to the request. The local authorities received orders not to allow any anti-Japanese agitation, nor the formation of Korean armed units, and to confiscate smuggled weapons. For this purpose, Cossacks were deployed along the border.[5]

The next shock that the Japanese received from the Korean nationalist movement in Russian territory was the incident at Harbin station: on October 26, 1909, former Resident General Prince Ito Hirobumi was assassinated by An Chung-gŭn, a

Korean militant from Vladivostok. Policemen attached to the Japanese consulate general investigated the incident and came to the conclusion that "the Maritime Province, particularly Vladivostok, may be considered to be the base area of the plot."[6] Toward the end of 1909 and in the first half of 1910 the Japanese command in Korea reinforced its troops in the northern part of the Korean peninsula.[7]

When the Japanese annexation of Korea was reported in Sinhanch'on, an extraordinary meeting was held at a Korean school and a statement of protest was adopted. According to a Japanese record, an attack against some Japanese residents occurred at that same time in Vladivostok. Consul General Oshima demanded that the Russian authorities take countermeasures against "undesirable" Koreans. The chief of the city police agreed to the demand; warned Kim Hak-man, the chairman of *Hanin minhoe*; and strengthened the patrol in Sinhanch'on.[8] In addition, the Japanese government pressured the Russian government, and Baron Motono, Japanese ambassador at St. Petersburg, made a formal request along those lines which proved far more effective than that made by the consul general at Vladivostok. Based on instructions from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Vladivostok police arrested forty-two Koreans, seven of whom were expelled to Irkutsk Province as "ringleaders of the anti-Japanese movement."[9]

Furthermore, common interests of the two governments led to the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Extradition, signed on June 1, 1911. The Secret Declaration appended to this treaty prescribed extradition of political criminals, contrary to a general principle of international law. The history of its negotiation shows that the treaty was initiated by the Russians, whose aim was to suppress the activities of political exiles in Japan after the 1905 Revolution. Japan, however, was no less eager than her partner to try and uproot any external threats to her government.[10] As a result of these strict regulations, the Korean anti-Japanese movement in Russian territory quieted down.

The Japanese government held the view that, according to Article 1 of the Declaration of the Annexation of Korea, the Russo-Korean Treaty of 1884 was terminated, and on the basis of this article, the Koreans had become subjects of Japan, even

though they resided in Russian territory. Of course the Russian government rejected this view. To inquiries made by the Japanese consulate general at Vladivostok, the government general at Priamur replied: "since the annexation of Korea, there has been no change in legislation applicable to the Koreans."[11] This was, however, an ostensible principle. In practice, after the annexation of Korea the legal position of nonnaturalized Koreans in Russia became unstable and dependent on Russo-Japanese political relations. In particular the outbreak of World War I had a pronounced effect on their treatment.

On December 5, 1914, the Japanese embassy in Petrograd requested in a note that several Koreans, whose names were on an appended list, should be expelled from Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry answered that it was impossible to extradite any subjects of Russia, but it was possible to banish any nonnaturalized Koreans "in accordance with the text of the Secret Declaration of June 1, 1911."[12] At the end of 1914, the Russian local authorities enacted a severe banishment policy toward nonnaturalized Koreans from the Pos'et area.[13] Nonetheless, it seems that the Japanese government was not satisfied with this measure, for a new note similar to the previous one was presented on August 29, 1915. This repeatedly claimed that thirty Koreans should be banished and extradited to the Japanese authorities, and if that were impossible to do, those Koreans should be expelled to the inner provinces of Siberia and placed under constant police surveillance.[14]

In addition to diplomatic pressure, the Japanese even resorted to frame-ups. This method was used, for instance, to entrap Yi Tong-hwi, one of the most influential figures in the Korean nationalist movement in the Russian Far East and Manchuria. In 1916 a Japanese secret agency systematically circulated rumors that Yi was a German agent making plans for the destruction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and organizing other anti-Russian plots. On the basis of these rumors and, of course, the urgent request by Japanese diplomats, he was imprisoned at the beginning of 1917 on suspicion of espionage for Germany.[15] To the extent that Russo-Japanese entente really existed, Tsarist Russia was Japan's reliable partner in the suppression of the Korean nationalist movement.

II. From Revolution to Intervention

The February Revolution of 1917, which ended the Tsarist regime, was welcomed by various national minorities in Russia. The new freedom encouraged their movements for national autonomy. Korean nationalist organizations, which had been closed following the outbreak of World War I, were newly revived. On June 2, 1917, the First General Assembly of Korean Representatives was convened in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, with ninety-six delegates from the region east of Irkutsk in attendance. The assembly expressed hope in a wire sent to the Petrograd Soviet that "the principle of national self-determination put forward by the Russian democracy should also be applied to oppressed nations of Asia."[16]

In this assembly, however, a conflict between two factions came to light. Most of the delegates were naturalized Koreans, whose political tendencies were generally moderate. According to a report of a Japanese official who had visited the Russian Far East, the agenda of the meeting was limited to "matters concerning autonomy and mutual aid of the naturalized Koreans"—for instance, demand of a seat in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and education in Korean, their mother tongue. In any case, "the main point was not at all anti-Japanese."[17] More controversial topics, such as the release of Korean prisoners, were omitted from the agenda. Dissatisfied delegates of a radical wing, mostly representing the nonnaturalized and lower-class Koreans, walked out in protest. The assembly elected the Central Executive Committee of the Korean National Association and decided to publish a weekly, *Ch'ŏnggu sinbo*, in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii. In opposition to this organ, the radical Koreans published their own newspaper in Vladivostok, *Hanin sinbo*, which was full of anti-Japanese articles. Further, they convened their own conference at the end of December 1917 in Khabarovsk.

In token of the alliance with Japan, the Provincial Government continued to imprison several Korean political exiles, first among them Yi Tong-hwi. His release was not effected until active support was given by Bolshevik leaders of the Vladivostok Soviet.[18]

The collapse of the Tsarist regime and the deepening of the

revolution caused a rise in the Korean workers' movement. In Vladivostok, the radical center of the whole Russian Far East, more than five-hundred Korean workers participated in a May Day demonstration. This situation made the Japanese government uncomfortable. A. N. Rusanov, the Plenipotentiary of the Provisional Government for the Far East, reported on June 30 as follows:

> According to information from the chief of the counterespionage office in Korea, Japanese gendarme officials and secret police agents have arrived in Vladivostok under the guise of workers or persons of various occupations. The exclusive purpose of these agents is regarded as the guarding of the secretary and director of the Korean section of the Japanese consulate here from an assassination attempt by the Koreans.[19]

The October Revolution opened a new chapter in the history of national minorities. However, only a rather small part of the Korean community welcomed the Revolution from its inception. Pak Chin-sun, well-known Korean activist in the Comintern, wrote that "after the October, the majority of the Korean community in Russia adopted a wait-and-see policy."[20] This moderate majority opted not for the Soviet system, but for the *Sibirskaia Oblastnaia Duma* [Siberian Regional Council] and the zemstvo as, respectively, the desirable supreme and local self-governing bodies. The idea of the Siberian Regional Council had been advocated by the Siberian regionalists [*oblastniki*] together with the Socialist revolutionaries. They encouraged each national minority in Siberia to participate in it. At the Executive Committee's conference of delegates, held in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, two Korean representatives were elected to the Siberian Regional Council: Ch'oe Chae-hyŏng, who was chairman of the Novokievskoe zemstvo, and a student named Yi.[21]

Meanwhile, Bolsheviks came to have closer contact with the Korean radical group. Aleksandra Petrovna Kim was a typical figure of the Bolshevik-Korean linkage in this early stage. She joined the Bolshevik Party at the beginning of 1917 in Ural, where she had been working as an interpreter for Korean and Chinese workers. She returned to the Maritime Province in the summer of that year and was engaged in propaganda activities

for the Party. When the Party conference for the Far Eastern region was held in October, she was one of its fifteen delegates. After the Bolsheviks seized power, she acted as Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the *Dal'sovnarkom* [Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars], under the chairmanship of A. M. Krasnoshchekov.

The influence of Kim and some other Bolshevik organizers bore fruit: under their guidance the Korean radicals headed by Yi Tong-hwi founded the *Hanin sahoedang* [Korean Socialist Party]. According to Kim Syn Khva [Kim Sŭng-hwa], *Hanin sahoedang* was founded in March 1918, and its program was adopted at the extensive plenary session of the Central Committee on March 28, 1918.[22] Another version states that one Kuregorinop (or Krepkov), a Bolshevik leader, pledged his support to the cause of Korean emancipation in a conversation with Yi and that this resulted in the founding congress of *Hanin sahoedang*, which was held on June 26, 1918.[23] That Bolshevik leader may not have been Kuregorinop, whose existence is doubtful, but Krasnoshchekov, who met with Yi as early as May 1918.[24]

Events in the spring of 1918 forced the naturalized and Russianized Koreans to the side of the Soviet regime. One of the factors contributing to this movement was the homecoming of discharged Korean soldiers from the German front. During World War I, some four thousand Koreans, all of whom were Russian subjects, had been drafted into the Russian army.[25] They returned home in the winter and early spring of 1918 with weapons and more or less pro-Bolshevik leanings. Their homecomings had an effect, for instance, on the formation of the village Soviet at Nikolaevka, a village in the Suchan basin. The most active organizer was Han Ch'ang-gŏl, newly discharged and returned from European Russia. The Nikolaevka village Soviet was founded in April 1918 and Han was elected chairman.[26]

Another important factor pushing the Koreans toward the Soviet camp was the urgency of Japanese intervention. On April 5, 1918, Japanese marines landed at Vladivostok. This step aroused an immediate response in the Korean communities. Five

days later, the Central Executive Committee at Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii convened a meeting and passed a resolution stating the following: "The present landing of the Japanese at Vladivostok endangers our position . . . in self-defense we must hold our own in cooperation with the Red Army."[27]

This idea of "cooperation with the Red Army" was promptly put into practice. At the beginning of May 1918 there were 57 Koreans in the Red Guard units in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, out of a total of 330 members.[28] In Novokievskoe, Ch'oe Chae-hyŏng was entrusted by a Red Army officer from Khabarovsk to engage in enlisting discharged Korean soldiers.[29] It is noteworthy that such an outstanding zemstvo leader as Ch'oe joined up with the Soviet authorities.

Because of the crisis caused by the Japanese intervention, the two Korean groups compromised and formed a single organization, *Chŏn-Ro Hanjok-hoe* [All-Russian Korean National Association]. When and how did this union occur? The following fragmentary information from the Japanese Defense Agency archives may provide a clue.

> *Hanjok-hoe*. This name was adopted on the background that *Hanin-hoe* [Korean People's Association] and *Koryŏjok-hoe* [Korean National Association] were consolidated in May 1918.[30]

Between June 13 and 24, 1918, the Second General Assembly of Korean Representatives was convened in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii and 128 delegates assembled. As a matter of fact, this was the inaugural congress of the reorganized All-Russian Korean National Association. Ch'oe Chae-hyŏng and Yi Tong-hwi were nominated as honorary presidents. The nomination of the two leaders with differing backgrounds symbolized the new unity of the two opposing groups. But what line did this united organization now take? Did this Assembly proclaim "the neutrality of the Koreans in the Russian Civil War?"[31]

On the contrary, the minutes of the Assembly prove that the Korean communities took a definite and realistic step toward siding with and pledging loyalty to the Soviet regime.[32] In fact, they sought national autonomy under Soviet guidance. In his speech, Krasnoshchekov advocated a joint struggle and the

Assembly decided to send Han Yong-hŏn [Andrei Han] and Pak Chin-sun as representatives to the *Dal'sovnarkom*. Concerning the situation at hand the Assembly resolved:

> The Second All-Russian Assembly of Korean Representatives proclaims that the attainment of the Russian Revolution should be advocated as the slogan of solidarity to achieve our national independent life on the basis of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Long live our freedom! Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live socialism!

Several days after the Assembly, Czechoslovak troops carried out a coup in Vladivostok and the local Soviet authorities fell. By this time Czechoslovak mutineers had seized all the cities along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Their uprising brought about the establishment of a counterrevolutionary regime over the whole territory from the Volga to Vladivostok and served as prelude to large-scale Allied intervention.

III. Under the White Regime

At the beginning of August 1918, a combined force of Japanese, American, British, and French troops began to land at Vladivostok. Soon these interventionists, together with the Czechoslovak corps, occupied main cities along the Trans-Siberian Railway and other strategic points. The Japanese troops constituted the largest part of this force: by November more than 70,000 Japanese were stationed in the Maritime Province, on the Amur, in Zabaikalia, and in North Manchuria. They supported reactionary elements, such as General Horvath and the Cossack Captains Semenov and Kalmykov.

Under these new conditions, the Korean communities were confronted with a great difficulty. In July, on the eve of the Japanese landing, the radical group led by Yi Tong-hwi had decided to organize the *ŭibyŏng* units and resist the Japanese expeditionary forces, and in fact prepared themselves in cooperation with the Bolshevik headquarters at Khabarovsk.[33] But later, overpowered by the Japanese interventionists, Yi and his comrades were obliged to move their base to Chinese territory. In addition they lost Aleksandra Petrovna Kim, who was captured

by Kalmykov's bands when the Bolsheviks withdrew from Khabarovsk to the Amur Province. On September 18, 1918, she was shot.

The moderate Koreans at this time respected the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia, headed by Petr Derber, the leading figure of the Socialist Revolutionaries in Siberia. The Central Committee of the All-Russian Korean Association requested permission from this government to form Korean armed units under its patronage. But Colonel Tolstov, the commander-in-chief, rejected this request.[34] In any case, the Derber government soon collapsed and the so-called White Guards seized full control of the Russian Far East. After Admiral Kolchak established a dictatorship through a coup on November 18, 1918, at Omsk, General Horvath was appointed Kolchak's plenipotentiary for the Far East. Later he was replaced by General Rozanov. Actually both Horvath and Rozanov were Japanese puppets.

The Allied intervention in the Russian Far East was accompanied from the outset by Japanese suppression of the Korean communities. For instance, in October 1918 the Japanese detachments in Pos'et and Novokievskoe disarmed the Korean residents, despite their long history of needing arms to protect themselves from bandits in these areas. As a whole, however, it may safely be said that Japan's policy toward the Koreans in the Russian Far East remained uncertain at the first stage of the intervention. Especially in Vladivostok, the Japanese dared not interfere directly with Korean matters as they wished, for fear of international complications.

Sinhanch'on thus still represented "a small independent state of the Koreans."[35] On August 29, residents of this quarter held a political meeting and demonstration at an annual observation of National Humiliation Day (the day of the Japanese annexation of Korea), "in spite of the presence of the Japanese armed forces and Japanese destroyer, which was at anchor just below their eyes."[36] The Koreans were still in high spirits, as shown by an incident in the fall of that year. One day in autumn 1918, Japanese Consul General Kikuchi Girō made his first inspection tour of this area. Before the Japanese landing scarcely any Japanese had set foot in Sinhanch'on. The consul general donated

two hundred rubles to a Korean school, but a schoolmistress tore up the bills and threw them into the fire.[37]

The next Japanese visitor to inspect this area after Kikuchi was Shinoda Jisaku. A high official of the government general at Seoul, he was considered by the Japanese to be an expert on the question of Koreans abroad. He had served as a civil administrator of the Jiandao branch office of the resident general from 1907 to 1909, and had been sent to Vladivostok in February 1919 on a special commission from the Japanese general staff.[38] There is no doubt that his mission in Vladivostok was to work out a plan to effectively counter the Koreans, especially in Sinhanch'on. As a first step he visited the school on March 1, 1919. Two days later he met with Han Yong-hŏn, the chairman of the Vladivostok branch of the *Taehan kungmin ŭihoe* [Korean National Council; the All-Russian Korean National Association had been renamed in February 1919]. Han criticized imperial Japan for not helping to keep peace in Asia, and stated that the Korean people would resist the Japanese nonviolently but persistently. On March 4, 1919, Shinoda visited the school again, when a teacher happened to be commenting in his class about the emancipation of Russian serfs in 1861. Shinoda reported the following impression to the chief of the general staff:

> Sinhanch'on is now out of the control of the Russian authorities and appears to be under the full rule of Andrei Han and his followers. Being a socialist and an extreme anti-Japanese, he is propagating his thought widely. I am sure that it is of urgent necessity but no easy matter to conciliate these fellows, and to lead them under the influence of the Imperial administration.[39]

At about this same time, on March 1, 1919, a declaration of independence was proclaimed in Seoul and a massive nonviolent demonstration occurred throughout Korea. The news arrived in Sinhanch'on a week later, reported by seasonal workers from Korea. The residents were excited, and made plans to hold a street demonstration on March 15. On March 11, Consul General Kikuchi demanded that the commander of the Vladivostok fortress and the commissar of the Kolchak government for the Maritime Province exercise strict control over the planned demonstration. Having readily consented to this request, the

White authorities prohibited "any act that might cause damage to diplomatic relations" with Japan.[40] Thus the Korean National Council and its Vladivostok branch were ordered dissolved. However, the Koreans did not yield to the official pressure. A. N. Iaremenko, an eyewitness to these events, left an interesting account in his diary:

> March 17–18. *Koreiskaia Slobodka* in Vladivostok is decorated with national flags and red banners. Today is the Koreans' holiday: the day of demonstration for the independence of Korea. Meetings are held. A manifestation of the Koreans moves from *Koreiskaia Slobodka* to the center of the city. Leaflets entitled "Declaration of Independence of Korea" are scattered on the street from running automobiles. . . . A special delegation of the Koreans delivers to all consuls the "Declaration" printed in English, Russian, Chinese, and Korean. Japanese gendarmes keep a sharp watch, hovering about Korean houses, tearing leaflets away.[41]

The *Samil* [March First] Independence Movement in Korea thus aroused an echo in the Russian Far East. Meetings and demonstrations were also held at Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, Razdol'noe, and Spassk, though they all were suppressed by the White authorities. Nationalist organizations, such as *Noin tongmaenghoe* [Old Mens' Union] and *Ch'ŏngnyŏn tongjihoe* [Young Mens' Association] were newly formed. At the end of April or beginning of May, *Hanin sahoedang* joined with another organization, *Sinmindan* [New Democratic League], and made arrangements for political activity.[42] The Korean National Council, however, failed to get over the severe blow suffered in March.

In those days, partisan activity was increasing here and there in Siberia. The most significant arena for partisan warfare in the Maritime Province was Suchan Valley , in the Ol'ginskii District. In this area there was the remarkable village of Nikolaevka, where Korean peasants had their own village Soviet. Han Ch'ang-gŏl and other leaders of this Soviet were in close touch with partisan detachments under the command of N. Il'iukhov, and in February 1919 they organized a Korean detachment with thirty-five members. In the same month a second detachment was formed in the village of Taudemi. By June 1919 there were

two companies of Korean partisans in the Ol'ginskii District.[43] It is noteworthy that their high morale attracted much attention. Russian partisan leaders wrote as follows:

> The Korean unit showed a good example of discipline, sincerity and devotion to their cause. . . . Among the Koreans we don't know of any case of disobedience or nonfulfillment of orders, not to speak of drunkenness. On this point they were model fighters for the Reds.[44]
> At the village of Frolovka, the Korean partisan unit performs its duty more faithfully than Russian ones.[45]

The joint struggle with Koreans in the partisan warfare led Russian workers and peasants to take an interest in bettering the miserable conditions of landless Koreans. The First Congress of Toilers of the Ol'ginskii District, which was convened on June 27, 1919, and attended by 140 delegates, unanimously proclaimed that Koreans were equal citizens in all points, including the right to cultivate land without rent on a general basis.[46]

The Korean unit which was organized by Han Ch'ang-gŏl took part in the so-called Gaida mutiny. General Gaida, a commander first in the Czechoslovak corps and afterward in Kolchak's army, turned against Kolchak and on the night of November 17, 1919, attempted to seize power in Vladivostok from General Rozanov. Han himself served as the chief of the machine gun team in Gaida's train. The attempt quickly resulted in failure and Han was put in jail. He was not released until after the Kolchak regime fell.[47] Though details of the Korean participation in this mutiny are not fully known, it is interesting to note that Gaida, during a short stay at Shanghai on his way back to Czechoslovakia, met and spoke with An Ch'ang-ho, Yŏ Unhyŏng, and other members of the émigré Korean Provisional Government.[48]

IV. Japanese Direct Control and Withdrawal

In late 1919 and early 1920 the intervention and civil war in Siberia took a new turn. As a result of the Red Army's march east and the insurrections of Kolchak's troops, as well as the widespread partisan movement, the White regime was over-

thrown. Revolutionary forces seized power in one city after another. On January 15, 1920, Kolchak, "Supreme Ruler of Russia," was turned over to the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee.

In the Maritime Province, too, the situation suddenly changed. In Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii the soldiers of the White Guard garrison revolted on January 26, 1920, and partisans entered the city to reinforce the insurgents. In Vladivostok a great insurrection broke out on January 31. General Rozanov fled to Japan. After the collapse of the White regime, the government in the province was turned over to the Provincial Zemstvo Board headed by A. S. Medvedev. Though both Medvedev and the commander-in-chief, Colonel Krakovetskii, belonged to the Socialist Revolutionaries, the actual power of the Maritime Zemstvo Government and its armed forces was in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

After the defeat of Kolchak, the United States, Great Britain, and France decided to evacuate their troops from Siberia. Japan alone continued to station her forces there, insisting on its "geographical proximity." The Japanese government explained in a memorandum to the United States Department of State on February 3, 1920, as well as in an official announcement on March 31, that political conditions in the Russian Far East gravely affected affairs in Korea and Manchuria, and that this was the main reason why Japan could not withdraw her troops immediately.[49] This excuse reveals her real motive: the necessity to defend the Japanese colonial system from the menace of Bolshevism. As a matter of fact, the Japanese military authorities in Korea felt uneasy about events in the Maritime Province. Summarizing the situation in Korea and abroad through February, they emphasized the following points:

> As a result of the political change in Siberia, reinforcement of the Bolshevik elements had encouraged anti-Japanese Koreans. It is true that many of them were coming from Russian territory into the Jiandao area with weapons, which are now much more accessible than before. It is not too much to say that the situation has become still more serious than about last October when there was a rumor floating around that armed invasion of Korea would take place.[50]

Now that Japan had lost her Russian partner in suppressing the Korean independence movement, her policy toward Koreans changed from indirect control over them to direct control.

The idea of direct control had already appeared in the latter half of 1919, in response to the weakening influence of the Kolchak regime. In July 1919 the staff of the Japanese army in Korea seized an opportunity to make wholesale arrests of stubborn anti-Japanese elements in the Russian-Korean and Chinese-Korean border areas.[51] Newly appointed Governor General of Korea Admiral Saitō supported this move, and as is generally known, just as he arrived at his post on September 2, he was met with a grenade thrown by Kang U-gyu, a member of the Vladivostok *Noin tongmaenghoe*, and barely escaped death. Presumably this incident convinced Saitō of the necessity for taking strong measures in the border areas. It is noteworthy that on September 28 he talked with Shinoda Jisaku, who had just returned from Vladivostok and been promoted to the governorship of P'yŏng-an namdo.[52] There is no doubt that Shinoda advised Saitō that "a wholesale arrest" was not only necessary for the defense of Japan, but also practicable even from the viewpoint of international law. He had stressed these very points in his report a few weeks earlier.[53] In any case, on the day following this talk, Governor General Saitō demanded of Premier Hara that strict regulations be put in force in the Russian Far East and Manchuria. A telegram from Tokyo to Vladivostok followed this,[54] and the gendarmerie attached to the Japanese expeditionary forces were sharply increased by the end of October 1919, by transferring personnel from Korea.

An opportunity to act independently came in late January 1920. When the insurrection took place in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, General Odagiri, the commander of the Fifteenth Brigade, warned the Staff of the Revolutionary Army against any "rash act by the Koreans." The Soviets, perhaps unwillingly, agreed not to include Koreans in their troops.[55] The Japanese, however, felt dissatisfied with the indecisive attitude of the Revolutionary Army and on January 30, 1920, arrested Chŏng Tae-jong, "a ringleader of anti-Japanese Koreans." As a result the fighting spirit was broken in that city.[56]

It shocked the Japanese that well-disciplined Korean units

together with Russian partisans entered several cities, and that the Bolsheviks and Korean communities had been brought closer together, with what is more the Maritime Zemstvo Government supporting the Korean independence movement. An atmosphere of international solidarity pervaded the first anniversary meeting in Sinhanch'on of the *Samil* uprising. At that meeting, Krakovetskii's adjutant concluded his speech with the following phrases: "We'll not be satisfied with the Japanese withdrawal from Siberia. We do expect you to restore the independence of Korea under the guidance of revolutionaries."[57] This impressed the Japanese as "a haughty attitude, and the presence of our armed forces was completely disregarded."[58]

Through March 1920 the Japanese command secretly made preparations for a general offensive on the revolutionary garrisons of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and other cities in the Maritime Province. A plan to eliminate anti-Japanese Koreans was devised as part of the general offensive. Yamazaki Masao, a successor of Shinoda Jisaku and also an official of the government general of Korea, took the initiative in the planning. On March 28, 1920, General Inagaki, the chief of staff, gave a special warning to Colonel Krakovetskii against arming Koreans, giving notice that if the Russian authorities could not take suitable steps, the Japanese command would independently take the necessary measures.[59] On April 2, 1920, an ultimatum was handed to the Maritime Government. In its final section, the Japanese ordered the Maritime Government:

> To exert all efforts in order to insure the safety of life, property, and other rights of our subjects in the region, including the Koreans.[60]

This point implied that the Japanese policy of direct control over the Koreans was based on the contention that all Koreans in Russia were actually subjects of Japan.

The thoroughly planned offensive began late at night on April 4. All the revolutionary garrisons throughout the province were disarmed. At the same time Japanese gendarmerie and troops opened an attack against the Koreans in Vladivostok, Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii, and other places.

Sinhanch'on was hit mercilessly. The Japanese committed all

manner of atrocities. They beat and slaughtered the people and set fire to the school. About three hundred Koreans were killed and another one hundred arrested and taken away.[61] Both Russian and Korean captives fell prey to bloody reprisals. While Sergei Lazo and other leaders of the Revolutionary Army were handed over to the White Guards and burned alive in a locomotive firebox, the Koreans were punished by the Japanese at their own discretion. According to A. S. Parfenov's memoirs, they bundled together the Korean victims and sank them with old rails in the Bay of Uliss, near Vladivostok.[62]

In Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii the Japanese shot to death four Korean leaders, including sixty-two year old Ch'oe Chae-hyŏng. The Korean National Council, which had only been reestablished less than two weeks earlier, was compelled to move to the Amur Province.[63]

In the areas where the Japanese forces were stationed, Korean nationalist, and socialist organizations in general, were ordered dissolved and in their place pro-Japanese organizations were established, as previously arranged. Thus the Japanese successfully placed the Koreans under their direct control. Governor General Saitō in his letter to General Uehara, the Chief of the General Staff, expressed his hearty thanks.[64] This is the most remarkable result of the April 4–5 offensive.

The Japanese forces remained in the southern part of the Maritime Province for another two and one-half years. During this period Korean partisan units continued to play an active role in the Amur Province and some areas of the Maritime Province, such as Iman and Suchan.[65] The Far Eastern Republic, which had begun operating in April 1920, patiently negotiated with Japan to effect early Japanese withdrawal, but the Japanese remained harsh in dealing with the Korean problem. On May 13, 1929, the Japanese cabinet, headed by Premier Hara, decided upon the conditions for the withdrawal of the Japanese expeditionary forces. The Japanese demanded of the Far Eastern Republic:

> to refrain from Bolshevik propaganda in Korea and the Japanese homeland and to prevent acts by Koreans and other nationals in the Far Eastern Republic aimed at causing disturbances in Korea.[66]

The last contingent of Japanese forces left Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. On the occasion of evacuation, the Japanese consul general requested that any advance of armed units to Korea should be blocked by all means. I. P. Uborevich, the commander-in-chief of the People's Revolutionary Army, answered that "such a matter as disturbing friendly relations with Japan should be avoided as much as possible."[67] In reality this meant that the Russian authorities ordered Korean units to be disarmed.

Thus the Korean armed movement for national emancipation in the Maritime Province was brought to a close. However, its active part in the civil war was reflected in the political and social conditions of the succeeding years. The high percentage of Korean communists illustrates this: as of July 1, 1923, Koreans accounted for twenty percent of the total number of candidates for the Maritime Province organization of the Russian Communist Party (250 out of 1,278).[68]

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Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937

HARUKI WADA

RESEARCH concerning Koreans in the Russian and Soviet Far East is scarce, and any that has been done in Russia bears political overtones. This was so in the time of Imperial Russia and is also the case today in the Soviet Union.[1] Korean inhabitants from both periods were extremely reticent about their situation. Only one book was written by a Soviet Korean author, Kim Syn Khva [Kim Sŭng-hwa], but he had a complicated history and his book should be read with care.[2]

In Western languages the classic description is *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* by Walter Kolarz, which has become a standard and is a source of inspiration, but might easily be considered too cursory.[3] In Japan, interest in the history of Koreans in the Russian Far East arose out of interest in the Siberian War. The important role played by Korean partisans in this war was duly established by the Japanese, with the research by Hara Teruyuki representing the current level of Japanese historiography on the subject.[4]

Herein I will not dwell on the activities of Koreans during the World War or October Revolution, but shall examine the continuity of the social status of Koreans before and after 1917. I will examine the profound changes wrought in the Korean community by Stalin's "revolution from above," and will investigate their tragic treatment during the 1930s.

The Japanese paid very close attention to the situation in the Soviet Far East during the 1930s. The Foreign Ministry, Army, and South Manchurian Railway Company collected a vast amount of information.[5] This article is an attempt to salvage and

use some of that information obtained by the Japanese about the Soviet Union during the 1930s.

I. Koreans in the Russian Far East

Imperial Russia obtained the Ussuri region from China by the Treaty of Peking in 1860. This area was first incorporated into the Maritime Province, and supervised by the governor general of East Siberia. Later, in 1884, the Province was joined with the Amur and Transbaikal Provinces as the newly formed Priamur Region [*Priamurskii Krai*].

At the beginning of Russian rule, only a few thousand natives and Chinese and Russian pioneers lived in this area. The Russian government immediately sent a number of Transbaikal Cossacks to settle there. Their migration ended in 1862, with the Ussuri Cossacks becoming permanent residents of this region. By 1869, 5,310 settlers, from 761 families, lived in twenty-eight Cossack villages. For their military services they were given a vast area of land, approximately 9,142,000 *desiatinas*.[6]

To increase colonization of the eastern territory, Tsar Alexander II issued a decree on March 26, 1861. According to this decree, peasant-colonists were granted one hundred *desiatinas* of land per household and were exempted from the poll tax for twenty years. Thus these first generations of peasant-colonists became known as *Starozhily* (*starozhilystodesiatinniki:* old dwellers—one hundred *desiatina* holders).[7]

However, the migration of Russian peasants into this area did not significantly increase, leading to the promulgation of the Great Peasant Reform. According to F. F. Busse, in the first eleven years (1860–70), 4,444 Russian peasants arrived in the Ussuri area, but during the next twelve years (1871–82) only 742 followed.[8] On the other hand, during this period a much greater number of Koreans crossed the Tumen River to the Russian Far East. In spite of severe prohibitions by the Chosŏn Dynasty, the first thirteen families crossed the border in secret as early as 1863. Many more followed their example, settling in the Pos'et Bay area without the permission of Russian authorities.[9] Tyzenkhe, IAnchi-khe, and Sidimi were the first Korean villages. N. Przheval'skii, the famous Russian traveller who visited this area

between 1867 and 1869, wrote that 1,800 Koreans lived in these three villages.[10] In 1869, when a famine broke out in northern Korea, 6,500 people fled their homeland for the Russian Far East.[11] Thus the number of Koreans came to surpass that of Russian peasants in this area.[12]

This situation must have worried the Russian authorities. The proposal of Przheval'skii, made in his book published in 1870, might have attracted attention. He proposed a temporary halt to receiving Korean immigrants, or their transfer to the Amur basin away from the Korean border. Although he was impressed by the Koreans' industriousness and neatness, he was afraid that Koreans living in their own separate villages in the border area kept too strong a spiritual bondage with their fatherland to be Russified.[13]

The governor general of East Siberia, Sinel'nikov, who visited this area in 1870, decided to transfer some of the Koreans to the Amur Regions. In the following spring, 103 Korean families (431 men and women) moved to the neighboring area of Blagoveshchensk, became naturalized citizens, converted to the Orthodox faith, and were given one hundred *desiatinas* of land per household, just as was the practice with Russian peasant-colonists. Their new village, named Blagoslovennoe [the God-blessed], was expected to serve as a model, attracting Koreans to the inner part of Russian territory. But their example was not followed and cost too much to be repeated.[14]

Russia did not establish diplomatic relations with Korea until 1884, later than either Japan or the United States. The first Russian ambassador to Korea, K. I. Weber, arrived in Seoul in October 1885. He immediately opened negotiations to conclude another agreement concerning overland trade. Weber proposed to include in this agreement an article about the status of Koreans in Russia. By providing that Koreans who came to Russia before 1884, if naturalized, were to be treated equally with other Russian subjects, Weber and the Imperial government wished to check the immigration of Koreans and to accelerate their naturalization. But this proposal ultimately was rejected by the Korean government.[15] Thus the agreement of August 20, 1888, concerning the border and dealing with trade on the Tumen River,

did not contain anything pertaining to the status of Koreans in Russia.[16]

In 1891 the governor general of the Priamur Region, Baron Korff, set down the first definite policy concerning Koreans in Russia. The Koreans thereby were divided into three categories. The first category was made up of Koreans who had settled in Russia before 1884 and who expressed the desire to acquire Russian nationality. Their wishes were to be granted and fifteen *desiatinas* of land per household were to be allotted to them. The second category was for Koreans who had settled after 1884. These Koreans were forbidden to stay in their settlements for more than two years. After two years, they were to be asked to leave, with passports issued by the Korean government. The third category was for Koreans who came for a limited stay with official documents issued by the Russian authorities.[17] According to Boris Pak, in 1895 Koreans in the first category numbered 13,111; those in the second category numbered 2,140; and those in the third numbered 3,000.[18] Baron Korff's policy, aimed at suspending new Korean settlement, was a product of deep apprehension about the Koreans in Russia.

However the death of Korff in 1893 ended this policy, and in 1896 the new governor general, Dukhovskoi, completely revised it. He accelerated the procedure for granting Russian nationality to Koreans in the first category and increased the time allowed Koreans in the second. Moreover, in 1898 Governor General Grodekov, successor to Dukhovskoi, promulgated a new policy of granting Russian nationality to all Koreans who had lived in Russia for at least five years.[19] Such a change in policy was based on a different, more favorable, view of Koreans in the Russian Far East. E. T. Smirnov wrote the following in an official report published in 1896:

> Fifteen years' acquaintance with the Koreans, Christianized and settled in the villages of the South Ussuri region, enabled me to draw a conclusion about their moral qualities, life styles, and degree of usefulness as colonization elements for the Priamur Region. The Koreans proved to have abilities in mastering the principles of Russian life and also inclinations toward Christianity. They donate a great amount of money for building Orthodox

> churches and Russian schools in their villages. . . . Many Koreans have already mastered several Russian customs and married Russians. . . . They fulfill every order of the Russian authorities accurately, pay local taxes and perform duties of service. Their primary industry is agricultuire, in which their love for painstaking work, order and accuracy is expressed. A peaceloving nature, gentleness and submissiveness are characteristic of them.[20]

Because of the new policy, the number of Korean settlers in the Maritime Province increased from 23,000 in 1898 to 32,410 in 1902.[21]

On the other hand, on June 22, 1900, a new law was decreed by which fifteen *desiatinas* per male member of each household were to be given to new Russian peasant-colonists coming to the Far East after 1901. These new Russian colonists were referred to as *Novosely* [new settlers].[22] Depending upon the number of male members, these settlers received fifteen to forty-five *desiatinas* of land per household. It was at this time that a formal social hierarchy could be seen developing in the Russian Far East, with the Cossacks on top and Koreans on the bottom.

Cossacks	197.7	*desiatinas* per household[23]
Starozhily	100	" " "
Novosely	15–45	" " "
Russian Koreans (category 1)	15	" " "
Korean settlers (category 2)	0	" " "
Korean workers (category 3)	0	" " "

The first three groups, and sometimes even the Russian Koreans, hired the last two groups to work on their farms, or lent their land to Korean settlers. A book published in 1909 contained an impressive saying heard around Lake Khanka. "Without Koreans it is impossible even to live. *Novosely* do not like to work. Retired soldiers are drunkards."[24] The deplorable situation of those Koreans in the lower groups is described vividly by V. Pesotskii:

> The landless Koreans of the region are without the law and their lives are controlled at the mercy of each Russian, not to speak of

> their casual masters and policemen. Neither legal deal nor judicial case in which a landless Korean appears as interested party is heard of. If we look with impartial eyes, landless Koreans are "roaming draught horses." While roaming, they change masters, but it never influences their status. This is not a figurative expression, but a deliberate conclusion, based on acquaintance with the realities of life. Such attitudes toward Koreans and use of their unprotected labor are spoiling Russians. Owners of land, lending out or hiring Korean workers, do not do anything themselves as peasants and prefer to be carriers. . . . The existence of sources of revenue such as rent deprives those Russians of a spirit of enterprise and leads them to idleness, drunkenness, and degeneration.[25]

Faced with such a situation, two opposite arguments about the Koreans in the Russian Far East reappeared in the twentieth century. In 1900 General Unterberger propounded his famous argument of "Koreans' perils." In his first book, *Primorskaia oblast', 1856–1898*, he writes:

> The Koreans, who lived in our territory for more than thirty years, proved to be inadequate as colonization elements in the Maritime Province, where Russian inhabitants are needed as a main force to counterbalance the peaceful invasion of the yellow race. They also proved to be inadequate as a pillar of our military and naval power on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Gathering from every aspect—religion, customs, habits, ways of thinking, and conditions of economic life—the Koreans are completely alien to us and their assimilation with Russians is exceedingly difficult.[26]

General Unterberger was appointed governor general of Priamur Region in 1905 and launched a policy of repression against the Koreans in the Russian Far East. According to his policy, Koreans were no longer given Russian nationality. The Russian Koreans were prohibited from farming government land. Korean workers were dismissed from gold mines. In 1908 Unterberger presented even this ominous view to the government:

> It is impossible to rely on the loyalty of these people on the occasion of war with Japan or China. On the contrary, they provide very convenient soil for our foreign enemies to organize wide-range espionage.[27]

However, a wave of criticism arose against these views and policies of Unterberger. In 1909–10, a special expedition headed by General Gondatti was sent by the government to investigate the Amur region. The conclusions reached by this expedition did not support Unterberger's policies. V. Grave wrote the following in one of the expedition reports:

> The Koreans are useful elements for Russia. . . . Their inclinations to settle down and their abilities to cultivate woodland bring nothing but benefits to the Russian State. Some people argue that the Koreans are not going to assimilate themselves with Russians, but this is not the case. . . . The author cannot but be surprised by the willingness of the Koreans for assimilation.
>
> Certainly, among the Koreans there are some who would evade military service. But they are very few and a majority of Russian Koreans think of military service as evidence of the equality of Koreans with other Russian citizens. After Japan's annexation of Korea, their hostility toward the Japanese grew substantially. . . . So Japanese propaganda toward Koreans is not to be feared.[28]

In fact, after the annexation of Korea by Japan, Koreans in the Russian Far East, seeking protection from Japanese imperialism, petitioned strongly for Russian nationality.

In 1911 Governor General Unterberger was replaced by Gondatti, who espoused a liberal policy toward Koreans. Gondatti did not hesitate to naturalize Koreans who had no land allotments, thus accelerating the naturalization procedure.[29] The number of Koreans who attained Russian citizenship grew rapidly.

Koreans in the Maritime Province[30]

YEAR	RUSSIAN KOREANS	FOREIGN KOREANS	TOTAL
1906	16,965	17,434	34,399
1907	16,007	29,907	45,914
1908	16,190	29,307	45,497
1909	14,799	36,755	51,544
1910	17,080	36,996	54,076
1911	17,476	39,813	57,289
1912	16,263	43,452	59,715
1913	19,277	38,163	57,440
1914	20,109	44,200	64,309

This table shows only those Koreans in categories one, two, and three. Koreans who went to Russia and stayed there illegally were not counted. One source suggested that such illegal Koreans might number as many as 30 percent of the officially registered Koreans.[31] It should be noted, however, that there were only small groups of Koreans outside the Maritime Province. In 1910 there were 2,014 foreign Koreans in the Amur Province and 84 in Kamchatka Province.[32]

When World War I broke out, Russian Koreans were drafted into the army, but the majority of the landless Koreans who had just been naturalized by Gondatti escaped to Manchuria with their families.[33] The war did, however, increase the demand for labor. Korean workers, as well as Chinese, were attracted to European Russia. Thus the immigration of Koreans to the Russian Far East continued to grow even during the war.

II. Koreans in the Soviet Far East

The Revolution of 1917 and the Siberian War of 1918–22 violently shook the Korean communities in the Russian Far East. In addition the March 1 Movement in Korea added impetus to their resistance against the Japanese. Despite such a tumultuous situation, many Koreans migrated to the Russian Far East, a region not controlled by any firm ruler.

Political awakenings and activities were remarkable among the Koreans during this period. They were expressed in two ways. First, Korean nationalists who had spent years in exile in this part of Russia launched a variety of militant activities and showed a distinct leaning toward socialism. For example, Hong Pŏm-do became commander of a guerilla unit and Yi Tong-hwi and O Sŏng-muk organized the Korean Socialist Party. Second, young Russian Koreans who were children of naturalized Korean immigrants fought in the Russian army against the Germans and came back to the Far East as left-wing Socialists. Nam Man-ch'un, Han Ch'ang-gŏl, Hwang Ha-il, and O Ha-muk all followed such a path.[34] Afanasii A. Kim, though much younger, jumped into politics at almost the same time. Born in IAnchikhe County, he studied at a Russian middle school in Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii. After March 1, 1919, he joined the revolutionary

movement. In 1920 he met O Sŏng-muk in Manchuria and accompanied him back to Blagoveshchensk where he entered the Russian Communist Party. In 1921 he took part in the inaugural conference of the Korean Communist Party (Irkutsk faction), and went to Moscow with Yi Tong-hwi to meet Lenin.[35]

The following activists joined the Russian Communist Party between 1919 and 1921.

Korean activists-Communists[36]

NAME	BORN	JOINED RCP
Yi Tong-hwi	1873	?
Han Myŏng-se	1885	1920
O Sŏng-muk	1886	1919
Kim Man-gyŏm	1886	?
Grigorii N. Tsai	1891	1919
Nam Man-ch'un	1892	1920
Han Ch'ang-gŏl	1892	1920
Ch'oe Ko-ryŏ	1893	1920
O Ha-muk	1895	1920
Hwang Ha-il	1895	1920
Pak Chin-sun	1897	?
Afanasii A. Kim	1900	1920
Matvei N. Kim	1901	1919

The striking feature of the revolution in Siberia and the Far East was the absence of peasant struggles against landowners. There were few big estates. Only the lands of Cossacks who sided with the Whites were confiscated and distributed. Thus the social hierarchy remained basically intact.

The Siberian War ended on October 25, 1922, when the last Japanese troops left Vladivostok. On November 16 the Russian Soviet Republic absorbed the territory of the self-dissolved Far Eastern Republic. *Dal'revkom*, the provisional governmental organ for the Sovietization of the region, was established and headed by Ia. B. Gamarnik. In order to settle the Korean issue, a special governmental section, called the Section of Plenipotentiaries about the Korean Matter was set up in the *Dal'revkom*.[37]

The first problem to be dealt with by this Section was the issue of nationality. According to the census of 1923, Koreans in the Maritime Province numbered 106,817, or 17 percent of the

total population; 34,559 (32.4 percent) were Russian nationals while the remaining 72,258 were aliens.[38] How to treat this large group of foreign Koreans on Soviet land was a difficult issue.

Connected with the nationality issue was the old problem of land. According to the land law of the Russian Soviet Republic, promulgated on October 30, 1922, all land was national property and every citizen who worked only with his labor had the right to hold land. No foreigner could have a share. In the Maritime Province the size of normal land allotment was five *desiatinas*.[39] In 1923, out of 16,767 Korean households only 2,290 (13.7 percent) had their land allotments.[40] Undoubtedly most Russian Koreans owned no land. Not only they but also many foreign Koreans rented the land they worked. From the agrarian census of 1923 one can discover the inequality of the individual economies of Russian and Korean peasants at that time.

Sowed Fields of Peasant Households[41]

	KOREAN	RUSSIAN
Without Sowed Fields	1,973	7,846
Up to 0.5 *desiatinas*	2,476	4,644
" 1 "	3,721	3,725
" 2 "	4,571	7,814
" 3 "	2,213	7,758
" 4 "	1,051	6,933
" 5 "	515	5,476
" 6 "	267	4,358
" 7 "	154	3,163
" 8 "	114	2,432
" 9 "	73	1,921
" 10 "	27	1,383
" 11 "	13	1,246
" 12 "	11	811
" 13 "	3	739
" 14 "	5	526
" 15 "	2	406
From 16 to 20 "	2	1,108
From 20 to 30 "	1	355
30 and over	—	181
	17,192	62,825

Upon naturalization a foreign Korean should have received a land allotment, but the arable land was already taken by others. This was the dilemma facing Soviet authorities in the Maritime Province.

A law of August 22, 1921, defined the procedure of applying for Soviet citizenship, and during 1923 and 1924, 11,598 Koreans filled out applications. This constituted only 16 percent of the total number of foreign Koreans who applied for Soviet citizenship, and the majority of Koreans were reluctant even to apply. The Soviet authorities set up a special committee to examine applications, but in fact they granted nationality to only 2,269 applicants (19.6 percent) during this period.

In the following two years, 1925 and 1926, the number of new applicants decreased to 6,276, but the number receiving Soviet citizenship increased from 2,270 in 1925 to 7,884 the following year.[42] By 1926 the number of Soviet Koreans totalled 52,635. However, from 1925 there had been a new influx of Koreans. By 1926 Koreans in the Ussuri region totalled 123,000.[43] Therefore the percentage of Soviet Koreans among the total body of Korean residents remained about the same, less than 40 percent. This, however, is just for the Maritime Province. According to the 1926 census, Koreans in the Far Eastern Region numbered 168,009.[44] Hence 45,009 Koreans had to have been living in other provinces located to the north. Yet the census gives the number of naturalized Koreans as 84,931.[45] If this information is reliable, almost two-thirds of the Koreans living in areas other than the Maritime Province were naturalized Soviet citizens. So the total picture suggests a slow but growing tendency of Koreans to move northward into the inner parts of the Far East and become naturalized and acquire land.

In the Maritime Province, however, the problem of land settlement [*zemleustroistvo*] was handled slowly. In 1923, 931 Korean households received land allotments; 717 in 1924; 2,931 in 1925; and 1,138 in 1926. Thus, among 18,809 Korean households in the Vladivostok *okrug*, 8,007 owned land allotments while the remaining 10,802 households did not.[46] These landless foreign Koreans were making their living as hired workers on Soviet Russian peasants' farms or as tenant peasants, renting land from the Soviet state or Russian peasants.

What attracted new Korean immigrants and temporary workers to the Soviet Union? The answer can be found in the rapid growth of rice production, which became a new economic phenomenon in the Soviet Far East following the Siberian War. Among the various ethnic groups inhabiting this region, only Koreans had a background in rice production. In 1919 there were three hundred *desiatinas* of rice fields in the Maritime Province. In the next year rice fields covered twenty-five hundred *desiatinas*, in 1921 six thousand, and in 1923 ten thousand. This rapid growth was due to the demand from the Japanese armed forces and a subsequent acute rise in rice prices. Some Japanese came to this area to open big rice farms, of eight hundred to sixteen hundred *desiatinas*.[47]

The rice boom ended with the withdrawal of the Japanese armed forces, but rice culture, once introduced, took root in local agricultural practice and developed considerably in the late 1920s. Rice fields expanded from 4,125 hectares in 1923 to 9,293 in 1926, and further to 17,641 in 1928.[48] This development resulted exclusively from the hard work by Koreans.

In 1928 state rice farms owned 7,434 hectares of planted fields; collective rice farms had 5,059 hectares; individual rice farms 3,590 hectares; and village commune farms and others 1,558 hectares. However, 98 percent of the rice fields on the state rice farms were leased to Koreans, as were 48 percent of the fields on collective farms. Of these, 52 percent were collectively planted, but mainly by hired Korean workers. In addition 55 percent of the individually owned rice fields were leased to Koreans.[49]

The price of rice was high compared to that of wheat. If we look at the statistics for products from the Vladivostok district in 1925, we find fishing yielded 5,479,800 rubles; timber 5,288,000 rubles; coal 3,181,710 rubles; wheat 2,950,000 rubles; and rice 2,340,000 rubles. In that year, four times as much land was in wheat as in rice.[50]

Because of the high price of rice, landowners could squeeze high rent from their Korean tenants. A report about Shkotovo near Vladivostok gave a description of a peasant who owned 4.5 *desiatinas*. In 1926 he leased 2 *desiatinas* to a Korean. As rent he received 22 *puds* of rice (39 rubles 60 kopecks) and 30 puds of

beans (27 rubles)—that is to say, 33 rubles for each *desiatina*. The next year he leased two *desiatinas* to four Koreans, and this time received 100 rubles per *desiatina*.[51] The same report reveals the general character of Shkotovo. At that time there were 517 households of Russian peasants: 274 of them leased land to 211 households of landless Koreans.[52]

This rice cultivation was a very traditional type of agriculture, completely devoid of farm machinery.[53] Therefore we are not surprised by the conclusion S. Anosov reached in 1928:

> Though the situation of Koreans in this region was improved under Soviet power, they were yet outcast [*paria*] to a considerable degree. To our regret, the views about Koreans which were dominant in the Tsarist period were not overcome today everywhere. . . . The old thinking does not quickly die out. Many people regard Koreans even now as a labor force, easy and profitable to exploit.[54]

Because the possibility of rice farming was limited to the area south of Khabarovsk, new Korean immigrants and temporary workers crowded the South Ussuri region. This situation led to a revival of concerns about security. One writer named Arkhipov repeated the same passage in his books of 1926 and 1929:

> On the other hand, we cannot forget the possibility that even Koreans, long-time enemies of the Japanese, who had been kicked out from their homeland, might some day become agents of intrigue against Soviet Russia, guided by some imperialist powers.[55]

Arkhipov added a few excuses, stating that his motive was not the nationalism of the Imperial period, but the consideration of "real factors." Anosov himself proposed a way to solve the Korean problem: those Koreans who had already received land allotments could stay, but other Koreans should be transferred to the North and given land there. Coercive methods should be used when necessary. Hereafter new immigration of Koreans should be controlled.[56]

From March 2 to 9, 1929, the Third Congress of Soviets of the Far Eastern Region was held in Khabarovsk. Of 318 delegates, 9 were Korean.[57] In the opening session Nikolai Ivanovich Lee

addressed the Congress, representing Koreans in the Khabarovsk area. Helped by Afanasii Kim as a translator, he said, in Korean, that they were building kolkhozes for the purpose of "socialist reorganization" of individualist agriculture, and that minorities would unite to defend their "proletarian fatherland."[58] Compared with the addresses delivered by Chinese representatives, his speech was highly political. In the discussion period, four Koreans spoke. A man named Kim spoke in Russian about the problems of activities on the lower level of the Soviets.[59] The other three spoke in Korean. Il'ia Kim talked about the difficulties of Korean peasants in the Vladivostok area. He welcomed migration to the North and asked for the spread of agricultural technology and an increased supply of chemical fertilizer.[60] Yun San-man, a Korean agricultural worker, demanded that the Five-Year Plan should solve such problems as the appointment of special Korean labor inspectors, construction of houses for agricultural workers, and publication of more popular journals and textbooks in Korean. He also said that Russian should be taught in every Korean school and that through migration to the North, landless Korean peasants should disappear by the end of the Five-Year Plan.[61] Elena Khan talked about medical care and public health in the Korean community in Vladivostok.[62]

Such speeches indicate that even at the end of the 1920s Koreans in the Maritime Province lived in cultural isolation and socioeconomic distress. Anosov reveals that Koreans ordinarily consulted with Tibetan doctors when they were ill.[63] This might not be an exaggeration. It does not mean that Korean communists were idle people. According to a report published in May 1929, there were 372 Korean members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and 418 Korean candidates for Party membership. Korean Komsomol members numbered 6,258. There were 15 Korean party schools, 2 teacher schools, 21 middle schools, and 208 elementary schools. Also there were three Korean hospitals, two newspapers, and two publishing houses.[64]

The main Korean newspaper was *Sŏnbong* [Vanguard], an organ of the Korean Bureau of the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, founded in March 1923. In 1929, O Sŏng-muk was its editor-in-chief.[65] The

paper was primarily concerned with the problems of Korean communities, but also paid attention to the situation in Korea. Its viewpoints were rather restrained. When the judgment court was held against the leaders of the First Korean Communist Party incident in November 1927, at Shinŭiju, Soviet Koreans met in a protest rally at the Korean Club in Sinhanch'on. O Sŏng-muk read a report, and a resolution and message were adopted. In the message, addressed to the comrades in Seoul prison, a feeling of passionate sympathy was expressed. "We are your brothers and sisters and your comrades. Defending a part of the territory of the Soviet Republic, Eastern fortress on the Pacific Ocean, we regret our life in exile and are thinking day and night about our brothers and sisters in Korea who endure the oppression of imperialists." But in conclusion it was said that they would make efforts to construct socialism and defend the Soviet Union, while supporting morally and financially the movements in Korea.[66]

At that time the leaders of the Korean Communists were drawn from the remaining Siberian War activists. Kim Ki-yŏng, Matvei Khan, Afanasii Kim, O Sŏng-muk, and O Ha-muk were in Khabarovsk; Kim Man-gyŏm and Nam Man-ch'un in Vladivostok; and Pak Chin-sun in Moscow.[67]

The most noteworthy event among Soviet Koreans during this period was their proposal for the "Far Eastern Korean People's Republic." Soviet Koreans in the Maritime Province presented a petition for such a republic to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The petition stated that the Soviet Korean people were ready to work to make Japan, China, and Korea Communist countries, to develop the Soviet Far East, and to defend Soviet territory. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee rejected this petition in August 1929.[68] Perhaps such an idea was stimulated by the decision of the Soviet government to set up a Jewish autonomous province around Birobizhan. When that decision was made, only Russians and Koreans lived in that area, so it was natural for Koreans to think that they were even more entitled to an autonomous province in the Soviet Far East. However, it is easy to imagine the apprehension of the Soviet government over granting such a request, given the coexistence of foreign Koreans and Soviet Koreans in the Maritime Province.

III. The Soviet Far East and Koreans during the "Revolution from Above"

In December 1927, the Fifteenth Party Congress declared the collectivization of agriculture to be the main task of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the ensuing grain crisis, extraordinary measures were applied to exact grain from the peasants. This effort became more intensive during the new grain crisis of 1928, when insubordinate peasants were attacked as kulaks.

Given such a tense atmosphere prevailing throughout the entire country, the Third Congress of Soviets of the Far Eastern Region presented a totally different picture. S. E. Chutskaev, chairman of the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee, said in his main report that the rate of collectivization in his region was "negligible yet," only 2.5 percent of the number of households in 1928.[69] He calmly noted that the amounts of grain collection had decreased from 8,800,000 tons in the first quarter of 1928 to 4,000,000 tons in the same quarter of 1929.[70] Nevertheless he did not propose any special measures. The resolution adopted on his report said that conditions for growth of agriculture should be prepared "on the basis of further development of kolkhozes and sovkhozes," and also "on the basis of comprehensive support for improvement and development of the individual economies of poor and middle peasants."[71]

Therefore signals for comprehensive collectivization, which Moscow issued from spring to early summer 1929, probably had a severe impact on the leaders of this region. On June 10 the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee issued an instruction to subordinate organizations about expropriation of kulaks. All rice fields larger than 1.5 *desiatinas* and non-rice fields over 15 *desiatinas* were to be expropriated, and peasants were allowed to own at most one horse and one cow. This expropriation was to be accomplished by October 1, 1929.[72] On the Union level, the November Plenum of the Central Committee declared the beginning of comprehensive collectivization, and the storm of collectivization was thus begun in the Far East and the Maritime Province.

But here we must take note of the fact that Koreans had assumed the lead in organizing kolkhozes and that there were

those among them who advocated radical collectivization. In 1928, of the 470 kolkhozes in the whole Far Eastern Region, 110 were in the Korean villages in Vladivostok *okrug*.[73] Koreans resented Russian peasants and Korean kulaks who exploited them as landlenders and employers. Naturalized or not, Koreans could now take part in the movement to collectivization. If they attacked and expropriated kulaks' property, a possibility of getting land might come to the landless and nonnaturalized Koreans. For them, this movement promised a shortcut to land and citizenship.

By the end of 1929, three hundred households of kulaks were liquidated. In the Suifun and Pos'et regions, the degree of collectivization grew to 90 percent by the beginning of 1930.[74] Some Koreans were active promoters of the "revolution from above," but others fled Russia because of it. To those workers who were not inclined to get land and citizenship and who took no advantage of this opportunity to do so, the disappearance of landlenders and employers was a fatal blow. On February 1 it became official, and the lending of land and the hiring of workers were prohibited.

K. Toizumi, staff researcher of the Investigation Section of the South Manchurian Railway Company, wrote that 50,969 Koreans left Russia illegally between October 1929 and March 1930.[75] This was announced by the Executive Committee of the Vladivostok *okrug* on March 21 and 23 of 1930. If this is true, then the population of Koreans in the Soviet Far East at that time decreased by two-thirds. This seems incredible, but it may be possible that ten or twenty thousand Koreans, including temporary workers might have left the country.

Such a drastic change dealt a heavy blow to the agriculture of the Far East region, especially to the rice crop. On May 31, 1930, *Pravda* reported that for that year the number of rice fields would be reduced by half in that region.[76] At the same time, the coal mining industry, which had relied on the Korean and Chinese labor forces, experienced a crisis. In June 1930 the Suchan mine produced only 30 percent of its planned output and the Artem mine just 20 percent.[77] Naturally the coal crisis affected the railways. Japanese observers wrote that a serious shortage of grain led to hunger riots in the spring of 1930.[78]

Pravda denied this report, claiming that it was fabricated by the Chinese,[79] but there was no doubt about the seriousness of the situation.

Therefore, once the famous article by Stalin was published in March 1930, followed by the resolution of the Central Committee on March 10, the Bureau of the Far Eastern Regional Committee hurried to adopt a resolution of self-criticism "on the process of collectivization of villages and fishermen." This resolution of April 19 admitted that the expropriation of properties of middle-class peasants was a grave error, and that special conditions of kolkhoz building in national regions had been ignored. The Regional Committee made it a policy to return expropriated properties to middle-class peasants and to allow kolkhozes to dissolve.[80] This policy was put into practice from April to June 1930.

In June, I. N. Perepechko, Secretary of the Regional Committee, spoke at the Sixteenth Party Congress held in Moscow, but he did not mention the problem of collectivization.[81] In fact his speech left no impression.

This was a difficult time for Korean kolkhozes. They endured various setbacks. In the Suchan region, by April 1930 only 600 remained of the 1,037 collectivized households. *Tikhookeanskaia Zvezda* reported on August 7 that in the Far Eastern Region, excepting Amur and Nikolaevsk *okrugs*, there were 89 Korean kolkhozes uniting 7,500 households, 27 percent of the Korean population.[82] But a Soviet writer reported that in the Pos'et region the rate of collectivization was 75 percent in 1930.[83]

The surviving kolkhozes suffered from the discriminatory and vacillating policy of the local Soviet and Party authorities. The first conference of the members of Korean kolkhozes, held in Nikol'sk-Ussuriisk in early August, was an attempt at self-assertion.[84]

A concrete picture of the difficulties experienced by a Korean kolkhoz was vividly described in Ali Zakhir's report, which appeared in the organ *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nost'* in early 1931.[85]

In September 1929, Korean peasants from four villages in the Suifun region established the *Tikhookeanets Revoliutsioner*

kolkhoz, which unified 672 households and 13,703 hectares of land. The regional Soviet Executive Committee promised to increase the landholding to 15,000 hectares, but this promise was not fulfilled. Near this Korean kolkhoz, a Russian commune, *ODVKA*, united 27 households and 1,145 hectares of land. In the spring of 1930 the regional Executive Committee demanded that the Korean kolkhoz sow 7,200 hectares. The Koreans, thinking that their arable lands amounted to only 5,000 hectares, asked to add 2,000 hectares. The regional authorities not only rejected this request, but decided to take away some land belonging to the Korean kolkhoz and give it to the Russian commune, without compensation. The Korean kolkhoz appealed in vain for fair treatment to the Vladivostok *okrug* Party Committee and later the regional Party committee. At last in August the regional Party Committee recognized the error, but the decision was never amended.

It was the same also with tractors. The Korean kolkhoz asked for twenty tractors and three hundred horses to cultivate virgin land. The *okrug* authorities decided to send ten tractors, which the regional authorities then distributed among Russian kolkhozes, not giving even one to the Koreans. Further the regional authorities demanded that the Korean kolkhoz immediately stop its "Asiatic methods of agriculture devoid of any economic effects" and accused the chairman and engineer of "insufficient liquidation of Asiatic methods." This discrimination toward Korean kolkhozes struck hard, but there was yet another factor, a hidden repulsion against the advance guard of the kolkhoz movement. It was reported that in the Suifun and Khanka regions, Russian peasants resorted to violence against Korean kolkhoz members. Even Party members and Komsomols joined in the beatings. After such attacks several Korean kolkhozes collapsed. Evidently the dissatisfaction of Russian peasants with forced collectivization also was entangled with national prejudices against Koreans.

This situation came to be known in Moscow in late autumn. Passages about "great power chauvinism" from the resolutions of the Sixteenth Party Congress were renewed. In the winter of 1930–31, the Far Eastern Regional Party Committee decided to apply the correct Party policy toward national minorities. Finally the Korean kolkhozes received strong support from the top.

Kolkhoz members were in high spirits. Their newspaper, *Sŏnbong*, reported in late January about a conference of kolkhoz members of the Khanka region. "The Conference of kolkhoz members of the Khanka region, remembering the activities of the last year, pointed out that the regional authorities could not do their tasks of Socialist construction as Bolsheviks do and that their vacillating leadership brought damage to grain collection and timber preparation." The Conference swore to bring forth a big change among Bolsheviks in realizing grain collection, by initiating a sowing campaign. It appealed for resistance against vacillations in practice and for paying greater attention to right-wing deviation as the greatest enemy of kolkhoz building.[86]

The wave of self-criticism slowly spread. In September 1931 errors of national policy in the Far Eastern Party organization were picked up and argued about at city-level Party conferences. In the Third Conference of the Communist Party of Vladivostok City, a representative of the City Party Committee reported that the Party concentrated on the most dangerous issue of Great Russian chauvinism and that it ridded many cells [*iacheiky*] of such a tendency. "Thus we won a change in the atmosphere of Russian workers toward Koreans." The reporter pointed out that for the first time five special cafeterias were established for Asian workers.[87]

In August the heads of the Party and the Soviets of the Far Eastern Region were reshuffled. Former Secretary of the Northern Regional Party committee, S. A. Bergavinov, a forestry specialist, replaced Perepechko, and A. T. Butsenko replaced A. N. Asatkin as chairman of the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee.[88]

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Army began military action in South Manchuria, the vanguard of aggression against all of Manchuria. This heightened to the utmost tensions between Japan and the Soviet Far East. The Soviet Union, making public its attitude of nonintervention, tried to avoid military conflict with Japan but at the same time reinforced the Special Far Eastern Army [*OKDVA*]. If Stalin's "revolution from above" radically transformed the Soviet Far East and the life of Koreans, the war scare from Japan deepened the change by cutting traditional communication over the border.

The first attempt by Soviet authorities to control the en-

trance of Koreans into the Far Eastern Region was a regulation of October 18, 1929. This regulation strictly limited the entry of Koreans to the following three purposes: to visit relatives, for commercial activity by permanent residents, and for agricultural work by immigrants. It was announced that Koreans who had come before this regulation should be checked to see whether each one's stay was legal in light of the new rule. If not, he would be expelled from the country, unless naturalized.[89] But this regulation could not be enforced in 1930 and a further attempt was made the following year.

On the very eve of Japanese aggression against Manchuria, September 10, 1931, the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee issued a regulation about visiting workers, according to which only those Koreans who were specially invited by official agencies could enter the country.[90] On December 20 a new regulation about visiting Koreans was announced, which authorized severe punishment for those who entered the country illegally.[91]

This new policy of closing doors to visiting Koreans was accompanied by a policy of comprehensive naturalization of Korean residents. Thus the life of Koreans in the Soviet Far East was radically changed. They all became Soviet citizens and kolkhoz members. Thanks to such changes, they were very loyal to the Soviet state and Stalin, and so responded faithfully to the appeals of Moscow for the Party purge of 1933 and for support for the *politotdel* [political section] of MTS.

In March 1933 Moscow sent a new secretary, L. I. Lavrent'ev, to replace Bergavinov. He had occupied important Party posts in the Ukraine and Georgia.[92] He found in the Far East a reliable assistant in the Korean Communist, Afanasii Kim. Kim was secretary of the Pos'et region, which had a population that was 95 percent Korean. The two of them united to implement the Party line.

We can guess how strong a tie existed between these two, when we see that Kim spoke as the representative of the whole Far Eastern Region at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He praised the role played by *politotdel* of MTS and criticized the unwillingness of the Maritime Province Party committee and other local Party organi-

zations to cooperate.[93] Set up in 1933, *politotdel* was a joint organization of the Party and *OGPU* [political police], created for the strengthening of the kolkhozes and suppression of sabotage.[94] Kim boasted that the Far Eastern Regional Party Committee, headed by Secretary Lavrent'ev, and his own Pos'et region cooperated with *politotdel*, observing that "now in the Pos'et region the percentage of collectivization amounted to 95 percent." The Pos'et region was part of the advance guard of Stalin's collectivization policy.

Afanasii Kim devoted the second half of his address to a vow of loyalty:

> We are now living in a tense situation of complicated political relations. When we discussed the decrees of Party and government in one of the kolkhoz of the Pos'et region near the border, we heard the whir of a Japanese airplane, which flew above the kolkhoz. . . . Korean kolkhoz peasants know that Soviet power is their own power, and that the Communist Party is their own party. . . . We know that the task of Korean kolkhoz peasants and Korean workers is to defend our Red borders of the Soviet Far East until the last drop of blood.[95]

In an international situation of expanding Japanese aggression, Soviet Koreans in the Far East were living under such psychological pressure that they thought they should show their loyalty to the Soviet state and Stalin.

After Afanasii Kim's success at this Congress, the Pos'et region was privileged to call itself the Pos'et Korean National region.

From January 1, 1933, special privileges had been provided to the inhabitants of the Far East.[96] Kolkhozes and kolkhoz members were exempted for ten years from the duty of delivery of grain and rice to the State. Individual peasants received exemptions for five years. The purchase price of fish from fishing kolkhozes was raised by 20 percent, and wages were raised by 10 to 30 percent. This measure was devised to invite new migrants from European Russia to replace the reduced migration from the former foreign neighbors, but it also brought considerable relief to the established inhabitants of the Far East, including the Koreans.

IV. Mass Repressions and Forced Migration

The assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934 was the action of a lone young man named Nikolaev, but Stalin made good use of it to suppress the opposition and unreliable Stalinists. The secret letter of the Central Committee of January 18, 1935, stated that the right-wing deviationists who predicted that their enemies would eventually come to the Socialist camp should be denounced.[97] It should be noted that such a prediction had been made by Kirov when he spoke at the Seventeenth Party Congress.[98]

In the Far East, Samoilov, Deputy Secretary of the Regional Party Committee, was dismissed in the spring of 1935 as a "Trotskyite." He was the first victim after the Kirov Incident in this region, and was replaced by V. V. Ptukha.[99]

In May 1935 a campaign began for the verification of Party documents. From November 2 to 12, the verification of Party documents was performed by a Korean, Han Ch'ang-gŏl, and two Russians from Vladivostok. There were twenty-three cells, but when they finished their investigation only six cells remained, and out of thirty-four members, they found three "reactionary elements." One of the three was sentenced by a people's tribunal to penal servitude for life on a charge of espionage. He tried to escape from confinement and was executed on November 14.[100] This indicates that spies were seen as the first enemies of the state.

In March 1935 an agreement for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan was signed by the Soviet Union and Japan, but tensions never decreased in the Far East. The commander of the Special Far Eastern Army, Marshal Bliukher, reinforced the defense of the Soviet Far East.[101] With the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, many Soviet officials and workers who had served in this joint enterprise returned to the Soviet Union. They and their families were put under surveillance by the NKVD.

On March 26, 1935, the Japanese consul general in Vladivostok protested to the Soviet Foreign Ministry representative for the Far East region about an article in *Sŏnbong* dedicated to the anniversary of the Paris Commune. The consul general complained that despite the conclusion of agreements between Japan

and the Soviet Union, this Soviet Korean newspaper had published still another article full of attacks upon and malice toward Japan. Since Soviet Russian newspapers did not publish such anti-Japanese articles on this occasion, this article could not be overlooked.[102] Thus the Japanese authorities utilized their traditional argument against the Korean nationalists: if peace was desired between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Russians should suppress the anti-Japanese Koreans.

At about this time occurred the alarming fall of Afanasii Kim, Secretary of the Pos'et Korean National Regional Party Committee. On January 4 and 5, 1936, there was a conference of Party activists of the Pos'et region, but it was Li Kwal [*Yi Hwal*], who in 1931 had been editor-in-chief of *Sŏnbong*, who made the major report at the December Plenum of the Central Committee as provisional secretary of the regional committee.[103] Since it was not possible for Kim to be promoted, the secretariat was known to be his last post.[104] By the time of the conference in 1936, he had already been dismissed, and perhaps arrested. It is known that he was not executed but died in a camp in 1943.[105] This means that he seems to have been arrested somewhat earlier, and his fall led to wholesale repression of his comrades, the old Korean activists. The 1936 Pos'et Party Conference decided to carry out the decision to issue new Party documents beginning from February 1936 and to actively promote the Stakhanovite movement.

According to a report received by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in July 1936, the Soviet authorities had begun to make some unreliable elements, presumably Buriats, migrate from the border near Blagoveshchensk. Even Party members and former anti-Japanese guerrillas were not excluded from this forced movement.[106] In June 1936 the Japanese government revised the "Guideline of National Defense of the Empire," reinstating the Soviet Union as its first enemy, together with the United States. Though merely a recognition of the established situation, it should not be ignored that this revision was connected to the subsequent concluding of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.[107] Finally, in July 1936 General Franco rose in revolt in Spain.

In this tense international atmosphere, the first show trial

was held from August 19 to 25, 1936. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and fourteen others were sentenced to death on charges of intrigue with Trotsky and collaboration with Fascists. Former Party leaders confessed during this trial to being "agents of the Gestapo," thus laying the psychological ground for subsequent expansion to large-scale repression.

In the Far East, P. M. Tanygin, Secretary of the Maritime Provincial Party Committee and Vladivostok City Committee, was dismissed in early September. One of the reasons for his dismissal was his inadequate control of the Pos'et Korean region.[108] Perhaps this dismissal was directly related to the fall of Kim.

On September 23, 1936, explosions occurred in the Kemerovo Pits in West Siberia. There had already been an explosion in these mines at the end of the previous year, but this time the incident was immediately picked up by the new head of the NKVD, N. I. Ezhov. On November 19 a trial was held in Novosibirsk. On the very day of the conclusion of the German-Japanese pact, nine defendants were sentenced to death.[109] As Arch Getty points out, this trial played an important role in preparing for the second trial in Moscow, where one of the heroes was G. I. Piatakov, Deputy Commissar for Heavy Industry.[110] This second trial was held in January 1937, with a new feature that should not be overlooked. That is, fourteen defendants at this trial were sentenced to death as agents of the Gestapo and the Japanese secret service.

In the same month, L. I. Lavrent'ev, Secretary of the Far Eastern Regional Committee, was recalled to Moscow and replaced by I. M. Vareikis.[111] According to G. S. Liushkov, a high NKVD official who later defected to Japan, the fall of Lavrent'ev, former patron of Afanasii Kim, was related to his opinion about the need for Bliukher's retirement. Lavrent'ev had talked with the chairman of the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee, G. M. Krutov; the head of Bliukher's Political Section, L. N. Aronshtam; and the Deputy of the People Commissar for Defense, Ian Gamarnik. Bliukher must have reported to Stalin, and on learning of these meetings, Stalin supported Bliukher, calling Lavrent'ev and Aronshtam back to Moscow. In a few months they were arrested.[112] Therefore it was Vareikis who re-

ported to the Regional Party Committee about the results of the notorious February 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee.

A lingering pause in the spring of 1937 was broken by a new wave of trials in the Far East. This was the work of V. A. Balitskii, head of the Far Eastern chapter of the NKVD.[113] On April 23, *Pravda* published an article about "Foreign Espionage in the Soviet Far East." This article stated that the Japanese secret service was sending many Korean and Chinese agents to the Soviet Far East disguised as inhabitants of the area.[114]

In early May a trial of officials of the Amur Railway was held in Svobodnyi. Forty-four defendants, including a former deputy director of the railway, were sentenced to death as former Trotskyites and White Guards who had caused railway accidents for the Japanese secret service. *Tikhookeanskaia Zvezda* reported this trial on May 9 and *Pravda* on May 22.[115]

On May 15 and 23, *Tikhookeanskaia Zvezda* reported on two other trials held in Vladivostok. At each trial eleven officials and workers of the Far Eastern Railway were sentenced to death.[116] Here we see that a chain reaction of repression was already in motion.

On June 4 it was reported that twenty-eight railway officials were sentenced to death in Svobodnyi, and a report of June 20 noted that thirty-seven officials were similarly condemned in Khabarovsk.[117] These trials in the Far East were directly followed by the trial of Marshal Tukhachevskii and other generals, announced on June 11. Gamarnik, Tukhachevskii's deputy who had been accused of treasonable activities with Lavrent'ev, committed suicide on May 31.[118] Thus in the Far East, even before the Tukhachevskii trial, large-scale repression of Regional Party, Soviet, Army, and Railway leaders had already begun.

In August Liushkov came to Khabarovsk to replace Balitskii, who was arrested on the spot. According to Alvin D. Coox, who interviewed some Japanese officials connected with the Liushkov case, Liushkov had told them that before his departure Stalin had called him to the Kremlin to issue confidential instructions. Bliukher especially was marked for liquidation.[119] This seems plausible. Reportedly another instruction was also given. According to Hayashi Saburo, head of the Russian Section of the Japanese General Staff, Liushkov told the Japanese

the following about the forced migration of Koreans. Stalin did not trust the Koreans as long as they lived near the border area and believed that the Japanese would continue to send Koreans as agents into Soviet territory. It was from that point of view that Stalin ordered the relocation of the Koreans.[120] This is the reason both for the forced migration, which was begun shortly after Liushkov's arrival, and for the fierce repression among the military.[121]

On July 29, on the eve of the relocation, *Pravda* published an article, "Subversive activities of the Japanese Secret Service." Once more it claimed that Japanese agents disguised themselves not only as Buddhist priests and fishermen, but also as Koreans and Chinese.[122]

Contemporary Soviet historians never wrote about the forced relocation of the Koreans from the Far East to Soviet Central Asia. Even Kim Syn Khva did not mention this fact in his book published in the mid-1960s.[123] We are obliged to rely totally on Japanese sources, but a file containing materials about this incident is missing from the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives.

The most valuable testimony now available is a deposition by Kim Ki-hong, recorded by the Japanese Army Secret Service agency at Hunchun in November 1937.[124] Kim was a sixty-year old Korean peasant from Khmel'nitskaia village, located about sixteen kilometers north of Suchan. He stated the following. On October 2, 1937, a Soviet official from the Migration Office came to Khmel'nitskaia and declared to the representatives of nearby villages, "By the high policy of our government, it is decided to relocate Koreans to Kazakhstan. The place where you will be located is very fit for agriculture. You must finish preparations by October 8 to be ready to start. If anyone of you does not wish to be relocated, but to return to Korea, make a request, then he will be allowed to return. You can take with you as much food and other things as can be carried on two trucks for each three households." Trucks did not come to Khmel'nitskaia on time. So in fact sixty-seven households left between October 13 and 28. Fifteen people who expressed their wishes to return to Korea were carried away by NKVD personnel to the border area on November 5 and urged to go over the border into Manchuria.

This testimony coincides well with the content of the sole contemporaneous article to be published in Japan. R. Ikeda wrote this article, presumably on the basis of similar secret information obtained by various Japanese agencies. According to Ikeda, the migration was carried out gradually, in one area after another.[125]

AREA	DATE
Khabarovsk	?
West Khanka	September 10
Spassk	Before September 12
Iman	Before September 12
Pos'et	After September 12
Grodekovo	September 13
Slavan Azimi	After September 16
Voroshilov	September 20
Vladivostok City	After September 25
Vladivostok	October 5
Ugol'naia	Early October
Kraskino	October 20
Hanchonlou	November 11
Sidimi	November 11

Such a method could be used only if rumors did not create disturbances. To prevent this, communication among Korean villages was prohibited and Koreans were not allowed to buy train tickets. According to Ikeda, the Soviet authorities announcing the decision praised Kazakhstan's good conditions for agriculture and explained that Koreans were rather privileged by this measure. The authorities promised to pay 370 rubles for each house and to provide free of charge a new house and land in Kazakhstan. On the very day of departure soldiers were brought to the villages.[126]

Thus 180,000 Koreans were forced to migrate to Kazakhstan in two months. According to Liushkov, 2,500 Koreans were arrested.[127] Judging from the fact that in the same article he mentioned the deportation of 8,000 Chinese and the arrest of 11,000 more, we must conclude that physical resistance by Koreans to the relocation was not so serious. The result satisfied Moscow very much. *Pravda* reported on December 20 that the Party and Government expressed special thanks to Liushkov and his assistants for "performance of a responsible task of

transportation."[128] Kolarz was right in saying that this was a response to the forced relocation of the Koreans.[129]

The Japanese government followed this incident, accurately interpreting the motives of the Soviet government. On November 13, the Embassy in Moscow protested to the Soviets about the migration of the Koreans. The logic of its protest was as follows. Originally Korean law did not allow subjects to discard nationality. Japan inherited this legal position after annexation. Therefore even though a Korean obtained other nationality, he continued to keep his original nationality too. This meant that wherever he went a Korean was still a subject of the Japanese emperor. Moreover on October 1, 1936, 978 Koreans had registered in the Japanese consulate general in Vladivostok. Japan thus protested the forced relocation of the Soviet Koreans who were, it argued, subjects of the Japanese Empire and demanded an investigation into the safety of those 978 Koreans.[130]

On November 27, 1936, the Soviet government rejected the protest. *Izvestiia* reported the next day, "The Japanese Embassy expressed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs a protest about the relocation of the Koreans living in the Far Eastern Region. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affiairs decidedly rejected this protest, pointing out that the Japanese Embassy is not privileged to intervene in the problems of the Koreans, who are Soviet citizens."[131] The Japanese Foreign Ministry published this exchange of statements on December 6 with a comment of dissatisfaction.

Activities of the Japanese Secret Service no doubt were made more difficult by this measure. On August 2, 1938, a Korean living in Manchuria who worked as an agent for the Japanese, reported after his return from the Khabarovsk area that, "there were friends of mine who provided me with accomodation and foods secretly in the past, but now all Chinese and Koreans were relocated to Central Russia. So I have no friend there. It made my activities very difficult."[132] Thus we know that such an inhuman measure as the forced relocation of Koreans proved effective against Japanese espionage in the context of international tensions in the Far East in the 1930s, but of course that effect does not justify the action itself.

Yi Tong-hwi, who died in 1935, might have been pleased by

this situation. In 1937 and 1938 Korean Communist activists were arrested and shot as Japanese spies. Kim Syn Khva mentions only one example, the case of O Ha-muk,[133] but many others shared that fate.[134]

This marked the end of the history of the Koreans in the Soviet Far East.

NOTES

1. For example: V. Grave, *Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy v Priamur'e* [Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese in the Amur River Region], in *Trudy Amurskoi ekspeditsii*, vyp. XI (Khabarovsk, 1912), with a Japanese translation: *Kyokutō Roryō ni okeru oshokujinshu* (Dairen, 1925); and, S. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae" [Koreans in the Ussuri Region], *Knizhnoe delo* (Khabarovsk, 1928).

2. Kim was born in Tashkent. After 1945 he went to North Korea, where he became principal of the Central Party School in 1948. In 1955 he served as Minister of Construction. Purged in 1956, he returned to the Soviet Union and entered academic life, defending his doctoral thesis in 1959. His book, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev* [Essays on the history of Soviet Koreans], was published in Alma Ata in 1965. See Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," *Asian Survey* 8, no. 4 (April 1968), pp. 279–280; and, L. M. Volodina, *Biblografiia Korei, 1917–1970* [A bibliography of Korea, 1917–1970], ed. A. M. Grishina and G. D. Tiagai (Moskva: Nauka, 1981), p. 26.

3. Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (New York: Praeger, 1954).

4. See Wada Haruki, "Siberia sensōshi kenkyū no shomondai" [Problems of the history of the Siberian war], *Roshiashi kenkyū* [Russian history], no. 20 (1973); Hara Teruyuki, "Niko jiken no shomondai" [Problems of the incident in Nikolaevsk-na-Amure], *Roshiashi kenkyū*, no. 23 (1975); and, "Roshia kakumei, Shiberi sensō to Chōsen dokuritsu undō" [The Russian revolution, the Siberian war, and the Korean nationalist movement], in *Roshia kakumeiron: rekishi no fukken* [On the Russian revolution], ed. Kikuchi Masanori (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1977).

5. We can find a number of files in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives. The bimonthly organ of the Investigation Section of the South Manchurian Railway Company, *Soueto renpō jijō* [Situation in the USSR] is available and useful. A book written by the former head of the Russian Section of the General Staff of the Japanese Army, Saburo Hayashi, serves as a summary of the information and analysis which the Japanese Army accumulated about the Soviet Far East, *Kantōgun to kyokutō Sorengun* (Tokyo, 1974).

6. One *desiatina* is approximately 2.7 acres. P. F. Unterberger, *Priamurskii krai, 1906–10 gg.* (Spb: Tip. V. F. Kirshbauma, 1912), pp. 50, 53.

7. N. I. Riabov and M. G. Shtein, *Ocherki istorii russkogo Dal'nego Vostoka XVII-nachalo XX veka* (Khabarovsk, 1958), pp. 110–112.

8. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae," pp. 5–6.

9. Grave, *Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy v Priamur'e*, p. 109.

10. N. Przheval'skii, *Puteshestvie v ussuriiskom krae, 1867–1869 g.* (Spb., 1870), p. 106.

11. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae," p. 6; also see A. I. Alekseev, *Osvoenie russkimi liud'mi Dal'nego Vostoka i Russkoi Amerik i do kontssa XIX veka* (Moskva, 1982), p. 143.

12. According to Grave, in 1882 the total number of Koreans in the Maritime Province amounted to 10,137, while Russian settlers in the same area numbered 8,385 (*Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy v Priamur'e*, p. 110). I think the latter number does not include the Cossacks.

13. Przheval'skii, *Puteshestvie v ussuriiskom krae, 1867–1869 g.*, pp. 107–111, 294–295.

14. *Priamur'e. Fakty, tsifry, nabliudeniia*, ed. T. I. Polner (Moskva, 1909), p. 152.

15. B. D. Pak, *Rossiia i Koreia* (Moskva: Nauka, 1979), pp. 61–67, 94.

16. *Opisanie Korei. Sokrashchennoe pereizdanie* (Moskva, 1960), pp. 527–532.

17. V. Pesotskii, *Koreiskii vopros v Priamur'e* [The Korean question in the Amur Region] (Khabarovsk, 1913), pp. 3–5.

18. Pak, *Rossiia i Koreia*, p. 68.

19. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae," p. 10.

20. E. T. Smirnov, *Priamurskii krai na Amurskoi-Primorskoi vystavke 1894 g. v gor. Khabarovske* (Khabarovsk, 1898), pp. 40–41; cited in *Priamur'e. Fakty, tsifry, nabliudeniia*, p. 156.

21. *Praimur'e. Fakty, tsifry, nabliudeniia*, p. 157.

22. Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, p. 44.

23. Based on the investigation of 1909; see Unterberger, *Priamurskii krai, 1906–10 g.g.*, p. 61.

24. *Priamur'e. Fakty, tsifry, nabliudeniia*, p. 432.

25. Pesotskii, *Koreiskii vopros v Priamur'e*, p. 27.

26. Unterberger, *Primorskaia oblast', 1856–1898* (Spb., 1900), pp. 114–115; cited in *Priamur'e. Fakty, tsifry, nabliudeniia*, p. 156.

27. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 12.

28. Grave, *Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy v Priamur'e*, pp. 168–169.

29. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 15.

30. Unterberger, *Priamurskii krai, prilozhenie*, pp. 2–3; Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 27.

31. N. V. Kiuner, *Statisticheskо-geograficheskii i ekonomicheskii ocherk Korei* [A statistical, geographic, and economic account of Koreans], part I (Vladivostok: Vostochnya Institut, 1912), p. 252.

32. Unterberger, *Priamurskii krai*, prilozhenie, pp. 5–6

33. Ivan Gozhenskii, "Uchastie koreiskoi emigratsii v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii na Dal'nem Vostoke" [The part of Korean emigrants in the revolu-

tionary movement in the Far East], in *Revoliutsiia na Dal'nem Vostoke*, part I (Moskva-Petrograd, 1923), p. 359.

34. M. T. Kim, *Koreiskie internatsionalisty v bor'be za vlasti sovetov na Dal'nem Vostoke (1918–1922)* (Moskva: Nauka, 1979), pp. 68–69, 77–84.

35. Ibid., pp. 71–72. Afanasii Kim wrote reminiscences about his encounter with Lenin: Koreiskaia delegatsiia beseduet s V. I. Lenin, *O Vladimire Il'iche Lenine. Vospominaniia 1900–1922 gody* (Moskva, 1963), pp. 615–617.

36. M. T. Kim, *Koreiskie internatsionalisty v bor'be za vlasti sovetov na Dal'nem Vostoke (1918–1922)*, pp. 33, 41, 63, 68–74, 77–80, 83–84, 93–95; Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, p. 121.

37. *Chto sdelala Sovetskaia vlast' na Dal'nem Vostoke za god (Kratkii otchet Dal'revkoma za 1923–1924 g.)* (Khabarovsk, 1924), p.

38. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 29.

39. Gaimusho Tsushokyoku [Department of Trade, Japanese Foreign Ministry], *Roryō Enkaishu no Beisaku ni kansuru Chōsa* [Studies about the rice crop in the Russian Far East], 1927, pp. 129–132.

40. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 64.

41. Ibid., p. 33.

42. Ibid., p. 29.

43. Ibid., p. 30.

44. "Koreitsy" [Koreans], in M. Fedorov-Doronin, *Sibirskaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 2 (Moskva, 1930), col. 949; also "Dal'nevostochnyi Krai" [Far Eastern Region], in *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 20 (Moskva, 1930), col. 255; and V. K. Arsen'ev and E. I. Titov, *Byt i kharakter narodnostei Dal'nevostochnogo kraia* (Khabarovsk, 1928), p. 23.

45. This means that half of the Koreans were Soviet citizens. But there is a difference of opinions: by the estimate of A. M. Yarmosh, the percentage of Soviet Koreans among the total body of Koreans in 1927 was 35 to 40 percent; see A. Petrov, "Koreitsy i ikh znachenie v ekonomike Dal'nevostochnogo Kraia," *Severnaia Aziia* 1929, no. 1, p. 45.

46. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 64.

47. *Roryō Enkaishu no beisaku ni kansuru chōsa*, pp. 23–25.

48. S. Bel'deninov, "K voprosu o razvitii risoseianiia v Primor'e," *Sovetskaia Aziia* 1931, no. 3–4, p. 197.

49. Ibid., p. 204. See descriptions of several types of farms in *Roryō Enkaishu no beisaku ni kansuru chōsa*, pp. 138–147.

50. *Roryō Enkaishu no beisaku ni kansuru chōsa*, pp. 26–27.

51. E. Zhigadlo, *Klassovoe rassloenie Dal'nevostochnoi derevni* (Khabarovsk, 1929), pp. 75–76.

52. Ibid., p. 74.

53. Some writers paid special attention to the need for technological improvements in rice cultivation in connection with the dominance of Korean labor. See Bel'deninov, "K voprosu o razvitii risoseianiia v Primor'e," p. 205; and, G. I. Podoinitsyn, *Agrotekhnika kul'tury risa v DVK* (Khabarovsk, 1929), p. 80.

54. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," p. 64.

55. N. B. Arkhipov, *SSSR po raionam. Dal'nevostochnaia oblast'* (Moskva-Leningrad, 1926), p. 43; *Dal'nevostochnyi Krai* [Far Eastern Region] (Moskva-Leningrad, 1929), p. 40.

56. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," pp. 62–63.

57. *Stenograficheskii otchet III Dal'nevostochnogo kraevogo s"ezda Sovetov r.,k.,k. i kr., deputatov* (Khabarovsk, 1929), pp. 356–360.

58. Ibid., p. 14.

59. Ibid., p. 260.

60. Ibid., pp. 303–304.

61. Ibid., pp. 194–195.

62. Ibid., pp. 118–119.

63. Anosov, "Koreity v ussuriiskom krae," pp. 85–86.

64. Report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 628, 29 May 1929, "Nihon kyōsantō kankei zakken, Chōsen kyosantō kankei" [Miscellaneous materials on the Japanese Communist Party, the Korean Communist Party], vol. 4, *Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives*, hereafter *JFMA*.

65. Report of the director of the police department of the Korean government general, no. 342, 27 February 1929, "Nihon kyōsantō kankei zakken, Chōsen kyosantō kankei," vol. 4, *JFMA*.

66. Report of the consul general of Vladivostok to the foreign minister, 24 October 1927, "Nihon kyōsantō kankei zakken, Chōsen kyōsantō kankei," vol. 1, *JFMA*.

67. Report of the head of the police at the consulate of Shenyang, 20 July 1929, and report of the police department of the Korean government general, no. 2001, 13 November 1929, "Nihon kyōsantō kankei zakken, Chōsen kyōsantō kankei," vol. 4, *JFMA*.

68. Report of the consul general of Shenyang to the foreign minister, no. 31, 14 January 1930, "Nihon kyōsantō kankei zakken, Chōsen kyōsantō kankei," vol. 5, *JFMA*.

69. *Stenograficheskii otchet III Dal'nevostochnogo Kraevogo s"ezda ovetov r.,k.,k. i kr., deputatov*, p. 20.

70. Ibid., p. 40.

71. Ibid., p. 329.

72. Report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 835, 22 July 1929, "Kakkoku kyōsantō kankei zakken, Sorenpō," [Miscellaneous materials about Communist Parties of various countries, USSR], vol. 2, *JFMA*.

73. *Stenograficheskii otchet III Dal'nevostochnogo Kraevogo s"ezda ovetov r.,k.,k. i kr., deputatov*, p. 20; Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, p. 163.

74. Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, pp. 169, 176.

75. K. Toizumi, "Roryō zaiju senjin no shedanteki dasshutsu undō" [The exodus of Koreans from Russia], *Soueto renpō jijō* 1, no. 2 (June 1930), pp. 57–58.

76. *Pravda*, 31 May 1930, p. 5.

77. *Soueto renpō jijō* 1, no. 4 (August 1930), p. 124.

78. "Enkaishu jiken" [Incidents in the Maritime Province], *Soueto renpō jijō* 1, no. 3 (July 1930), pp. 72–76.

79. "Provokatsionnye vymsly Nankina," *Pravda*, 30 May 1930, p. 2.

80. Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, pp. 176–177.

81. *XVI s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moskva, 1931), pp. 125–126.

82. *Soueto renpō jijō* 1, no. 6 (October 1930), p. 121.

83. Ia. Ten, "Koreitsy Sovetskogo Soiuza," *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nost'* 1935, no. 7 (65), p. 47.

84. *Soueto renpō jijō* 1, no. 6 (October 1930), p. 121; Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, p. 178.

85. Ali Zakhir, "Za leninskuiu natsional'nuiu politika v kolkhoznom dvizhenii sredi koreitsev Dal'nevostochnogo kraia," *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nost'* 1931, no. 2–3, pp. 76–81. This article is summarized by Kolarz, but his understanding is not completely accurate.

86. *Sŏnbong*, 31 January 1931, p. 3.

87. Report of the governor of Fukui Prefecture to the foreign minister, 28 November 1931, "Soren naisei kankei zassan, Kyōsantō kaigi kankei" [Miscellaneous materials about politics of the Soviet Union, meetings of Communist Parties], vol. 2, *JFMA*.

88. *Soueto renpō jijō* 2, no. 10 (October 1931), p. 59.

89. Report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 1383, 2 December 1929, "Kakkoku ni okeru honpōjin no nyūkoku kyoju oyobi eigyō kankei zakken. Hōki kankei. 2. Sorenpō" [Miscellaneous materials about entrance, residence and enterprise of Japanese in foreign countries. Laws and regulations. 2. The Soviet Union], *JFMA*.

90. Ibid., report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 1231, 8 October 1931.

91. Ibid., report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 1498, 8 December 1931.

92. *Soueto renpō jijō* 4, no. 6, p. 96.

93. *XVII s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moskva, 1934), pp. 585–586.

94. See I. E. Zelenin, "Politotdely MTS (1933–1934)," *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, vol. 76 (Moskva: Nauka, 1965).

95. *VII s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet*, p. 587.

96. *Izvestiia*, 12 December 1933, p. 1.

97. *Istoriia VKP (b), Kratkii Kurs* (Moskva, 1950), p. 312–313.

98. *VII s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b)*, p. 253. About this interpretation, see Wada Haruki, "Soren ni okeru han fashizumu no ronri" [The logics of anti-fascism in the Soviet Union], in *Fashizumu ki no kokka to shakai* [State and society in the period of fascism], vol. 8 (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 73–74.

99. Report of the consul general of Khabarovsk to the foreign minister,

no. 69, 13 June 1935, "Kakkoku ni okeru kyōsantō kankei zakken. Sorenpō," vol. 7, *JFMA*.

100. Ibid., vol. 8, report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minister, no. 1553, 30 November 1935.

101. Hayashi, *Kantōgun to kyokutō Sorengun*, pp. 83–86.

102. Report of the consul general of Vladivostok to the foreign minister, no. 64, 25 March 1935, "Kakkoku ni okeru kyōsantō kankei zakken. Sorenpō," vol. 7, *JFMA*.

103. Report of the consul general of Jiandao to the foreign minster, no. 174, 14 February 1936, "Sorenpō naisei kankei zassan. Kyokutō roryō kankei," vol. 3, *JFMA*, pp. 2041–2047.

104. See Kim's short biography, *O Vladimire Il'iche Lenine. Vospominaniia 1900–1922 gody*, p. 628.

105. See another short biography, *Vospominaniia o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine*, vol. 5 (Moskva, 1970), pp. 501–502.

106. Report of the vice-consul of Heiho to the foreign minister, no. 307, 10 July 1936, "Sorenpō naisei kankei zassan. Kyokuto roryō kankei," vol. 3, *JFMA*, pp. 2278–2279.

107. Hayashi, *Kantōgun to kyokutō Sorengun*, p. 79.

108. Report of the consul general of Vladivostok to the foreign minister, no. 33, 16 September 1936, "Sorenpō naisei kankei zassan. Kyokuto roryō kankei," vol. 3, *JFMA*, pp. 2323–2325.

109. *Pravda*, 20–26 November 1936; *Izvestiia*, 20–26 November 1936.

110. J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 132–133.

111. *Soueto renpō jijō* 8, no. 1 (1937), pp. 359–160.

112. G. S. Liushkov, "Kyokuto sekigun ron" [The red army of the Far East], *Kaizō* 1939, no. 9, pp. 148–149.

113. *Sorenpō jūyō jikoshi*, 1937, p. 110.

114. I. Volodin, "Inostrannyi shpionazh na Sovetskom Dal'nem Vostoke," *Pravda*, 23 April 1937.

115. *Sorenpō jūyō jikoshi*, 1937, supplement, p. 18; and "Zashchitniki trotskistsko-iapono-germanskikh shpionov i diversantov," *Pravda*, 22 May 1937.

116. *Sorenpō jūyō jikoshi*, 1937, supplement, p. 18.

117. *Soueto renpō jijō* 8, no. 1 (1936–1937), pp. 360–361.

118. Liushkov, "Kyokuto sekigun ron," p. 149.

119. Alvin D. Coox, "L'affaire Liushkov," *Soviet Studies* XIX, no. 3 (January 1968), p. 408.

120. Hayashi, *Kantōgun to kyokutō Sorengun*, pp. 110–111.

121. See Liushkov, "Kyokuto sekigun ron," pp. 150–151.

122. "Podryvnaia rabota iaponskoi razvedki," *Pravda*, 9 July 1937, p. 4.

123. Kim wrote only that the Korean theater which had been in the Maritime Province moved to Kzyl Orda in 1937 (*Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, pp. 224–225).

124. "Ekkyo Senjin Kin Ki-ko chōsa hōkoku" [Report about Kim Ki-

hong, Korean who came over the border], 1–2, *Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Official Archives*, microfilm R. 108 (T773–774), 18578–18590.

125. R. Ikeda, "Chōsenjin no kyōsei iju mondai" [The forced migration of Koreans], *Gekkan Roshia* [Monthly Russia], no. 34 (April 1938), pp. 39–40.

126. Ibid., p. 40.

127. G. S. Liushkov, "Soren shakaishugi hihan" [I criticize Soviet socialism], *Gekkan Roshia*, 1939, no. 5, p. 50.

128. *Pravda*, 20 December 1937, p. 4.

129. Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 39.

130. *Asahi shinbun*, 7 December 1937.

131. *Izvestiia*, 28 November 1937, p. 6.

132. Report of the chief of the police section of Buen Prefecture, no. 36, 2 August 1938, "Sorenpō naisei kankei zassan. Kyokuto roryō kankei," vol. 3, *JFMA*, pp. 2896–2900.

133. Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*, p. 121.

134. Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 221.

Soviet Koreans and Their Culture in the USSR

YOUN-CHA SHIN CHEY

AT A MEETING on December 21, 1982, commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yuri Andropov, the late general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), spoke on the nationality issue in the USSR. He reiterated the policy of the CPSU regarding the nationality question and acclaimed the success of this policy as manifested in the formation of socialist federalism and a new historical community of the Soviet people. This community of *Sovetskii narod*, Andropov pointed out, includes "millions of Germans, Poles, Koreans, and others for whom the Soviet Union long ago became a homeland and who are themselves full-fledged Soviet citizens." Andropov added, however, that nationality problems still remained to be solved, for the "end goal is not only to bring the nationalities together but to fuse them." He stressed that the completion of this unfinished work had to be the basic intent of the efforts of the Party.[1]

The Soviet Union comprises over 270 million people, from dynamically varied national groups. There are 104 officially recognized nationalities and 130 languages are spoken within the USSR's borders, which span eleven time zones and contain 8.6 million square miles. Koreans have been a part of this demographic constituency since the mid-nineteenth century. However, despite the size of the Korean population and its significant con-

tributions to the building of Soviet society, very little has been written about Koreans in the Soviet Union.

A comprehensive study of Soviet Koreans and Korean culture in the USSR would require systematic research and extensive field work. Given the inherent limitation on data available on the subject outside the Soviet Union, this chapter can only be an introductory attempt to study the impact of Soviet institutions on the patterns of socioeconomic development of Soviet Koreans, particularly those in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and to examine the effects of government policy on Korean culture in the Soviet Union. Brief profiles of selected Soviet Koreans have been compiled to illustrate how some Koreans have come to participate in and contribute to Soviet society; these profiles appear at the end of this article.

I. History of Soviet Koreans

Koreans living in the Soviet Union have traditionally identified themselves either as *Koryŏ saram* [People from Koryŏ] or as *Chosŏn saram* [People from Chosŏn], but the ethnic name *Sovetskie Koreitsy* [Soviet Koreans] has become more widely used over the last two decades. The use of *Sovetskie Koreitsy* rather than *Koryŏ saram* or *Chosŏn saram*, serves two purposes. It distinguishes Soviet Koreans from Koreans living in other parts of the world, and the Koreans who lived under the Tsar from Koreans in the USSR. The name thus emphasizes Soviet commitment to its nationality policy. Soviet ethnographer R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova argues for the appropriateness of this newly adopted name as follows:

> In this widely spread notion is expressed the change in customs and consciousness in the economic, political, and cultural life of the Koreans, whose fate has been mingled with the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus the ethnic name *Sovetskie Koreitsy* most fully expresses the result of a complex process in the formation and creation of a new ethnic community.[2]

This change in name reflects the unique history of the Korean immigrants, a history which can be divided into two dis-

tinct periods involving two very different locales: 1) Koreans in the Russian Far East Region (South Ussuri Region) from the 1860s until the time of the mass relocation of Koreans to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the late 1930s; and 2) Koreans from 1937 to the present.

1. The Tsarist Era

The Russian empire acquired the virtually uninhabited lands of the Far East Region—350,000 square miles of territory with only about 15,000 inhabitants—from China in 1860 under terms of the Treaty of Peking. The territory stretched between the Ussuri and Amur Rivers and the Pacific Ocean and included the Maritime Province. This newly secured boundary placed Russia at the back door of Korea, and this new geographic proximity prompted the development of relations between the two countries.

For the ten years following the initial Korean immigration in 1863, the regional administration was tolerant of the Korean presence in Russia. Koreans provided cheap labor for this sparsely inhabited land, working as *arendatory* [tenants, lessees] and *batraki* [farm laborers]. Those without any means of support were sent by order of the local Russian administration to various parts of the region along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers. For example, through government relocation, the first large Korean village, Blagoslovennoe, was formed along the Samarka River in 1872. Thus even from the very beginning, the formation of Korean settlements was not a purely natural process; the Tsarist administration played a part in their placement, using this new resource to its advantage.[3]

In 1888 Russia finally made an agreement with Korea that dealt with the immigration issue and restricted the mounting influx of Koreans, who by this time were also arriving by sea from the southern reaches of the Korean peninsula. According to the agreement, Russian citizenship was granted to Koreans who had crossed the border before June 25, 1884, when formal diplomatic relations were established by the signing of a treaty of commerce. This accounted for about 20 to 30 percent of all Koreans in Russia, most of whom later became merchants, kulaks, or *podriadchiki* [contractors]. The remainder were either

aliens who had come to Russia with a visa or illegal aliens without passports. Those under 12 or over 60, who were ineligible for work, were prohibited from immigration. In 1893 the regional governor general, Dukhovskoi, began accepting Koreans as citizens, allocating some land for them in order to colonize sparsely settled areas and implement the policy of Russification. Just thirty years later, the 1923 census counted 34,559 Koreans as Russian subjects and 72,258 as noncitizen residents.

Initially Korean peasants and laborers emigrated mostly for economic reasons. However, after the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and the unsuccessful March First Uprising in 1919, Koreans fled to Russia for political reasons as well. The last major wave of immigration occurred between 1917 and 1923, with the majority of these new arrivals settling in the Maritime Province.[4]

The Tsarist regimes were ambivalent on the Korean question. Government indecision meant that policy depended largely upon the discretion of individual local administrators, who had to consider several conflicting factors. The Koreans did represent cheap farm labor. More than 80 percent of the Koreans in Russia were *batraki*, and they assisted Russia's agricultural development, especially in the Pos'et area. Unlike the Chinese, who often returned to China with their earnings, the Koreans kept their money in the region. In addition Koreans became a source of revenue through the issuance of passports and the collecting of registration fees. N. M. Przheval'skii considered Korean immigration to Russia to be a notable phenomenon in the Far East and wrote that the Korean character was marked by obedience, politeness, and hard work.[5] On the other hand, the presence of a significant number of foreigners without legal status was disturbing, and the use of land by Korean leaseholders meant a resultant loss of work for Russian farmers. Thus administrators were faced with the task of maximizing the exploitation of cheap Korean labor while avoiding possible repercussions should that Korean community establish itself economically and thus threaten others.

To solve that problem the Tsarist governments proposed a policy of Russification of Koreans. Acceptance of Russian Orthodox Christianity was a prerequisite for naturalization, and

citizenship was required to gain the right to receive an allotment of land. But this attempt to assimilate Koreans into the Russian social order did not succeed. Instead the continuing flow of Koreans and the clustering of new arrivals brought about the formation of Korean villages, as those who came first paved the way for relatives and friends. This growth served to reinforce Korean culture and values within the Korean community. In fact, Governor General Unterberger, despairing of the Koreans ever being successfully Russified, argued:

> Although some have accepted Christian Orthodoxy, this is only superficial in appearance, for the majority of Koreans do not know the language. . . . The fact that Koreans are striving to settle on the land permanently and do not avail themselves of assimilation and that they are creating within Russia their own community is essentially harmful.[6]

Unterberger's policy was to deny Russian nationality to the Koreans, and as a result the majority remained landless.

2. *The October Revolution*

The October Revolution was welcomed by the many landless Koreans as a way to improve or settle the land question. In 1900 Korean workers had joined Russians in a strike in the Amur Region and later participated in the revolution of 1905–07. In October 1917 Korean peasants even formed Red Army detachments and actively participated in partisan activities, fighting alongside Russian units. The Korean military detachment headed by Hong Pŏm-do is an example of such a unit.[7] There were others, and M. T. Kim has compiled a list of Korean revolutionaries who fought for the establishment of a Soviet government in the Far East.[8] However, the Revolution did not immediately improve their lot. It was only after 1923 that the new Soviet regime began to regulate the dispersal of land among the peasants. By 1926 in Vladivostok alone 10,007 Korean families had acquired property, while before the revolution, the number of households with land had totalled only 2,290. In fact by 1926 a majority of the Koreans who had settled in the Soviet Far East had received Soviet citizenship, a prerequisite for obtaining land, and land was essential for the rice cultivation

initiated by Korean peasants on the Ussuri plain, by Lake Khanka.

Rice was sown for the first time in the Maritime Province in 1917 by Koreans who had brought the seeds from Korea. Since the Koreans were successful rice growers, production rapidly increased. In addition to rice, silkworm breeding was introduced to the region by Koreans. More than 210,000 mulberry tree saplings were brought into the Nikol'sk-Ussuriiskii and Vladivostok Regions. Koreans also grew beans, barley, and maize, and a small number worked in the fishing and lumber industries. During the late 1920s and early 1930s the sizeable settlement by Koreans thus made an important contribution to agricultural development in the Far East Region, especially on the Ussuri-Khanka plain, by struggling on lands previously thought unsuitable for farming. However, their hard work and effort went unrewarded, when in 1937 all 182,000 Koreans in the area were ordered relocated to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

3. The Soviet Era

The 1979 census provides an official list of all individuals in the Soviet Union who identified their nationality as Korean; the total comes to 389,000.[9] Unofficial sources, however, estimate the actual figure to be twice that. This discrepancy may have two sources. First, a Soviet citizen of Korean descent may choose to be classified as a non-Korean at the age of 16. In most cases a child will take the citizenship of his father. For example, a child of a mixed marriage between a Russian father and Korean mother will usually specify in his passport that his nationality is Russian. Second, in order to avoid heavy taxes, in some cases not all household members are registered.

More than a century after the first thirteen families had settled in the South Ussuri Region, the number of Koreans in the Soviet Union has risen to about 750,000. Even the official census data reveals the growth of the Korean population.[10]

1907	*1923*	*1959*	*1970*	*1979*
46,430*	106,817	314,000	357,000	389,000

*62,000 if nonregistered Koreans are included, according to Anosov[11]

Kazakhstan and Central Asia are now the home of the majority of Koreans, as more than two-thirds live in that area. Of course they did not become residents of Central Asia by choice. Rather, under Joseph Stalin, they were the victims of a forced relocation from the Maritime Province.

The Koreans survived the ordeal of being forcibly transplanted thousands of miles from their original homeland to a territory totally alien to Korea, to what was formerly the Turkestan and Steppe Regions and Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. They became the pioneers of this virgin land. In 1959 Koreans numbered 213,000 in Central Asia, and by 1970 had increased to over 250,000. The nonindigenous Koreans constitute but one of over one hundred nationalities found in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. They are the ethnic group most recently arrived in the area, and the one with the least established local tradition.

When Koreans found themselves in the totally foreign environment of Central Asia, they once again had to begin cultivating undeveloped territory. In 1937–38 a collective farm, *Politotdel*, was organized in the Tashkent region by Koreans under Kim Suk Bon [Kim Sŏk-bŏm] (1890–1969). Other well-known collective farms run by Koreans in the Tashkent Region include: *Poliarnaia Zvezda*, under Kim Byung Hwa [Kim Pyŏng-hwa] (1905–1974), and *Pravda* and *Leninskii Put'*. In Kzyl Orda can be found the *Third International* and *Avangard*, headed by Choi Kwon Hak [Ch'oe Kwŏn-hak], Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan. In the Tselinograd region there is *18 let Kazakhstana*, under Kang Tae Han [Kang Tae-han], Third Deputy to the Union of Collective Farmers. In 1957, in the Kungradskii Region of Uzbekistan, the first state farm, *Raushan*, was established and was modeled after the Korean collective farms.[12] On these collective and state farms, Koreans engaged in cultivating rice on virgin soil, as well as growing cotton, corn, sugar beets, vegetables, and fiber crops (kenaf).[13] Koreans also acquired a knowledge of animal husbandry from the local inhabitants. In Uzbekistan alone, more than one hundred ethnic Korean farmers have been honored as *Heroes of the Work of Socialism*.

In spite of the severe hardships, Korean farmers made significant contributions to the development of agriculture and

the improvement of economic life in the barren lands of Central Asia. Korean labor systematically increased the collective fund, which made possible the establishment on the collective farms of schools, clubs, nursery schools, kindergartens, hospitals, libraries, drugstores, and homes with electricity, radio, and television. The *Politotdel* manages a restaurant named after the famous Korean dish ***kuksu*** [noodles], as well as stores, a trade center, a hotel, and even a soccer team.[14] The children of these collective farms receive their higher education in the area's technical institutes. According to Dzharylgasinova, in the Samarkand Region of Uzbekistan, a large number of Koreans work in biochemical and phosphate factories and in the Communist Party apparatus. There is both an intelligentsia providing teachers, doctors, agronomists, and engineers, and a technically trained pool including mechanics, bookkeepers, metal workers, and drivers.[15] The Soviet Koreans once again have built and renewed their economic lives with their bare hands as tools. Their efforts support the notion that Koreans were born to love the land.

II. Korean Culture

This description of life among Koreans on collective farms is based primarily on studies by Dzharylgasinova and Ionova, who conducted field work at various collective farms and villages in Kzyl Orda, Tashkent, Fergana, Alma Ata, and Samarkand, and at Raushan State Farm during the period between 1957 and 1974. Additional information comes from an immigrant to the United States from Soviet Central Asia.

1. Customs

The data reveal that much of their material culture has been retained by Soviet Koreans. Their daily life on the collective and state farms reflects this heritage. They reportedly eat the traditional fare of rice and ***kimchi*** on a *papsang* (a low serving table) and eschew dairy products. Typical Korean favorites like ***tubu*** and ***ttŏk*** are prepared from scratch. The customary family celebrations, such as an infant's first birthday, wedding rituals, and the sixtieth birthday celebration are regularly observed. The family is monogamous with numerous children. The Koreans

living in the villages are still endogamous. A survey taken by M. Pak at *Politotdel* revealed 30 mixed marriages out of 560 families, a total of 5.4 percent.[16] The most frequent mixture is a Korean man married to a Russian woman. It is noted, however, that in the cities mixed marriages occur more frequently, involving youth who have attended institutions of higher education or served in the military. The Confucian world view is maintained by the older generation, and some remnants of shamanism are found in the villages.

2. Names

Within a family, the Korean style of name giving is maintained. Children of the same generational line have names with a common first or second syllable. For example, parents Yun Morbei and Tatiana would give their sons and daughters names beginning with the same phonetic sound *v*, such as Valery, Vladimir, Varya, and Vissarion, thus indicating membership in one family. Names of first generation Soviet Koreans consist of only two parts, the family name and a given name, as in Kim Alexandr, and lack the familiar Russian practice of employing the patronymic as middle name. Also, family names are frequently kept first as in Korea, where family names precede given names. Third and fourth generation Koreans, however, now take the patronymic, following accepted Russian practice. As in Korea, many women keep their maiden names after marriage. Dzharylgasinova found that out of twenty-three marriages, only five women adopted the family names of their husbands. The Korean custom of prohibiting marriage between two persons from the same clan is also strictly observed among Soviet Koreans.

3. Housing

Another remnant of Korean culture is seen in their housing. The Korean-style house, with room arrangements of kitchen, *utkan*, and *marubang*, and the traditional home heating system of *p'odan* on an *ondol* floor, is characteristic of Korean homes on the collective farms. The installation of *ondol* flooring, the unique Korean heating sytem, clearly indicates that the Koreans built their homes themselves, based on a pattern familiar to them. Even city dwellers include a room arranged in the tradi-

tional Korean manner, for older family members. This *ondol* room is the center around which family life revolves. In addition, houses are kept spotlessly clean.

4. Clothing

Though most Koreans wear typical modern clothing, there is not a family that does not boast some example of the traditional *hanbok* dress. Women will frequently favor the Korean skirt called *ch'ima* and sleeveless jacket, or *tunggŏri*, a restyled *chogori* which men also wear.[17] At big family celebrations such as birthdays, marriages, and anniversaries, women wear traditional clothes. On the whole, however, *hanbok* is worn in public only occasionally, even by the elderly, and the color is usually the basic white. It is treasured and saved to be worn on one's deathbed.

5. Language

The Korean language is spoken, studied, and printed in the Soviet Union. There is a newspaper called *Renin kich'i* [Lenin's banner]. Started in 1938, it was originally published for the Koreans in the Kzyl Orda district and had a circulation of 5,000. Since 1960 it has been printed five times a week and distributed to other republics, and has a circulation of more than 135,000.[18] Twice a month the paper provides a literary page, printing the work of Soviet Korean writers. Almost every household subscribes to *Renin kich'i.* Another Korean language newspaper, *Leninskii Put'* [The way of Lenin], is published in Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

In 1971 a local publishing house in Kazakhstan, Zhazushy, published *Pod Solntsem Oktiabria* [Under the October sun], a collection of poems and stories by Korean writers; in 1973 *Bagul'nik v stepi* [Marsh tea in the steppes], a collection of poems by nineteen poets of Kazakhstan, was published; and in 1975 *Melodii Syrdar'i* [The melodies of Syr Dar'ya] appeared. According to Dzharylgasinova, on the local level some fifty Soviet Korean writers and poets, many of whom are members of the Soviet Writers' Union, write in Korean and their efforts are printed in Tashkent, Alma Ata, Kzyl Orda, and Sakhalin in the Far East. Literary works by Soviet Koreans are diverse in form:

a novel by Kim Chun, *The Korean Pinetree*, was translated into Russian in 1974; there are short stories by Kim Kwang-hyun and Han Sang-uk; and poetry by Anatolii Han, Ugai Deguk, and Kim Chin-sun, whose collected poems were translated into Russian in 1975.[19] Also there is much written on folklore, legends, proverbs, and tales of historical figures. It is, however, uncertain how many of these works are in circulation. The limited number of copies printed would not make these books easily available to the general public.

The founding of the Korean Theater contributed to the wide use of the Korean language. This regional theater was formed in Vladivostok in 1932 and featured amateur performances of Korean plays. After the mass relocation, it reopened in the city of Kzyl Orda, remaining there from 1937 to 1941. It moved to Ushtobe from 1942 to 1959, when it returned to Kzyl Orda for ten years. In 1968 it moved to Alma Ata and became known as the Korean Theater of the Republic. In addition to many translated works by Russian and European playwrights, including *Othello* by Shakespeare, *The Enemy* by Gorky, and Gogol's *Inspector General*, Korean national classics such as *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, *Simch'ŏngjŏn*, and *Hŭngbu wa nolbu* were produced, as were new plays on contemporary themes written by local playwrights. More than seventy plays have been created by Soviet Korean writers. The theater also maintains an ensemble called *Arirang* that makes a regular tour of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.[20] "You do not realize how many Koreans there are until the Korean Theater comes to town for a performance," a Soviet Korean from Central Asia told me.

The study of the Korean language by Soviet Koreans is carried out on two different levels: at local schools and at higher institutes for academic research. Following the education reform of 1923, the Korean language was permitted to be the medium of instruction on a limited scale . At that time the Soviet government was intent upon reaching all the nationalities in their native languages so that the country could be organized and all peoples indoctrinated in Party policy. Solzhenitsyn writes that, "In the twenties, all those minority languages were encouraged; it was endlessly dinned into the Crimea that it was Tatar, Tatar, and nothing but Tatar; it even had the Arabic alphabet, and all

the signs were in Tatar. Then it turned out that this was... all a mistake,"[21] and detracted from the government's need to unify all Soviet citizens under a single cultural and linguistic mantle.

Under the Soviet Union's language policy, in republics such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, instruction in schools occurs in the republic's native language and Russian is taught as the second language. Korean children learn their native language in a Korean school on the collective farms, but only where Koreans have a recognized presence. In 1975 there were reportedly fourteen middle schools, with more than two thousand students, offering Korean language courses. Teachers of Korean receive their training at the Tashkent Teachers' Institute. However, in most middle schools, the Korean language is not taught because there is not enough of a demand for it. Because of the importance of the knowledge of Russian in Soviet society, Soviet Koreans send their children to study in schools that use Russian as the language of instruction, rather than to republic schools. This is in sharp contrast to Tsarist times when, despite the outlawing of foreign languages, Koreans organized schools in the Far East region to promote the continued use of Korean. But the need in modern times to gain access to society and its major institutions has produced a new priority.

In printed media, schools, and theaters, the Korean literary language is used, which is quite distinct from the language spoken at home or in general conversation.[22] A large number of Koreans in Central Asia and Kazakhstan speak a northeastern dialect of Korean. Spoken Korean is also characterized by the presence of many loan words from Russian and also from the Uzbek and Kazakh languages. The non-Korean phonemes *l* and *f* and the tendency to form hybrid words, as in the combination of Russian nouns with the Korean verb *ha-da*, occur frequently. In addition most Koreans in Uzbekistan have a good colloquial command of Uzbek, which the young and middle-aged have studied in classrooms. All Koreans except the really aged and the very young know Russian well. They learn it at school and it has become their second language. There has even been a noticeable Russian language impact on the vocabulary and syntax of Korean.[23]

According to the 1970 census, Korean was the first language of an overwhelming majority of Soviet Koreans.

Republic	Number of Koreans	Korean as First Language	
		Population	Percentage
Uzbekistan	147,538	108,483	74
Kazakhstan	81,598	52,218	64
Kirgiz	9,404	6,067	64
Tadzik	8,490	5,825	69
Turkmen	3,493	2,549	73[24]

The 1979 census data, however, reports that only 55.4 percent of the 389,000 Koreans consider Korean their native language, while 47.7 percent consider Russian their second language.[25] This data reveals that in one decade there was a significant drop in the number of Koreans who considered Korean their native language and that nearly half the total Korean population in the USSR speaks Russian as a second language. This decrease in the knowledge of Korean among Soviet Koreans, however, is in juxtaposition to the Soviet government's increased interest in Korean studies at higher institutions.

6. Korean Studies

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the international struggle for domination of the Korean peninsula stimulated Russia's interest in the study of Korea. In 1899 the *Vostochnyi Institut*, the first institute to study Korea, was established in Vladivostok.[26] Russian diplomats, geographers, and other scientists made expeditions to Korea that were of great importance to the future development of Korean studies. N. IA. Bichurin's monumental three-volume work, *Opisanie Korei* [Description of Korea], published in 1900, and N. V. Kiuner's *Ocherki Korei* [Essays on Korea] made a significant contribution toward understanding Korea, which had long been isolated from the outside world. But such studies dealt with only the most general information.

After the October Revolution, Korean studies in the USSR can be divided into two major periods: 1917 to 1939 and 1945 to the present. During the first period, numerous articles and pamphlets, *Novyi Vostok* and *Tikhii Okean* for example, were

produced, primarily in Leningrad. They were devoted mostly to Korea's struggle for independence and revolution. By 1939, under Stalin's regime, research on Korea in the USSR was practically discontinued. Only after World War II, with the transfer of the Institute of Oriental Studies from Leningrad to Moscow, and especially since the establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea, did Soviet Korean studies enter a new stage of development. The Twentieth Party Congress played an important role in the history of Soviet Korean studies. As a result of decisions made at this Congress, a section on Japan and Korea was created in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Scientific research on Korea, its history, economics, linguistics, and literature is now carried out in Moscow and Leningrad.[27] In addition, the ethnography of the Korean people is studied at the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Leningrad the Anthropology and Ethnography Museum has on permanent exhibition a collection of representative items from Korea, including traditional objects of daily Korean life, such as clothing, utensils, ornaments, applied art work, and Korean porcelain.

The newly published *Biblografiia Korei, 1917–1970* contains an extensive list of books and articles on Korean history, literature, and language, but very little material relating to the lives of Koreans in the USSR.[28] I. S. Kazakevich points out that 80 percent of the work by Soviet Korean specialists concentrates on contemporary problems of North Korea.[29] Aside from selections on Marxism and Leninism and some translated Russian classics, the quantity of publications in Korean is minimal.

III. Koreans and Soviet Nationality Policy

Koreans in the USSR do not form any administrative unit, unlike other ethnic groups who reside in native territories now classified as republics or autonomous regions. This lack of political support within the Soviet power structure places them at a disadvantage. The Uzbek SSR, for example, advances the interests of Uzbeks but not of Koreans. The lack of official administrative support hastens the assimilation of Soviet Koreans, since there remains no alternative to assimilation in seeking the

opportunity to gain recognition and participate in decision-making processes that can affect their economic welfare. The Korean dilemma is that the policy of the republics to encourage an appreciation of individual ethnic heritage does not literally apply to Koreans, who are without a republic of their own. The Koreans' will to survive regardless of the hardships imposed upon them by the system has influenced Soviet Koreans to favor assimilation and has made them achievement oriented.

Dzharylgasinova describes three basic tendencies as characteristic of the developmental process of the Korean community in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: development of its national tradition; adoption of the Russian language and culture; and adoption of other cultural elements of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.[30] The assimilation of Koreans into neighboring non-Korean cultures is minimal, but what is most apparent is the adoption of material items for general use. For example, in place of traditional Korean clothing, Soviet Koreans often wear Uzbek clothes and men enjoy wearing the Central Asian *tiubeteika* [skullcap]. The close contact between Koreans and the neighboring Kazakhs over the past four decades has resulted in strong ties between them. It is reported that 535 Koreans in Kazakhstan acknowledge the Kazakh language as their native language.[31] Korean names are often transformed by adding the suffix -gai, as in Ko-gai or U-gai. However, the assimilation of Koreans into neighboring non-Russian cultures is also minimal. The 1979 census notes that only 2.2 percent of the total Korean population lists languages other than Russian as their second language, whereas 47.7 percent consider themselves bilingual in Russian and Korean.

During Stalin's administration, the policy of cultural proletarianization had assumed the form of Russification, which enforced the compulsory study of Russian in non-Russian schools. Although at the present time there exists as a thrust of Soviet nationality policy an effort for multilingual development of each of the republics, the importance of the Russian language was reemphasized by Andropov in his December 21, 1982, speech. "The Russian language, which has naturally entered the life of millions of people of every nationality, is a factor of exceptional

importance in the country's economic, political, and cultural life, in the drawing together of all its nations and nationalities."[32] Russian is not only the native language of the Russian ethnic group but also the interethnic language of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government promotes this spread of Russian within the USSR as a means of unifying ethnic groups into "the *Sovetskii narod*."

Thus, education in the Soviet Union has become a formidable instrument, even more so politically than culturally. Russian is taught as the second language to all non-Russian graduates of secondary schools and institutes of higher education. Mastering Russian, as well as developing the proper political outlook, are prerequisites for career advancement. However much importance is attached to the development of national languages, it is still Russian that is considered the medium of higher education. Since Korean is not an officially sanctioned language, more Koreans living in cities than in villages consider Russian their native language. In Uzbekistan, out of 85,417 city dwellers, 57,988 (67.9 percent) consider Korean their native language, and 27,380 (32.1 percent) consider Russian to be native. By contrast, out of 62,121 village dwellers, 50,492 (81.2 percent) regard Korean as their native language, and only 11,593 (18.7 percent) regard Russian as their native tongue.[33]

In 1959 more than 70 percent of the Koreans living in Central Asia lived in rural areas, but according to the 1970 census data, 59.9 percent lived in cities. This shift to urban areas, in evidence since the 1960s, is a unique phenomenon, not witnessed among other nationalities in Central Asia. In 1970, 58 percent of the Koreans in Uzbekistan lived in cities, as compared to 20 percent in 1959. It was 62 percent in Tashkent Region, 64 percent in Kirgiz Union Republic, 89.8 percent in Tadzhik Union Republic, and 71.7 percent in Turkmen Republic.[34] Two factors account for this trend in interregional and even interrepublic migration by Soviet Koreans: achievement in education among young Koreans in preparation for technical jobs and success in entering higher educational institutions where mastery of Russian is required; and mobility derived from improvement of economic circumstances. Solzhenitsyn writes:

> The Koreans prospered even more in Kazakhstan—but of course they had been exiled earlier, and by the fifties were already in large measure emancipated from serfdom: they were no longer required to report, and they traveled freely from oblast to oblast, provided they did not cross the borders of the republic. They did not excel as good home builders or husbandmen (their homes and steadings were uncomfortable and primitive until the younger people became Europeanized); but they responded very well to education, quickly filled the educational institutions of Kazakhstan (no one put obstacles in their way during the war), and became the main component of the educated stratum in the republic.[35]

Many Koreans have managed to establish themselves economically in spite of the obstacles they have encountered. An unofficial source reports that even today Koreans lease land from the collective farms and with much hard work succeed in exceeding planned production figures. This entitles them to market their excess amount for a profit. "*Koreitsy zhivut khorosho*" [Koreans live well], confirms V. S. Starikov, former professor at the Institute of Ethnography in Leningrad.[36] According to Dzharylgasinova, the percentage of Koreans with considerable education is very high. Many have positions in the institutes of union republic academies, teach at universities, or are recipients of degrees in higher education.[37]

As a result of urbanization and industrialization, a group of professionals and local elites has emerged, and ethnic intermarriage has increased as Korean doctors, teachers, technicians, and engineers pursue their careers in urban settings. It is noted that engineers, scientists, and the technically modernized elite are more likely than humanists to be susceptible to assimilation and Sovietization.[38] The fact that many Korean professionals are scientists is significant in analyzing the extent of the assimilation of Koreans under the Soviet nationality policy. In fact, it must be asked whether Sovietization is occurring among Koreans in the USSR with such speed that there exists the risk of the eventual loss of the Koreans' ethnic identity. There is no doubt that a new generation of Soviet Koreans, strongly Russian in character, is being reared, beginning in nursery schools and continuing within the confines of Soviet institutions. This cultural development

is in accordance with the policy of eliminating the complexities of multinationalism and creating a homogeneous nationwide Soviet culture.

This process of assimilation is necessitated by practical considerations, but is opposed by an inherent will to preserve the ethnic identity of the old culture. Paula Rubel writes that there is a kind of inertia and conservatism about ethnicity and national identity.[39] Many graduates of higher education forgo obtaining a diploma and prefer to return to the collective farms to perform hard manual labor on leased land, in a quest for economic betterment and mental satisfaction. Frustration with the system's operation and disappointment with unequal opportunities are the reasons most cited for the reverse flight from city jobs to the farm. Sensitive positions, related to national defense for example, are not open to Soviet Koreans, and access to reputable institutions of higher learning is difficult as certain percentages are allocated to preferred applicants. Though it is not the expressed policy of the Soviet government, it is widely recognized that admission to Moscow State University, for example, is based on priority designations, with first priority given to foreigners, second to the children of the elite, and third to students from the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. Only then are the remaining slots divided among the rest of the USSR.

The decision to opt for the rural life signifies a yearning for one's home and land, to replenish one's mind and soul with the familiar nourishment of one's native culture. It is worth remembering that for nearly two decades during the Stalin era Koreans lived in an enclosed boundary on collective farms. It is only since 1956, after the death of Stalin and with new policies under Khrushchev, that they have been allowed to leave that area. This unique circumstance presented Koreans with the need to sustain themselves through strengthening the support derived from close kin relationships and their cultural heritage.

The history of Korean immigration indicates that the multiplication pattern of chain settlements may apply to the case of continued urbanization. Korean ethnic identity will persist regardless of socioeconomic developments and changes in many aspects of daily and cultural life. A group may utilize the language of another group, adopt new dress or diet, participate in

political, economic, and educational institutions, and yet still maintain its spiritual make-up. Beliefs, values, and goals appear to be more durable than material traits.[40] There is evidence of assimilation taking place, but it remains a matter of speculation to what extent future generations of Koreans will become assimilated into the Russian mold. How enthusiastically ethnic Russians will accept the idea of assimilation is still another question for the future.

IV. Conclusion

Article 123 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union stipulates that "any kind of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of their racial or natural characteristics, and similarly, any encouragement of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred or neglect is punishable by law." Education under this nondiscriminatory legal framework serves as a means to Sovietize all nationalities, providing a communist upbringing and installing a correct worldview within all Soviet citizens. As the first generation of Korean settlers in Central Asia dies off, Koreans in the USSR are emerging as the products of the Soviet education system. During the twenty-year blackout from 1937 to 1956, Korean farmers, dislocated but not by choice from the Russian Far East, toiled in a barren wilderness, cultivating not only crops but also a future generation of Soviet Korean professionals. Mastery of Russian and diplomas from technical institutes paved the way for the move from collective farms to the city. Education and urbanization facilitated assimilation of Koreans into Soviet, essentially Russian, culture, and encouraged ethnic intermarriage. This new trend has resulted in the slow growth of the Korean population. The low birth rate is attributed to increased education and urbanization.[41] Indeed Kh. S. Salimov notes that for the ten-year period from 1959 to 1970 the total Korean population in the USSR had a growth rate of only 2 percent.[42]

The declared goal of the Soviet Union is a culture which is national in form but socialist in content and a society that fuses all nationalities. This goal involves the embracing of a national culture through assimilation, although by constitutional stipulation no minority is to be neglected. At the end of the nineteenth

century, it was suggested that because of their character Koreans were resisting assimilation. During the past century, Koreans have been drawn in opposite directions in this regard. On the one hand, their initially clustered living pattern and the subsequent restrictions on contact with outsiders nurtured the growth of Korean communities and strengthened their ethnic identity. The traditions of the old culture, customs, and manners are preserved even today wherever Koreans live, both in villages and cities. On the other hand, since 1956 Koreans have gained freedom of mobility and the opportunity to participate as Soviet citizens, and with no administrative and national support for their heritage they face difficulties in reinforcing their culture.

No means are provided by the government to promote particularly Korean literature, art, and music. There is no open cultural interaction with either North or South Korea to help in sustaining interest. As the older Koreans die, Soviet Koreans will be an important generation further removed from their roots. Their cultural inheritance and current patterns of life may in the future become more and more difficult to reconcile.

V. Selected Biographies of Soviet Koreans

Several Soviet Koreans have been selected here to suggest the many contributions made to Soviet society by descendants of the first group of families who left Korea for Tsarist Russia. The profiles are brief, but the variety of the fields covered demonstrates the richness of the Korean participation.

A. Agriculture Specialists

Kim Byung Hwa [Kim Pyŏng-hwa] (1905–1974)

Director of the collective farm *Poliarnaia Zvezda* for thirty years and twice recipient of the honor *Geroi Sotsialistichęskogo Truda*; his bronze bust is in the central courtyard of the collective farm. On July 27, 1974, the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party and the council of Ministers voted to rename the *Poliarnaia Zvezda* in his memory; also one of the village schools and a street in Tashkent were named after him. (*Sovetskii Kazakhstan*, 1970, p. 370)

Kim Man Sam [Kim Man-sam]

Korean farmers of the Kzyl Orda Region are well known for their expertise in rice production. Kim earned his reputation in 1943 when, on a field of two hectares, he managed to harvest 156 *tsentner* (1 *tsentner* = 100 kilograms) of rice. This established the world record and made rice from Kzyl Orda famous.

B. Academicians

Georgiy Fedorovich Kim

Born in 1924 in the Maritime Province to a peasant family, Kim graduated from Omsk Teachers Institute and earned a Doctor of Science degree. He is a leading Soviet authority on contemporary Korean history and headed the Department of Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences, where he has served as director since 1985. He has made notable contributions to Oriental studies: his research on the genesis of the Korean proletariat and the problems of socialist construction is widely recognized in Soviet academic circles. He is fluent in Korean. (S. D. Miliband, *Biobibliograficheskii slovar'sovetskikh vostokovedov*, p. 250)

Kim Fedor Zinov'evich

A linguist, Kim was born in a peasant family in the Pos'et District of the South Ussuri Region in 1918, graduating in 1942 from the history and philology department of Central Asia State University. He taught at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, was a scholar at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences (1956–58), and has over twenty published works. (Miliband, p. 251)

Miliband's biobibliographical dictionary also includes as academicians Boris Dmitrievich Pak and Mikhail Nikolaevich Pak. (p. 415)

C. Artists

Honored artists in the Soviet Union include Bong Do Choi [Ch'oe Pong-do] (Republic of Kazakhstan), Kyung Hee Yi [Yi Kyŏng-hŭi] (Uzbekistan), and I. F. Kim (director and artist from the Republic of Kirghiz). (*Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, vol. 13, p. 439)

Jang Choon Tai [Chang Chun-t'ae]

Jang is a member of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Republic of Kazakhstan. He wrote more than ten plays, including *Hong Bong Do* [*Hong Pŏm-do*], for the Korean National Theater. His "South of the Thirty-Eighth Parallel" was translated into Russian and successfully staged in Moscow, Leningrad, and Riga, and in theaters across the USSR. (*Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstan*, p. 581)

Choi En [Ch'oe Ŭn]

Choi is one of the founders and a long-time director of the Korean National Theater. He is a member of the Union of Soviet Writers and is a playwright and producer. (Dzharylgasinova, in *Etnicheskie protsessy u natsional'nykh grupp Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, p. 70)

D. Sports

Nelly Kim

Kim received three gold medals at the XXI Summer Olympics. A gymnast from Chimkent, Kazakhstan, she was born in 1957 to a father of Korean descent and a Tatar mother. Kim began learning gymnastics at school, and in 1975, while still a student, became European champion in free exercise competition. She is monolingual in Russian. (Ascertained from my interview with Ms. Kim in 1980 in Los Angeles)

E. Political Participants

Liubov Lee

Lee was brigade teacher of *Politotdel*, twice elected Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Republics (1962 and 1966), and is a member of the Communist Party.

Anatoly Kang

Kang, from Pravda Kolkhoz in Tashkent, was twice elected Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Republics (1970 and 1974), and is a member of the Communist Party. (Dzharylgasinova, p. 71)

F. Military

Soviet Korean patriots are remembered by Kim Syn Khva, who lists many Korean heroes who participated in World War II.

As evidence of their patriotic efforts in service of their country, he cites the many Koreans who demonstrated bravery in the Red Army. For example:

Alexandre Min

Before World War II, Min studied at the Credit-Planning Institute in Saratov, joined the army as a volunteer, and fought at the front against the Germans. He received the Order of the Red Star in 1943, and in 1944 the Order of Alexandr Nevskii, (Kim Syn Khva, p. 229)

G. A fourth generation Soviet Korean

Ksenia

Ksenia is a fourth generation Soviet Korean, born in Central Asia to a Korean father and Russian mother. Her grandfather, a merchant born in the Russian Far East Region, married a Korean. Ksenia's father, Ivan, was one of three sons born in Khabarovsk; he came to Central Asia with the family in 1937, leaving behind all family possessions. Ivan joined the Communist Party and worked as a party member. His wife had a job as a sewing woman. They had ten children, but only six survived; Ksenia was the fifth child. All six children have received diplomas and become professionals. The eldest brother is a teacher of Russian, earning approximately 270 rubles per month. Ksenia graduated from the Technical Institute in Tomsk and worked as an engineer in a glass factory, earning 210 rubles per month. She lived in a city apartment. (A house can cost 30,000 rubles, a car between 12,000 and 15,000 rubles, a pair of shoes 150 rubles, and a coat as much as 200 rubles). Of the six children, three are married to Koreans and three to Russians. All six of them, from a family that had ten children, have only one child each, although their grandmother admonished them to have more to continue the "rod" (family bloodline). Ksenia has fond memories of her grandmother, who prepared Korean dishes, told her many stories, and died when Ksenia was 12. Ksenia has seen her Korean costume, which she wore at her death. According to Ksenia, the majority of Soviet Koreans are economically well established. Many own homes and even cars, as she did before her immigration to the United States after her marriage. "*Koreits-*

ev uvazhaiut za trudoliubie" [Koreans are respected for their hard work]: she is vivid proof that the adage is true. (Information from interviews with the subject in San Francisco, 1983)

NOTES

1. "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR," *Soviet Life*, February 1983, pp. 2–5.

2. R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova, "Osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov u Koreitsev Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana" [Basic ethnic processes among the Koreans of Central Asia and Kazakhstan], in *Etnicheskie protsessy u natsional'nykh grupp Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* (Moskva: Nauka, 1980), p. 44.

3. Kim Syn Khva, *Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev* [Essays on the history of Soviet Koreans] (Alma Ata: Nauka, 1965), pp. 28–29. See also Wada in this volume.

4. S. D. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae" [Koreans in the Ussuri Region], *Knizhnoe Delo* (Khabarovsk, 1928), p. 8.

5. N. M. Przheval'skii, *Ocherki istorii Sibiri*, vyp. 2, (Irkutsk, 1971), p. 45.

6. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae," pp. 11–12.

7. Iu. V. Ionova, "Koreitsy" [Koreans], in *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* [The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan], ed. S. P. Tolstov (Moskva: Nauka 1963), p. 565.

8. M. T. Kim, *Koreiskie internatsionalisty v bor'be za vlasti sovetov na Dal'nem Vostoke* (Moskva: Nauka, 1979).

9. *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1980* (Moskva, 1981), p. 25.

10. *A Family of Peoples*, ed. Smith, p. 127.

11. Anosov, "Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae."

12. Ionova, "Koreitsy," pp. 565–67.

13. Ibid., pp. 47–48.

14. Dzharylgasinova, "Osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov u Koreitsev Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana," p. 53.

15. "The Koreans in Central Asia," *Central Asian Review* 3 (1967), p. 214.

16. Dzharylgasinova, "Traditsionnoe i novoe v semeinoi obriad-nosti Koreitsev Srednei Azii," in *Istoriia, Arkheologiia i etnografiia Srednei Azii* (Moskva: Nauka, 1968).

17. "The Koreans in Central Asia."

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34. Kh. S. Salimov, *Naselenie Srednei Azii* (Tashkent, 1975), pp. 103–104.

35. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, p. 401.

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Korean Minorities in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan

HIDESUKE KIMURA

KOREANS in the Soviet Union officially numbered 389,000 in 1979. Their immigration was due mainly to Japan's annexation of Korea and its suppression of the March First Movement. In 1937 the Koreans in the Soviet Far East had been forced to migrate to Central Asia and Kazakhstan by Stalin's order, in consequence of Japan's anti-Soviet foreign policy. After World War Two, with the occupation of South Sakhalin island by the Soviet Union, the more than 40,000 Koreans who had been sent there by the Japanese government became residents of the Soviet Union.

By comparison, Koreans in Japan numbered 667,325 in 1981; they comprised 84.5 percent of the 792,946 foreigners in Japan.

When discussing Soviet nationality policy, we must study the history of Korean immigration into Russia and compare the past and present circumstances of Koreans in the Soviet Union with those of Koreans in Japan.

I. Early Korean Immigration to Russia and the Soviet Union

Map 1 shows Korean settlements in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1926, although borders are shown as they are at present. At that time Kazakhstan was an autonomous republic in the Russian SSR. The Karakalpak ASSR is now part of Uzbekistan,

Map 1. Koreans in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1926



From E. V. Adrianov, *Materialy k istorichesko-etnograficheskomu atlasu srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* [Material for a historico-ethnographic atlas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan]

but in 1926 it was an autonomous oblast in Kazakhstan, and hence almost all Koreans in the USSR outside of the Far East were residents of Kazakhstan. Koreans in Kazakhstan in 1926 numbered 52,000, 0.8 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan, according to data in Egiazarian's study published in Erevan in 1965.[1] Egiazarian gives no data for Uzbekistan.

The Koreans in Central Asia and Kazakhstan migrated from the Soviet Far East after the mid-1920s and organized the first Korean kolkhoz in the suburbs of Tashkent.[2] Iu. V. Ionova claims that 167,400 Koreans lived in the Soviet Far East in 1926. Counting the 52,000 living in Kazakhstan, there was then a total of 220,000 Koreans in the Soviet Union. According to V. I. Kozlov[3] and the *East European and Soviet Data Handbook* edited by Shoup,[4] the Koreans in the Soviet Union numbered 87,000, a very low figure. In 1927 Walter Kolarz wrote in *The*

Peoples of the Soviet Far East that there were only 170,000 Koreans in the Soviet Union in 1927 according to official data, but that unofficially there were "at least 250,000."[5] I believe that Kolarz's "at least 250,000" is closest to being accurate.

Korean immigration into Russia began around 1860, when Russia obtained the lands to the east of the Ussuri River, and continued into the 1920s. Displaced by a crisis in Korean feudalism and by the intrusions of foreign capitalists, Koreans emigrated to the Russian Ussuri region and China. The famine of 1869–70 induced 6,500 Koreans to emigrate, and by 1897 the number of Koreans in Russia totalled 24,000. That number greatly increased after Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910.

During the Russian civil war (1917–23), the number of Koreans in the Soviet Far East increased from 64,000 to 106,000.[6] In 1925 almost all of the 120,000 Koreans in the Soviet Far East became Soviet citizens.[7] The Koreans concentrated in the Vladivostok *okrug*, where in 1926 they amounted to about one-quarter of the total population. The largest Korean communities lived in the Suchan district, to the east of Vladivostok, and in the Pos'et area, to the west of Vladivostok, adjoining the Korean and Manchurian borders. Several dozen Korean villages in that area were united into the "Korean National District." Some 95 percent of the population of the district were Koreans, and their principal occupations were rice farming, fishing, and logging. Until 1930 there were still more Koreans than Jews in the Jewish Autonomous Province,[8] which included 27,350 Russians, 3,200 Koreans, 3,000 Ukrainians, and 2,700 Jews.[9]

II. The Deportation to Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan

TABLE 1. NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF KAZAKH SSR
(in thousands and percents)

	1923		*1939*	*1959*		*1970*		*1979*	
Kazakhs	3,713	57.0	38.0	2,787	30.0	4,234	32.6	5,289	36.0
Russians	1,280	20.0	40.2	3,972	42.7	5,522	42.4	5,991	40.8
Ukrainians	861	13.2	10.8	761	8.2	934	7.2	898	6.1
Germans				659	7.1	858	6.6		
Tatars	81	1.2	1.7	192	2.1	288	2.2	313	2.1

TABLE 1 (cont.)

	1923		1939	1959		1970		1979	
Uzbeks	213	3.3	1.7	136	1.5	216	1.7	263	1.8
Belorussians	26	0.4	0.5	107	1.2	198	0.9	181	1.2
Uigurs	11	0.2	0.6	60	0.6	121	0.2	148	1.0
Koreans	52	0.8	1.6	74	0.8	82	0.6	92	0.6
Dungans	8	1.1	0.1	100	0.1	17	0.1	22	0.2
Azerbaizhans								73	0.5
Poles	4								
Total	6,503		6,082	9,295		13,009		14,684	

Kazakhskaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia [*Kazakh Soviet encyclopedia*] (Alma Ata, 1981), p. 289

According to the ratios in Table 1, taken from an encyclopedia published in Alma Ata in 1981, the number of Koreans in the Kazakh SSR in 1939 can be calculated at 97,000. Adding to this figure the 73,000 Koreans listed for the Uzbek SSR in Katz's *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, we obtain 170,000 as the total Korean population in the two republics.[10] R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova claims that the Korean population in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan was 182,000.[11] Kozlov says that there were 182,300 Koreans in the entire USSR.[12]

From these figures we can deduce the following:

1. By 1939 most of the Koreans in the Soviet Union, including almost all of the 167,400 Koreans that had been residing in the Soviet Far East in 1926, lived in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
2. The "at least 250,000" Koreans in the Soviet Union in 1926 had decreased to 180,000 thirteen years later.

We cannot find any explanation for these two points in Soviet literature. After stating that the Korean population in 1926 was 87,000, Kozlov concludes that this figure had doubled by 1939; he explains this increase as being due to new groups of Koreans immigrating to Soviet Central Asia, mainly Uzbekistan, and to South Kazakhstan, for the development of the rice crop.[13]

In fact, the Koreans in the Soviet Far East were deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1937, because the Soviet government doubted their loyalty following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

In July 1941, immediately following the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union, the German ASSR on the Volga was dissolved. From the end of 1943 to the spring of 1944, the Kalmyk, Karachai, Chechen, Ingushi, and Balkar autonomous republics and oblasts were dissolved, and members of these national groups were deported en masse to Siberia and Central Asia for having collaborated with the German invaders. In June 1944 the Crimean Tatars were also deported. These peoples eventually restored their honor after Stalin's death. I think that the movement of Koreans from the Soviet Far East in 1937 established the precedent for these later deportations. The "dissident" intellectual Roy Medvedev makes no mention of the mass deportation of Koreans.[14] In his *Gulag Archipelago*, however, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn writes the following:

> In 1937 several tens of thousands of those suspicious Koreans —with Khalkin-Gol in mind, face to face with Japanese imperialism, who could trust those slant-eyed heathens?—from palsied old men to puling infants, with some portion of their beggarly belongings, were swiftly and quietly transferred from the Far East to Kazakhstan. So swiftly that they spent the first winter in mud-brick houses without windows (where would all that glass have come from!). And so quietly that nobody except the neighboring Kazakhs learned of this resettlement, no foreign correspondent uttered a squeak.[15]

According to G. S. Liushkov, who was chief of the NKVD administration in the Far Eastern Territory in the summer of 1937, and who in June 1938 fled to Japan, the deported Koreans numbered 180,000.

> Those arrested from among the ranks of the Red Army, the Party, and the Soviet organization, as well as from industry, cities, and villages, amounted to 9,000 in the Soviet Far East alone. Moreover, 11,000 Chinese were arrested, and 8,000 were deported, while 180,000 Koreans were deported and 2,500 were arrested. More than 1,000 Kharbins, 600 Hungarians, and several hundreds of Germans, Latvians, Lithuanians, and other peoples were also arrested. A thorough purge was conducted in Birobizhan, where there were many Jews who had immigrated from abroad. Thus, in only one region in the Soviet Far East, 60,000

> were arrested and 190,000 deported. In all, 250,000 were suppressed in various ways. Moreover, these figures do not include all the victims.[16]

In December 1936, the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a new constitution that declared the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union. In the capitalist world, however, the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, Japan-Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936, and Japan attacked China in July 1937. Amidst this tense world situation, political trials were conducted in the USSR. Zinoviev and Kamenev were shot in August 1936, Piatakov was condemned to death in January 1937, Tukhachevskii and other leaders of the Red Army were secretly shot in June, and Bukharin and Rykov were shot in March 1938.

On March 3, 1937, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Stalin listed as elements in the "Trotskyite" program developed by Piatakov, Radek, and Sokolinikov:

> "the restoration of capitalism; the dissolution of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes; the revival of exploitation; alliances with fascist groups in Germany–Japan for an anti-Soviet War; struggle against the peace policy; partition of the Soviet territory, with the Ukraine to go to Germany and the eastern seaboard of the Soviet Union to go to Japan; preparations for a military defeat through an attack by a hostile country; subversive activities, plots, and terrorism against the Soviet leaders; and espionage on behalf of the fascist powers (Japan–Germany)."[17]

Stalin emphasized the need to put an end to indifference, credulousness, and political shortsightedness, and to carry out measures to eliminate espionage and terrorism by agents of foreign intelligence organizations.

Based on these facts, we may conclude that the deportation of the Koreans in 1937 was a part of Stalin's anti-Piatakov campaign.[18] We cannot know the timing or duration of the actual deportation, or how 180,000 people could have been transported by the Siberian railway at that time. Yasuo Mishima gives an account of the deportation in his *Sekigun* [The red army], published in Japan in December 1937. Regrettably, Mi-

shima writes only about part of the Korean deportation and does not indicate his sources, but he is worth quoting here.

> Having replaced soldiers of Asian descent with those of European descent following the Japanese invasion of China, the Soviet government is now also replacing the nonmilitary inhabitants. The aim of this policy is not only the oppression of the anti-Soviet movement in the USSR, but also the strengthening of border defenses. Now as the peoples of the Soviet eastern seaboard are Chinese, Koreans, Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews, the Soviet government fears that they will foment an anti-Soviet uprising in an emergency. The Soviet government deported these peoples from those areas and sent in reliable European peoples as soldier-peasants.
>
> In the period from the beginning of September 1937 to March of the following year, nearly 50,000 inhabitants were to be transferred in five groups from areas within sixteen kilometers of the Soviet-Manchurian border. The first group consisted of 187 families (1,000 persons), including 156 Korean families, 10 Chinese families, and 20 Russian families. The second group was to be moved on about 20 December, the third in mid-December 1937, and the fourth and fifth groups in March of the following year. Russian kolkhozes were to replace the groups that had been forcibly removed. It is said that the Chinese and Korean peasants near the border were in a panic, as such soldier-peasant settlements were planned, not only on the Soviet eastern seaboard, but also in East and West Siberia.[19]

Kolarz points to an announcement in *Pravda* of December 20, 1937, as an important clue to the transportation of the Koreans. Specifically the announcement expressed to Liushkov the gratitude of the Soviet government and the Communist party for fulfillment of a government assignment in the field of transport, and commended the entire staff of the NKVD of the Far Eastern Territory and the personnel of the Far Eastern Railway that participated in the implementation of the assignment.[20]

If the transportation was completed by December 1937, many Koreans must have perished. But once moved to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Koreans found themselves well adapted to their new circumstances.[21] According to Ionova, who makes no comment on the relocation, it was thought that the Koreans were experienced in rice culture and fruit growing,

and villages were constructed in the basin of the main stream and the branches of the Syr Dar'ya, Amu Dar'ya, Ili, Karatal, and other rivers with good potential for irrigation, and all-out government support was given to the Korean kolkhozes that were organized in 1937–38 in the newly cultivated area. The exemption from taxation for the first year, and the supply of agricultural machines and implements, fertilizer, and construction materials, as well as the devoted labor of the Koreans themselves, led to the Korean kolkhozes' success in bringing wasteland under cultivation in a short time, and in growing rice and other crops.

Kolarz also says that the Korean migrants to the Chirchik Districts of Tashkent Province and the Gurlen Districts of Khorezm Province showed a high degree of efficiency, and that the economic losses caused by the departure of the Koreans from the Soviet Far East were compensated for by the benefits that accrued from their presence in Uzbekistan.

There was a population decrease in those previously mentioned national groups that had been accused of collaborating with the German armies and deported en masse during the war.[22] Table 2 shows population trends among the various nationalities. The Kalmyks suffered an especially telling blow, with their population decreasing 21.1 percent between 1939–1959. More than 20,000,000 Soviet citizens were killed in World War Two. The populations of the Belorussians, the peoples of the Baltic countries, and the Jews, who were persecuted with special severity, had not regained their prewar levels by 1959.

TABLE 2. CHANGE IN POPULATION (in percents)

	1926–39	39–59	
Total Population	15.7	9.5	20,000,000 died in W.W. II.
Russians	28.0	13.5	
Ukrainians	−9.9	4.6	
Belorussians	11.3	−4.4	died during collectivization
Lithuanians	−21.4	14.4	
Latvians	−9.6	−14.1	
Estonians	−7.2	−13.6	
Moldavians	−6.6	7.5	
Karelians	1.8	−33.8	

TABLE 2 (cont.)

	1926–39	39–59	
Mordvinians	8.4	−11.8	
Kalmyks	1.8	−21.1	
Karachais	37.6	7.4	
Balkars	28.2	−0.7	
Chechens	28.1	2.6	
Ingushs	24.3	15.1	
Germans	15.2	13.5	
Koreans	109.5	72.1	
Kazakhs	−21.9	16.8	died during collectivization
Adyges	39.8	−9.6	
Karakalpaks	27.0	−7.1	
Buriats	−5.4	12.6	
Yakuts	0.6	−2.2	
Altais	27.4	−5.4	
Shorets	29.4	−6.1	
Evenks	−9.5	−16.8	
Nenets	31.9	−7.3	
Chukchs	6.1	−15.8	
Nanais	16.0	−6.0	
Evens		−16.2	
Poles	−19.5	119.1	
Jews	16.4	−25.1	

V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti USSR, etnodemograficheskii obzor* [Nationalities of the USSR: an ethnodemographic overview] (Moskva, 1982), pp. 285–287.

Compared to these peoples, the Koreans adapted to the Central Asian environment and increased their population by 72.1 percent. Still we must add that a part of this increase resulted from the seizure by the Soviet Union of South Sakhalin, to which 40,000 Koreans had been transferred by the Japanese.

III. Koreans in the Soviet Union Since 1959

Table 3 and Map 2, based on the 1970 census, show that Koreans are scattered throughout Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan, while in the Soviet Far East they are concentrated in the Sakhalin oblast, and the Khabarovsk and Primor'ye *krais*.

TABLE 3. KOREAN POPULATION (1970 Census)

	Total Population	*Koreans*
Uzbek SSR		
Tashkent oblast	1,478,785	73,349
Tashkent city	1,384,509	18,186
Syr Dar'ya oblast	575,461	11,661
Samarkand oblast	1,468,884	7,708
Fergana oblast	1,331,972	6,438
Andizhan oblast	1,059,174	4,660
Khorezm oblast	553,707	6,368
Surkhan Dar'ya oblast	662,027	3,666
Bukhara oblast	933,656	2,257
Karakalpak ASSR	702,264	8,958
Kazakh SSR		
Kzyl Orda oblast	491,780	13,429
Karaganda oblast	1,552,056	13,391
Taldy Kurgan oblast	610,046	12,514
Chimkent oblast	1,287,431	9,862
Dzhambul oblast	794,320	8,228
Alma Ata oblast	712,148	4,391
Alma Ata city	729,633	6,908
Guriev oblast	499,577	2,998
Kustanai obast	889,621	2,730
Tselinograd oblast	754,955	1,872
Kirghiz SSR	2,932,805	9,404
Tadzhik SSR	2,899,602	8,490
Turkmen SSR	2,158,880	3,490
Sakhalin oblast	615,652	35,396
Khabarovsk *krai*	1,345,907	19,249
Primor'ye *krai*	1,721,285	8,003

Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g. [Summary of the 1970 census] (Moskva, 1973), Volume 4.

Table 4 reveals that in the Uzbek SSR the Korean population increased from 7,300 to 130,000 between 1939–1959. If the deportation from the Far East was completed before 1939, this increase may be considered a result of migration from the Kazakh SSR, as well as a natural increase. The Koreans in the Kazakh SSR decreased from 96,000 to 74,000 during the same period. During the next twenty years, 1959 to 1979, we observe only a 17 percent increase in the Korean population in the


Map 2. Koreans in the Soviet Union, 1970
Central Asia and Kazakhstan
Kustanai
Far East
Guriev
Tselinograd
Karaganda
Aral Sea
Syr dar'ya River
Karakalpak ASSR
Dzhezkazgan
Nikolaevsk-na-Amure
Sakhalin
Khorezm
Kzyl Orda
Lake Balkhash
Amu dar'ya River
Amur
Bukhara
Chimkent
Dzhambul
Taldy Kurgan
Khabarovsk krai
Amur River
Blagoveschchensk
Tashkent
Fergana
Sea of Japan
Kashka dar'ya
Dzhizak
Andizhan
Alma Ata
Jewish Autonomous oblast
Samarkand
Syr dar'ya
Primor'ye krai
IRAN
Surkhan dar'ya
Lake Khanka
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
MANCHURIA
Ussurisk
Vladivostok

Uzbek SSR, from 139,000 to 163,000. Such a low rate of increase is incomprehensible, since the Korean family typically has many children—usually three to five, sometimes seven or eight. As the general rate of increase was 24.3 percent in the USSR,[23] a portion of the Koreans might have migrated to other regions in the Soviet Union. It is also possible that the number of men might have decreased during the forced deportation and World War Two, causing a reduction in the number of households. However, we cannot assess the real cause, because of the absence of data showing sex and age distinctions.

TABLE 4. NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UZBEK SSR
(in thousands and percentage)

	1926		*1939*		*1959*		*1970*		*1979*	
Uzbeks	3,299	74.2		65.0	5,038	62.1	7,725	65.5	10,569	68.7
Karakalpaks	27	0.2		2.8	108	2.1	230	2.0	298	1.9
Russians	243	5.5		11.5	1,093	13.5	1,474	12.5	1,666	10.8
Tatars	27	0.6		2.3	445	5.5	574	4.9	649	4.2
Kazakhs	105	2.4		4.8	343	4.2	476	4.0	620	4.0
Tadzhiks	351	7.9		5.1	311	3.8	449	3.8	595	3.9
Koreans			73	1.2	139	1.7	148	1.3	163	1.1
Ukrainians	25	0.5		1.1	88	1.1	112	0.9	114	0.7
Kirghiz	80	1.8		1.4	93	1.1	111	0.9	142	0.9
Jews	38	0.8		0.8	94	1.2	103	0.9	100	0.6
Turkmens	26	0.6		0.7	55	0.7	71	0.6	92	0.6
Total	4,446		6,271		8,119		11,799		15,389	

V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti USSR, etnodemograficheskii obzor*

In 1926, only 10.5 percent of the Koreans were urban dwellers, with the majority of Koreans living in rural areas. However, this ratio increased to 48.3 percent in 1959, 77.6 percent in 1970, and 78.0 percent in 1979. In the USSR, this ratio is second only to that of Jews (98.8 percent). Russians stand third at 74.4 percent, Greeks fourth at 63.4 percent, and Tatars fifth at 62.8 percent. The ratio of Korean urban dwellers is high indeed compared to that of Uzbeks (29.2 percent) and Kazakhs (31.5 percent). In 1970 the ratio of the Korean urban population was 43 percent in the Uzbek SSR, 73.1 percent in the Kazakh SSR, 84.4 percent in the Sakhalin oblast, 70 percent in the Primor'ye *krai*, and 65.1 percent in the Khabarovsk *krai*. An exceptional number of Koreans in Uzbekistan were urban dwellers.[24]

There have been several articles by Japanese journalists who

have visited the Korean kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Uzbekistan. The consensus of these journalists is that the Koreans are successful farmers. The Koreans "achieve good results and special positions in Uzbekistan, which is a melting pot, by their diligence and manual dexterity."[25] "In Central Asia there are many Korean kolkhozes, all of which are rich farms. The word 'Korean' means 'the rich', just as it does in the Soviet Far East and Siberia."[26] The Japanese journalists visited the Lenin and Politotdel kolkhozes.

The most detailed account by a Japanese visitor is "Koreans in Central Asia," by Hikosaku Ozaki. Though Ozaki's report is based on a 1976 visit to the Soviet Union, conditions have changed little since then. He writes that when the chairman of the kolkhoz said "we are Soviets who built this kolkhoz," he was proud of "being a Korean who was also a Soviet."[27] This kolkhoz chairman, Khvan Man-Gym Grigorievich [Hwang Man-gŭm], is one of 470 delegates to the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, a member of the Presidium, and a member of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. He was born in 1921, became the chief of supply for construction materials in the IAngiiul' cotton factory in the southern suburbs of Tashkent in 1939, the chief of the attached enterprise for the Tashkent Railway administrative bureau, the chairman of the Lenin's Way kolkhoz, and the head of the agricultural section of the Higher Chirchik district party committee. In 1953 he became the chairman of Politotdel kolkhoz. He joined the Communist Party in 1946 and graduated from a higher Party school attached to the Central Committee of the Party.[28]

Another Korean delegate appears in the list of delegates to the Supreme Soviet. Kan Pavel Khritonovich was born in 1934 and joined the Party in 1959. He graduated from Odessa Hydrotechnic Institute and became a site foreman and chief engineer. He worked on the Karakalpak Construction Trust SMU-1 of the Ministry of the Uzbek SSR. He was chief of the Zhizak Construction District SMU-6, chief of the silicic acid workshop of the capital construction section in the Zhizak Construction Materials Combine, and since 1962 has been head of the Yangiyuri Construction Material and Construction Combinat in Syr Dar'ya oblast, and secretary of the standing committee on construction and construction materials.[29] He is one of the leaders

of the new Korean urban generation which is replacing Khvan's generation.

As urban population grows, there is a rapid decrease in the number of Koreans who consider Korean their native language. In the Uzbek SSR, where many Koreans live in rural areas, the ratio of this category of Koreans decreased from 73.5 percent in 1970 to 62.1 percent in 1979. In the Soviet Union as a whole, that ratio declined from 68.6 percent to 55.4 percent. Almost half of the Korean population already considered Russian, or the language of a republic, to be their native language, and with linguistic Russification, the ratio of Koreans who considered Russian to be their second language decreased from 50.3 percent to 47.7 percent. In sum, almost all Koreans consider Russian to be either their native or their second language.

The use of Russian as a second language has spread to other Soviet peoples, particularly in Central Asia. For example, between 1970 and 1979, the ratio of Russian speakers grew from 13.0 percent to 52.9 percent among Uzbeks, and from 9.6 percent to 45.2 percent among Karakalpaks. In Transcaucasia, the ratio is lower: it is 29.5 percent among Azerbaizhans, 38.6 percent among Armenians, and 26.7 percent among Georgians. The ratio changed only slightly, from 62.5 percent to 68.9 percent among Tatars.[30] It is of interest that among Jews in the Uzbek SSR, the ratio of Hebrew as a native tongue grew from 37.5 percent to 44.7 percent. Thus it can be seen that the linguistic Russification of Koreans is proceeding more rapidly than that of other peoples. However, Ionova, Dzharylgasinova, and Japanese journalists note that the Koreans' attachment to tradition is often still very strong. Koreans prefer to eat rice, Korean cabbage, leeks, and garlic; they dwell in houses with *ondol* heating and use the *homi* (the Korean shovel), the *chunigi* (the Korean spade), and the *nat* (the Korean sickle); and they maintain their proudest tradition, one that has earned them universal respect, their diligence.

NOTES

1. A. M. Egiazarian, *Ob osnovnykh tendentsiiakh razvitiia sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR* [The basic tendencies in the development of socialist nationalities in the USSR] (Erevan, 1965), p. 89.

2. Iu. V. Ionova, "Koreitsy" [Koreans], in *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* [The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan], ed. S. P. Tolstov (Moskva: Nauka, 1963), p. 565.

3. V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSR, etnodemograficheskii obzor* [The nationalities of the USSR: an ethnodemographic overview], second edition, (Moskva, 1982), p. 287.

4. Paul S. Shoup, *The East European and Soviet Data Handbook: Political, Social, and Developmental Indicators, 1945–1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 141.

5. Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 35.

6. Ionova, "Koreitsy," p. 564.

7. Ibid., p. 565. See Hara Teruyuki, "Roshia kakumei, Shiberi sensō to Chōsen dokuritsu undō" [The Russian revolution, the Siberian war, and the Korean independence movement], in *Roshia kakumeiron: rekishi no fukken* [On the Russian revolution], ed. Kikuchi Masanori (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1977); "Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō to Nihon" [The Korean independence movement and Japan in the Russian Far East], *Kikan Sanzenri* 17 (1979); Yoshida Yutaka, "Nihon teikokushugi no Shiberia kanshō sensō" [The intervention in Siberia by Japanese imperialism], *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 490 (March 1981).

8. Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 36.

9. Ibid., p. 34. Kolarz writes, "According to the Ministry of Nationality Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, the Koreans numbered 300,000 in the buffer state, and were, after Russians and Ukrainians, its third largest ethnic group" (*The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 35).

10. Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

11. R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova, "Osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov u Koreitsev Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana" [Basic ethnic processes among the Koreans of Central Asia and Kazakhstan], in *Etnicheskie protsessy u natsional'nykh grupp Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* (Moskva, 1980), p. 43.

12. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSR, etnodemograficheskii obzor*, p. 287.

13. Ibid., p. 289.

14. Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Knopf, 1973).

15. Alexandr I. S. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956. An Experiment in Literary Investigation*, vol. V–VII, tr. Harry Willett (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 386–87.

16. Liushkov, "Soren shakaishugi hihan" [I criticize Soviet socialism], *Gekkan Roshia* [Monthly Russia] 1939, no. 5, pp. 49–50. Liushkov was born in Odessa in 1900, entered the Ukrainian Cheka in 1920, became the chief of the NKVD in Rostov oblast in 1936, and became the chief of the NKVD for the Far Eastern Territory and was elected a delegate to the Supreme Soviet in 1937. He fled to Japan in June 1938. The Battle of Khasan occurred following his departure. In August 1945 he was shot by the Manchurian command of the Japanese army, and his writings for the Japanese General Staff Headquarters

were destroyed. Several reviews by him appeared in the journal *Kaizō* in 1939. See Nishino Tatsukichi, *Nazo no bōmeisha Ryushikofu* [The puzzling exile Liushkov] (Tokyo: San'ichi shobō, 1979).

17. Stalin's report at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on March 3, 1937. See *Sutarinshugi to Arubania mondai* [On Stalinism and the Albanian question] (Tokyo: Gōdō shuppansha, 1962), p. 291.

18. The Kazakhs in the Kazakh SSR decreased from 3,700,000 to 2,310,000 during the period 1926–39, when collectivization and the settling of nomads were carried out with butchery on a massive scale. Many Kazakhs perished from hunger, were transported elsewhere, or fled to China. The relocation of Koreans and other peoples had the effect of compensating for the resulting population decline in Kazakhstan. Wada Haruki writes that the relocation was intended to isolate the Koreans dwelling in the immediate neighborhood of the Korean and Manchurian borders, before Japan could use them for intelligence gathering. See Wada, "Soren no Chōsen seisaku, 1945, 8–10" [The Soviet policy toward Korea, August–October 1945], *Shakai kagaku kenkyū* 33–4 (October 1981), p. 81.

19. Mishima Yasuo, *Sekigun* [The red army] (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1937), pp. 276–78.

20. Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 39. *Pravda*, 20 December 1937, p. 6.

21. Ionova, "Koreitsy," p. 566.

22. Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 41.

23. Dzharylgasinova, "Osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov u Koreitsev Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana," p. 62.

24. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSR, etnodemograficheskii obzor*, pp. 90, 100.

25. Arai Kozaburo, "Soren no naka no Chōsen minzoku" [Koreans in the Soviet Union], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 10 October 1979.

26. Shirai Hisaya, "Soren ryō shirukurōdo" [The silk road in the Soviet Union], *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 October 1982. See Fujino Masayuki, "Samarukando de atta Chōsenjin" [Koreans in Samarkand], *Kikan Sanzenri* 21 (February 1980); Nito Yoshiki, "Tashikento de atta Chōsenjin" [Koreans in Tashkent], *Kikan sanzenri* 24 (November 1980), Maruyama Masaru, "Ryōdo naki Chōsenjin shitataka ni chōwa" [Koreans without territory], in *Repo Sobieto NOW* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Press, 1983), among others.

27. Ozaki Hikosaku, "Chūō Ajia no Chōsenjin" [Koreans in Central Asia], *Kikan Sanzenri* 6 (1976), p. 129.

28. *Deputaty Verkhnogo Soveta Uzbekskoi SSSR, deviatyi sozyv* [The delegates to the ninth supreme soviet of the Uzbek SSR] (Tashkent, 1976), p. 59.

29. Ibid., p. 248.

30. *Naselenie SSSR, po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda* [The population of the USSR according to data from the 1979 national census] (Moskva, 1980), p. 23.

Soviet Koreans and North Korea

DAE-SOOK SUH

SHORTLY AFTER the liberation of Korea in March 1946, an anonymous writer published a brief pamphlet describing the condition of Koreans in the Soviet Union and their contribution to the Allied cause in World War II. More than half the pamphlet was devoted to glorifying the Communist system of the Soviet Union as one that treated the Korean minority with care and respect, but it also presented a graphic description of the Koreans' living conditions, giving wage figures and outlining cultural amenities existing under the Soviet leader Stalin. It also cited relatively obscure Korean labor heroes and soldiers in the Soviet army who had been heavily decorated during the war; these included Alexandre Min, Alexei Kim, Sergei Choe, Mansam Kim, and Pyong-hwa Kim.[1]

It is understandable that the Koreans who migrated to the Soviet Union were enthusiastic in their support of a Communist government in Korea when the Soviet army liberated its northern half. However, neither the Soviet government nor the Soviet occupation forces seem to have been able to devise a plan to utilize the Soviet Koreans in the liberation or occupation of North Korea. Nor was there any organized effort on the part of the Soviet Koreans themselves to return to their homeland with the explicit aim of influencing or dominating the political scene and the inculcation of Communism in the North.

A number of Soviet Koreans did return to North Korea, and a few played important roles during the first decade after the liberation, but these returnees seemed to have been making individual efforts that were unorganized and lacked any specific

goals or objectives. For example, the Soviet Koreans were not organized in a group similar to the Korean Independence League formed by Korean revolutionaries in China.

The Korean Communist movement can trace its origins to the Soviet Union, but throughout the tormented history of their movement, Korean Communist leaders have either died or retired in the Soviet Union without truly attaining a position of prominence in the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the Korean revolutionary movement. Early Korean Communist leaders who were members of the Executive Commitee of the Comintern, such as Pak Chin-sun and the more colorful woman revolutionary, Aleksandra Petrovna Kim Stankevich, had all died long before Korea was liberated;[2] and Kim Ha-il, the last Korean Communist to represent any Korean group—he served in the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935—had long since lost touch with the Korean revolutionaries in either the Soviet Union or Korea.[3] By the end of World War II, the majority of Koreans in the Soviet Union had become more like Soviet citizens than Korean revolutionaries yearning to return to their homeland after the liberation. However, a few Soviet Koreans who returned to Korea with the Soviet occupation forces did attain prominent positions in the North, and at times exercised a significant influence in building the party and government there.

The role of the Soviet Koreans in the North has fluctuated with the vicissitudes of North Korean-Soviet relations. Soviet Koreans figured prominently when the Soviet Union was occupying the North and supporting the creation and initial development of a Communist state in Korea. Soviet scholars and Soviet Koreans wrote books and articles extolling the meager achievements of North Korea. Even after the Korean War, the Soviet Union gave material assistance to the war-ravaged young Communist republic in its efforts to reconstruct and restore normalcy. However, from the mid-fifties and particularly when the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified and it became obvious that the North was in collusion with China, Soviet economic and technical assistance was abruptly cut. The Soviet Koreans in North Korea suffered the consequences of this.

It is not difficult to document early signs of anti-Soviet feel-

ing in the North. Kim Il Sung's first proclamation of self-reliance in December 1955 had its origin in an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese stance. When Kim began to assert his own style of patriotic socialism, almost all prominent Soviet Koreans who occupied important party and government positions in the North were either demoted or replaced, and most of them returned to the Soviet Union.

When Kim began to modify the basic tenets of communism with his own xenophobic nationalism, the Koreans in the Soviet Union also began to change their attitude from indifference to consternation. Herein I shall make a modest effort to examine the role of the Soviet Koreans and their adventures in the North during the decade after the liberation, and to assess how Kim Il Sung's efforts to establish his *chuch'e* idea have contributed to the demise and alienation of Soviet Koreans in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I. Characteristics of the Soviet Korean Group

After the initial confusion had subsided, four distinct political groups emerged in liberated North Korea. First there was the Korean Communist group, consisting of a number of Korean Communists who belonged to the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, headquartered in Seoul. The second group was the Korean Independence League, returned revolutionaries from northern China, near Yanan. The third group was Kim Il Sung and his partisan guerrillas from Manchuria; and the fourth element was the Soviet Koreans who had returned to Korea, mostly from Soviet Central Asia. Except for the last of these, each group had an organizational base, such as the Korean Communist Party and the New Democratic Party, or a chain of command, such as the one Kim Il Sung used to control the partisans of the former Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army in Manchuria. The Soviet Korean group was not organized, and the returnees from the Soviet Union felt no need to maintain a common group identity.

It is true that Kim Il Sung himself returned to Korea from the Soviet Union in 1945, and that his group had spent some four years in a camp near Khabarovsk in the Russian Maritime

Province after being defeated in Manchuria. However, the partisans under Kim who had fought the Japanese as part of a Chinese guerrilla army in Manchuria were fundamentally different from the Soviet Koreans, most of whom had been born and raised in the Soviet Union. The fact that both groups had returned to Korea from the Soviet Union with the Soviet occupation forces at first blinded even the most informed observers to the fact that these were two very different groups.[4] Kim's partisans were Korean guerrillas who had fought the Japanese under the most trying conditions in Manchuria, with the goal of achieving independence for Korea. The Soviet Koreans were Soviet citizens, the children of Korean immigrants to the Soviet Union who might have joined the Soviet army to defend the Soviet Union. None of them had participated directly in any armed struggle for Korean independence, as is shown by List 1 of politically-active Soviet returnees.

LIST 1. *Partial List of Soviet Koreans in North Korean Politics*

Chang Ha-il (1905)	College graduate from Leningrad. Editor; Party member; Returned to Soviet Union.
Chang Ik-hwan (1915)	Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute graduate; High School teacher, Kzyl Orda. Cabinet; Diplomat; Returned.
Chin Pan-su	Kzyl Orda Party Section Chief; High School teacher. Party; Cabinet, Supreme People's Assembly (SPA); Returned.
Ch'oe Il	From Tashkent; Moscow Economic Institute graduate. Party; Diplomat; Returned.
Ch'oe Pong-su	From Ushtobe kolkhoz; no education. Party; SPA; Returned.
Chŏng Yul	From Alma Ata, Kazakhstan; Leningrad State Teachers College graduate. Editorial writer; Editor; Cabinet; Jailed; Fate unknown.
Han Il-mu	Officer of Soviet Navy. Party; Military; Diplomat; Cabinet; SPA; Returned.

LIST 1 (cont.)

Hŏ Ik (1911)	From Iman; teacher at Khabarovsk; Leningrad State University graduate; Chimkent (Kazakhstan) College professor. Party; University; Returned.
Hŏ Ka-i (1904)	From Russian Far East; Oblast party functionary; Section Chief (Zaveduyuschii Otdela) in Tashkent; College graduate in Moscow. Party; Cabinet; Suicide in North Korea.
Ki Sŏk-bok	Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute graduate; Junior High School teacher in Kzyl Orda. Party; Press; Cabinet; Fate unknown.
Kim Chae-uk	From Tashkent; Graduate of Party School; Uzbekistan Party worker. Party; SPA; Returned.
Kim Sŭng-hwa [Kim Syn Khva]	From Tashkent; Moscow Engineering College graduate. Party; Cabinet; University; Returned and died in USSR.
Kim Yŏl	From Samarkand; College graduate. Party; Cabinet; SPA; Jailed; Fate unknown.
Kim Yong-sŏng (1918)	From Kzyl Orda; Kzyl Orda High School teacher. University; Fate unknown.
Kim Ung	From Moscow; Soviet Army officer. Party; Cabinet; Military; Returned.
Nam Il (1913)	From Tashkent; College graduate; Chimkent High School teacher. Party; Cabinet; SPA; Military; Died in North Korea.
O Wan-muk (1912)	Agricultural College graduate. University.
Pak Ch'ang-ok	From Khabarovsk; Uzbekistan Party official; High School teacher. Party; Cabinet; Returned.
Pak Ch'ang-sik	Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute graduate. Party; SPA; Returned.
Pak Mu	From Kzyl Orda. Party; Press; Returned.

LIST 1 (cont.)

Pak Ŭi-wan	From Kzyl Orda; Editorial writer; High School teacher. Party; Cabinet; Military; SPA; Returned.
Pak Yŏng	From Samarkand; Leningrad Pedagogical Institute graduate; Taught in Chimkent. Party; Diplomat; Returned.
Pak Yŏng-bin	From Tashkent; Party School graduate. Cabinet; Diplomat; Returned.
Pang Hak-se	From Uzbekistan; NKVD member. Party; Cabinet; Security Officer; Supreme Court Justice; SPA; Active in North Korea.
T'ae Sŏng-su	From the Soviet Union. Party; Press; SPA; Returned.
Yang Yŏng-sun	From the Soviet Union. Party; Diplomat; Fate unknown.
Yi Hŭi-jun	From the Soviet Union. Cabinet; Party; Fate unknown.
Yi Il-gyŏng	From the Soviet Union. Party; Cabinet; SPA; Suicide in North Korea.
Yi Mun-il	From the Soviet Union; Studied in Leningrad; Worked in Kzyl Orda. Party; Press; Cabinet; Returned.
Yi Sin-p'al	From Uzbekistan; Leningrad State University graduate. Cabinet; Diplomat; Returned.
Yi Tal-chin	From Alma Ata; Worked at kolkhoz. Party; Returned.
Yi Tong-gŏn	From the Soviet Union. Diplomat; Cabinet; Fate unknown.
Yi Tong-sŏk	From Samarkand; Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. Cabinet.

A number of characteristics distinguish the Soviet Korean group from the other three. First, during the Soviet occupation of North Korea, from the liberation until the end of 1948 the Soviet Korean group was perhaps the most influential and pre-

stigious. Because they were Soviet citizens, able to speak Russian and understand the occupation policy of the Soviet Union, Soviet Koreans were able to identify themselves with the occupation forces. Though they had stayed in the Soviet Far East for nearly five years, none of Kim's partisans was as proficient in Russian or as familiar to the occupation authorities as were the Soviet Koreans. However, at the same time, because the Soviet Koreans were Soviet citizens, the Soviet occupation authorities did not consider them an indigenous Korean revolutionary group with which they could work to establish a Communist government in North Korea. The Soviet occupation authorities certainly considered the Soviet Koreans useful but did not use any of them to implement their policy in North Korea.

Second, relatively few Soviet Koreans chose to remain in North Korea and participate in politics. One source relates that approximately 427 Soviet Koreans entered Korea between August 1945 and January 1949, but many of these were members of the Soviet occupation army who returned to the Soviet Union at different stages of troop withdrawal from North Korea. Those who stayed behind to participate in North Korean politics, together with those who came from the Soviet Union on their own for that purpose, numbered less than fifty in all. This was indeed a small number compared to Kim's guerrillas, who totalled more than two hundred. Numerically, there was really no comparison between the Soviet group and either the Korean revolutionaries within Korea or those returned from China.

Third, Soviet Koreans were, on the average, graduates of high schools and colleges in the Soviet Union, but none was a nationally prominent figure there. Nor had any of them held a high post in the Soviet Union, either in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Soviet government. There were no well-known Soviet Koreans in the Soviet Union that the occupation forces could bring with them for counsel. There were many prominent Koreans in the Soviet republics in Central Asia, where many Koreans lived. Even there, however, prominent Koreans—for example, Nikolai Nam, vice-minister of commerce in the Kazakh SSR, Petr Pak, vice-minister of finance in the Kazakh SSR, and Evgenii Kim, chief engineer at the Kara-

ganda coal mines—chose not to return to Korea.[5] Among those who returned to Korea from the Central Asian republics were many obscure figures who seemed more adventurers than revolutionaries, and who thus failed to command direct Soviet government support for their quest for power. Once Soviet influence had ebbed in North Korea, they were no match for the Koreans in Korea or those who had returned from China and Japan.

Fourth, Soviet Koreans always retained the option of returning to the Soviet Union when and if their political fortune turned against them. In retrospect, many returned home when they lost their positions in the North. They did not have that resolution common to all the returned Korean revolutionaries who, for better or worse, were committed to sharing the fate of liberated Korea. In conjunction with this, none of the Soviet Koreans adopted any particular region or province in North Korea as a home base in order to build a constituency in representing the people of that region. Also, few visited their parents' hometowns or established residences. Thus, the record of the Soviet Koreans as representatives to the Supreme People's Assembly was very poor; the majority of Soviet Koreans were interested in administrative, diplomatic, and party positions.

Fifth, Soviet Koreans were first and foremost citizens of the Soviet Union, and had to defend the Soviet system of government as well as the Soviet style of party organization. They made an effort to defend and emulate the Soviet system, and when the Soviet Union was in vogue in North Korea, their fortunes improved. When the Soviet Union fell short of North Korean expectations, however, Soviet Koreans suffered the consequences. They had become official apologists for the Soviet Union, having had to try to explain to the North Koreans the Soviet policy which was based on Soviet national interests. Even those few who chose to teach at the paramount institution of higher learning in North Korea, Kim Il Sung University, discovered that with their Soviet college degrees and high school teachers certificates, they were no match for professors who had earned their doctorates in Europe, or graduates of Japanese imperial universities who had competed with the best students in Japan and Korea.

Sixth, the returnees from the Soviet Union had to make social adjustments to live in Korea. If their ambition of climbing the political ladder in North Korea was to be realized, they had to reconvert their Russified names into Korean ones and learn to speak proper Korean . Many Koreans have one-syllable given names, but an unusually large number of Soviet Koreans had names of this sort, such as Kim Yŏl, Nam Il, Kim Ung, Ch'oe Il, Hŏ Ik, Pak Mu, Pak Yŏng, and Chang Ch'ŏl. Also, if a person was born and raised in the Soviet Union, it would not be uncommon for him to have a Russian given name. A number of Soviet Koreans made an honest effort to change their names. For example, Alexandr Hŏ changed his name to Hŏ Ka-i, meaning "a fellow in the household of Hŏ;" Ivan Pak was known in North Korea as Pak Ŭi-wan; and Petr Choi was called Ch'oe P'yo-dŏk. Indeed it would have been unthinkable in terms of Korean social customs for the First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea to be known as Alexandr Hŏ, or the Vice-Premier of the Republic to be known as Ivan Pak. The language barrier proved more difficult to overcome, however, and Hŏ Ka-i, for example, was openly ridiculed for his inability to speak proper Korean while professing to know everything about Communist party operations.

II. Political Activities of Soviet Koreans

In a United States State Department case study of the Soviet takeover of North Korea, it is alleged that Soviet Koreans manned every cabinet post and major government agency as vice-ministers or vice-chairmen, implementing Soviet policy,[6] but this is simply not true. Out of the twenty-member first cabinet, only one vice-minister was a Soviet Korean: this was Nam Il, who served under Minister of Education Paek Nam-un. Paek was a prominent economist educated in Japan. There were a number of Soviet Korean vice-ministers in later cabinet posts, including the ministries of culture and propaganda, national defense, trade, and foreign affairs, and Soviet Koreans served as ministers in a variety of departments, from vice-premiers to chairmen of the State Planning Commission. A number served as ambassadors or generals in the army, but only a few served in

the Supreme People's Assembly. True to their training in the Soviet Union, however, most Soviet Koreans preferred to serve in what they considered the two most important organizations in any Communist state: the party and the press.

A. The Workers' Party

The most powerful of all the Soviet Koreans in the North was Hŏ Ka-i. Hŏ was born and raised in the Russian Maritime Province as Alexandr Hŏ, and after receiving his education in Moscow, he worked as a section chief of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR. As early as August 1946, at the time of the first party congress of the Worker's Party, Hŏ was elected one of five members of the Political Committee, the highest organ of the Central Committee of the party. There were six Soviet Koreans in the forty-three member Central Committee of the first party congress. These were Hŏ Ka-i, Pak Ch'ang-sik, Kim Yŏl, Kim Chae-uk, Han Il-mu, and T'ae Sŏng-su, and this was the smallest representation of any of the four groups.[7]

All the Soviet Koreans were reelected to the second Central Committee in March 1948, and eight additional members were selected. The new members were Chin Pan-su, Ki Sŏk-bok, Kim Sŭng-hwa, Kim Ung, Pak Ch'ang-ok, Pak Mu, Pang Hak-se, and Yi Hŭi-jun. There were thus fourteen Soviet Koreans in the sixty-seven member Central Committee of the second party congress. This was still a very small number, but it represented twenty-one percent of the Central Committee and was the largest number of Soviet Koreans ever on the Central Committee.[8]

At the time of the third party congress, in April 1956, only three new Soviet Koreans (Nam Il, Pak Ŭi-wan, and Yi Il-gyŏng) were added, and seven veterans, including Hŏ, were dropped from the Central Committee. Thus there were only nine Soviet Koreans in the seventy-one-member Central Committee of the third party congress; they represented a mere 13 percent. When the fourth party congress was convened in September 1961, only two Soviet Koreans remained on an eighty-five member Central Committee: Nam Il and Yi Il-gyŏng. Similarly the fifth party congress in November 1970 had only Nam Il and Pang Hak-se in a 117-member Central Com-

mittee. Yi Il-gyŏng was purged from, and Pang reinstated to, the Central Committee of the fifth party congress. Nam Il died in March 1976,[9] and there was only one Soviet Korean, Pang Hak-se, in the 145-member Central Committee of the sixth party congress in 1980.

Pang has served in four Central Committees, and Nam Il and Han Il-mu in three, but the demise of the Soviet Koreans in the party came when Hŏ and Pak Ch'ang-ok were purged in 1953 and 1956 respectively. There were six Soviet Koreans who served as alternate members to the Central Committee, but except for Nam Il none was elected to full membership. Hŏ Ik and Kim Sŭng-hwa served as principals of the Central Party School, and Kim Yŏl and Pak Yŏng served as chairmen of the Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee and Hamnam Provincial Party Committee respectively. List 2 shows the rank order of Soviet Koreans in the Central Committee of the Workers' Party.

LIST 2. *Soviet Koreans in the Central Committee of the Workers' Party*

Party Congresses	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Others
Chang Ha-il							Alt. III-16
Chin Pan-su		19	25				
Ch'oe Il							Alt. III-12
Ch'oe Pong-su							Alt. II-20
Han Il-mu	22	21	40				
Hŏ Ka-i	5	3					
Ki Sŏk-bok		28					
Kim Chae-uk	20	13					
Kim Sŭng-hwa		27	35				
Kim Ung		54					
Kim Yŏl	19	15					
Nam Il			23	10	16		Alt. II-11
Pak Ch'ang-ok		11	7				
Pak Ch'ang-sik	9	36					
Pak Mu		55	69				
Pak Ŭi-wan			9				
Pang Hak-se		52	26		43	68	
T'ae Sŏng-su	23	31					
Yi Hŭi-jun		25					
Yi Il-gyŏng			17	38			
Yi Mun-il							Alt. III-17
Yi Tal-chin							Alt. III-9

B. The Press and Kim Il Sung University

The Soviet Koreans were eager to take control of the mass media, and several of them wanted to teach at Kim Il Sung University. Their particular preferences for these two fields was due primarily to their own experiences in the Soviet Union. A number of them had come from Kzyl Orda in the Kazakh S.S.R., where a Korean-language newspaper, *Renin kich'i* [Lenin's banner], was published. Chŏng Yul, Pak Mu, Pak Ŭi-wan, and Yi Mun-il all had worked there as editorial writers at one time or another. Also, many of the returnees had been high school teachers, including Chang Ik-hwan, Pak Yŏng, and Pak Ch'ang-sik, and they wanted to teach at the university level in Korea.

When they returned to North Korea during the Soviet occupation, Soviet Koreans took over important editorial posts. The first head of the Korean Central News Agency [*Chosŏn chungang t'ongsinsa*] was Yi Mun-il, and he was succeeded in 1948 by Pak Mu, another Soviet Korean. At the very beginning, the chief editors of the official party organ, *Nodong sinmun*, were also Soviet Koreans, among them Ki Sŏk-bok and Yi Mun-il. The editor of the first party journal, *Chŏngno*, the predecessor of the current *Kŭlloja*, was T'ae Sŏng-su, still another Soviet Korean. When *Chŏngno* changed its title to *Kŭlloja*, its successive editors were all Soviet Koreans. They included Pak Ch'ang-ok, Ki Sŏk-bok, and T'ae Sŏng-su. When the Communist government was established in the North, more Soviet Koreans—for example, Chang Ha-il and Yi Mun-il—were appointed editors-in-chief of the official government newspaper, *Minju Chosŏn*. They also edited an army magazine, *Inmin'gun* [People's army], and the journal of the Korean Writers' Association, *Munhwa chŏnsŏn* [Cultural front]. They dominated the Korean Writers' Association and the Korean Reporters' Association during the initial period after liberation.[10]

The Soviet Koreans were not as successful in academic circles. A number of them were appointed as professors at Kim Il Sung University, but their high school teachers' certificates or Soviet college education qualified them only for lower academic posts. A few worked as Russian-language teachers.[11] The Liberal Arts College of Kim Il Sung University was headed by Pak Kŭk-ch'ae, a Japanese-educated economist who was a graduate

of Kyoto Imperial University and a former Professor of Economics at Keijo Imperial University, and the faculty included some professors who had earned their doctorates in Europe.[12] A number of Soviet Koreans did teach at Kim Il Sung University, including Hŏ Ik, O Wan-muk, Kim Yong-sŏng, Pak Yŏng, and Yi Mun-il (see List 3), but most of them left the academic scene and ventured into politics.

LIST 3. *Soviet Koreans in the Press and University*

Chang Ha-il	Editor, *Minju Chosŏn* and *Inmin'gun*; Chairman, Korean Reporters' Association
Chŏng Yul	Editor of *Munhwa chŏnsŏn*; Dean, Korean Teachers College
Hŏ Ik	Professor of Literature, Kim Il Sung University; Principal, Central Party School
Ki Sŏk-bok	Editor of *Nodong sinmun*; member, Korean Writers' Association
Kim Sŭng-hwa	Assistant Dean, Kim Il Sung University; Principal, Central Party School
Kim Yong-sŏng	Professor of Russian, Kim Il Sung University
O Wan-muk	Professor of Agriculture, Kim Il Sung University
Pak Mu	Head, Korean Central News Agency; member, Korean Reporters' Association
Pak Yŏng	Professor of History, Kim Il Sung University
T'ae Sŏng-su	Editor, *Chŏngno* and *Kŭlloja*
Yi Mun-il	Head, Korean Central News Agency; Editor, *Nodong sinmun* and *Minju Chosŏn*; Professor, Kim Il Sung University

C. The Supreme People's Assembly

That they lacked ties within Korea became most apparent to Soviet Koreans when a handful of them participated in elections to represent the people in the Supreme People's Assembly. Even if the North Korean electoral process was suspect, only a few Soviet Koreans volunteered to have their name appear on a ballot to be voted on by the people. There were only eight Soviet Koreans out of 572 members of the first Supreme People's Assembly in 1948, and the same number in the second Supreme People's Assembly in September 1957. The third Assembly, of

October 1962, had only two Soviet Korean members: Nam Il and Yi Il-gyŏng. This number did not change at the fourth Assembly, in December 1967, or the fifth, in December 1972. The roster of the sixth Assembly was not made public. Soviet Koreans may have visited their parents' home provinces or villages, but none stayed there to represent the people in the Supreme People's Assembly. Similar to their services on the party's Central Committee, only Nam Il and Pang Hak-se were repeatedly elected, five times and four times respectively.[13] List 4 catalogs the Soviet Koreans elected to the Supreme People's Assembly.

LIST 4. *Soviet Koreans in the Supreme People's Assembly*

Assemblies	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Chin Pan-su			176				
Ch'oe Pong-su	110	200					
Han Il-mu	132	48					
Kim Chae-uk	71						
Kim Yŏl	86						
Nam Il	75	192	10	6	408		
Pak Ch'ang-sik	50	90					
Pak Ŭi-wan		169					
Pang Hak-se	53	145		265	430		
T'ae Sŏng-su	114						
Yi Il-gyŏng		29	114				

Numbers indicate the order in which members' names were reported in announcing the members of the Supreme People's Assembly.

D. Cabinet and Diplomatic Posts

Ten Soviet Koreans[14] held the post of vice-minister, but they were not assigned to this post to check and control other ministers, as has been alleged in the State Department study. In fact, most vice-ministers were not appointed until after the Korean War, when the Soviet Koreans' influence had begun to wane, and the ministers they served under were in most cases powerful partisans loyal to Kim Il Sung. Han Il-mu and Kim Ung, for example, served as vice-ministers under Minister of National Defense Ch'oe Yong-gŏn, a partisan. Furthermore many prominent Soviet Koreans served as full ministers. Foreign Minister

Nam Il, Foreign Trade Minister Chin Pan-su, State Construction Minister Kim Sŭng-hwa, and Public Security Minister Pang Hak-se are examples. In addition, four Soviet Koreans served as vice-premiers under Kim Il Sung: Hŏ Ka-i (1951–53), Nam Il (1957–76), Pak Ch'ang-ok (1954–56), and Pak Ŭi-hwan (1953–58).[15]

Compared to other groups, the Soviet Koreans did well in securing high government posts, but their lack of support from within, and North Korea's deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union, made their tenures relatively short. Except for Nam Il, who served in five different cabinets, none served in more than two cabinets. But even Nam, who had served Kim Il Sung well as his foreign minister during the 1950s, was relieved of his post when North Korean relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in October 1959. He was replaced by Kim Il Sung's partisan, Pak Sŏng-ch'ŏl. Later Nam was elevated to the post of vice-premier, but only in an honorary capacity; for the ten years from 1962 to 1972 he was not given a working ministry to head. He was appointed vice-premier in the fourth cabinet, but it was not until the fifth cabinet that he was assigned a ministry, and then it was the least influential post in the cabinet: chairmanship of the Light Industries Commission. Nam Il remained in this post until his death in March 1976.

The Soviet Koreans fared worse in securing choice diplomatic posts. None returned to the Soviet Union as the chief of the North Korean mission. When Ambassador Yi Sang-jo[16] defected to the Soviet Union in 1958, Yi Sin-p'al, a Soviet Korean, acted as temporary head of the North Korean mission to Moscow, and only he has returned to the Soviet Union as ambassador. Pak Yŏng-bin and Yi Il-gyŏng led North Korean trade delegations to the Soviet Union, and Pak served briefly as trade secretary in the North Korean mission in Moscow, but no others have returned to the Soviet Union as North Korean diplomats. Only one, Ambassador Ch'oe Il, was assigned to an important post in the People's Republic of China, heading the mission from 1953 to 1957. Ch'oe also served as ambassador to Poland in 1950. Other Soviet Koreans served in secondary diplomatic posts; thus Yang Yŏng-sun and Chang Ik-hwan went to Czechoslovakia in 1954 and 1959 respectively, Yi Tong-gŏn

to Hungary in 1959, and Han Il-mu to Mongolia from 1958 to 1961, as shown in List 5.

LIST 5. *Cabinet and Diplomatic Posts*

Cabinets	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Chin Pan-su	I: Foreign Trade, Internal and External Commerce					
		II: Commerce				
Hŏ Ka-i	I: Vice-Premier					
Kim Sŭng-hwa	I: City Construction, State Construction Commission					
Nam Il	I: Foreign Affairs					
		II: Vice-Premier, State Construction Commission				
			III: Vice-Premier, State Construction Commission			
				IV: Vice-Premier		
					V: Vice-Premier, Light Industries Commission	
Pak Ch'ang-ok	I: Vice-Premier, State Planning Commission, Machine Industries					
Pak Ŭi-wan	I: Vice-Premier, Transportation, Railways, Light Industry					
		II: State Construction Commission				
Pang Hak-se	I: Public Security, Interior					
		II: Interior				
Yi Il-gyŏng		II: Education and Culture, Common Education				
			III: Foreign Trade			

Diplomats	
Chang Ik-hwan	Czechoslovakia, 1959
Ch'oe Il	Poland, 1950; People's Republic of China, 1953
Han Il-mu	Mongolia, 1958-61
Yang Yŏng-sun	Czechoslovakia, 1954
Yi Tong-gŏn	Hungary, 1959

E. Military and Security Forces

North Korean military and security forces were controlled by Kim Il Sung and his partisans from the outset of the Soviet occupation. Kim did not allow the returned revolutionaries

from either China or the Soviet Union to challenge his control of the armed forces or security apparatus. He and his deputies were in full control of the military forces from the beginning. An Kil, Kang Kŏn, Ch'oe Hyŏn, Ch'oe Yong-gŏn, and a number of other partisans had established military cadre schools and begun to train young men. They disarmed the forces returning from China under the command of Mu Chŏng and Pak Il-u, whom they considered potential rivals. In Kim's military estimate of North Korea after the liberation, Soviet Korean military personnel were not considered a threat to him or his partisans. In fact, a majority of the Korean military officers in the Soviet army in North Korea had returned to the Soviet Union.

A few Soviet Koreans participated in the North Korean military, but these were exceptions. The most prominent was Kim Ung, who commanded North Korean frontline soldiers during the Korean War. There was a navy vice-admiral, Han Il-mu, and Major General Pak Ŭi-wan, who served in the North Korean Army. Nam Il was given a rank of full general, to represent the North Korean and Chinese team that negotiated the truce in the Korean War. Nam's military background included his participation in World War II as a captain in the Soviet army, but he was not a professional soldier. His first appointment in Korea after his return from the Soviet Union was as vice-minister of education.

Similarly, in the security forces Pang Hak-se was once known as the person most to be feared in the North, because he had been trained as an intelligence officer in the Soviet Union and had once headed the Political Security Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior. He later became the minister of the interior, as well as minister of public security. He was also a member of the Inspection Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, but he, too, was replaced by a partisan, Sŏk San, in 1960. Pang may have had an inside track with the Soviet occupation forces, but he had to cooperate with security agents dispatched to him by Kim Il Sung's partisans. Pang disappeared mysteriously from the North Korean political scene in the early 1960s, but later reappeared to be elected president of the Central Court, the highest judicial organ in the North, and he ranked 68 in the 145-member Central Committee of the fifth party congress held

in October 1980. Pang is perhaps the only Soviet Korean still in a position of influence in North Korea.

LIST 6. *Military and Security Posts*

Han Il-mu	Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Navy; Vice-Admiral
Kim Ung	General of the Army; Commander, North Korean frontline forces, 1953
Nam Il	General of the Army; Chief, North Korean truce negotiating team
Pak Ŭi-wan	Major-General of the Army; Deputy Commander, North Korean forces
Pang Hak-se	Minister of the Interior, Minister of Public Security, member of the Inspection Committee of the Workers' Party, President of the Central Court (the Supreme Court) of North Korea

III. Confrontation with Kim Il Sung

In all their political activities, the Soviet Koreans seem to have wanted to make some impact on the formation and development of a strong Communist party in Korea. Hŏ Ka-i was considered the most powerful of all returned Soviet Koreans, and when the North and South Korean Workers' Parties were merged to found the Workers' Party of Korea in June 1949, Hŏ was one of the two vice-chairmen of the party, under the chairmanship of Kim Il Sung.[17] Hŏ was virtually third in command behind Kim and Pak Hŏn-yŏng, and was the first secretary of the newly created secretariat of the party. He was recognized as an expert in party organization.

Hŏ's confrontation with Kim had to do with basic principles of party organization. He wanted to build an elite Communist party modeled after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while Kim Il Sung wanted a mass party. Hŏ's differences with Kim originated in a panicky speech the latter made to the third joint plenum of the Central Committee on December 21, 1950, when the war was going against North Korea.[18] Kim said that the war had distinguished the loyal from the disloyal members

of the party, and appropriate measures should be taken to punish the latter. However, he also cautioned that each case should be judged by the proper authorities, and that the party should be magnanimous in dealing with the low-ranking members and avoid indiscriminate purges. Hŏ was the chairman of the Inspection Committee, and he undertook the task of judging the loyal and disloyal.

From the third joint plenum in December 1950 to the fourth joint plenum on November 1, 1951, Hŏ did exactly the opposite of what Kim had told him to do: he carried out indiscriminate purges of low-ranking party members. During 1951, Hŏ expelled and punished 450,000 out of 600,000 party members, 75 percent of the entire membership.[19] Hŏ issued a new party identification card to each member in return for his old card, and all those who were unable to produce their old party identification cards were considered collaborators and were expelled and punished. During the brief period when the South Korean forces occupied the North, many North Korean party members had discarded their party identity cards in fear of reprisals by the South Korean security forces.

Kim Il Sung said that 80 to 85 percent of the expulsions were due to the failure to produce the old identity card. In an extreme case, for example, 154 out of 164 members of the Sunch'ŏn County Party in P'yŏngan Pukto were expelled because of the loss of the cards. Kim said that he had cautioned Hŏ and his deputies in a September 1951 meeting against such harsh measures, but Hŏ had refused to cooperate.[20]

Hŏ also closed the doors on many qualified applicants to the party. In an effort to preserve a proper balance of proletariat and peasants, Hŏ refused to consider applications from farmers. Kim noted that 80 percent of North Koreans were farmers, and said that Hŏ should not spend his time looking for a small number of industrial workers. For example, Hŏ set up an arbitrary quota of seventeen farmers in the Pakch'ŏn County party and refused to consider applications from other qualified farmers. People were rejected on the grounds of their educational level, their former affiliation, and involuntary service to the enemy. For example, Kim said that 77.4 percent of the 212 applicants in Hyesan

County, Hamgyŏng Pukto, had been refused because they could not recite the party platform.

Kim said later that Hŏ had argued for an elite Communist party of fewer than 600,000 members, consisting primarily of industrial workers. Kim instead argued that Korea should build a mass party in accordance with its unique national characteristics, and that Hŏ should not have looked for a nonexistent proletariat while denying farmers their participation in the party. Kim emphasized that to force impracticable methods and ideas from the Soviet Union on Korea was improper, bureaucratic, and formalistic and should be banned.[21]

Kim ordered most of the expelled party members reinstated, and by the time of the fifth joint plenum in December 1952, approximately one year after the confrontation, 69.2 percent of the expulsion orders had been rescinded. Party membership had grown to one million by then, but Kim admitted later that approximately half of the 450,000 new members recruited during the Korean war were uneducated, being barely able to read simple Korean.[22] The uneducated were trained, and by the time of the third party congress in April 1956 the party claimed a membership of 1,164,945, approximately 12 percent of the population and the highest ratio of members to population of any Communist party in the world. Kim said that more than half of the entire membership of the party had been recruited after the Korean War.[23]

Kim ridiculed Hŏ for his claim of erudition in matters pertaining to party organization and stigmatized him as a "party doctor" who could cure everything. Kim also commented frequently on how well Hŏ spoke Russian but how unable he was to converse in proper Korean.[24] Kim also accused Hŏ of attempting to control all those who came from the Soviet Union, an act tantamount to the crime of individual heroism. Kim said that Hŏ was secretive about everything, including party work. He accused Hŏ of many other crimes, relating mostly to his insistence on a Russian style of operation. At the sixth joint plenum of the Central Committee on August 4, 1953, it was reported that Hŏ had committed suicide, and his cowardly act was condemned by Kim.[25] It was rumored that Hŏ had conspired with Korean Communists from the South to overthrow Kim.

IV. Demise of the Soviet Koreans

The demise of the Soviet Koreans may be traced back to the nonparticipation of the Soviet Union in the Korean War. When the United States came to the assistance of the South, the Soviet Union failed to back Kim Il Sung, and it was not Soviet troops but Chinese volunteers that restored Kim to power. The Chinese remained in North Korea for eight more years after 1950, renewing their old ties and reminiscing—with no need for interpreters—about their joint guerrilla activities against the Japanese in Manchuria.

The Chinese occupation of the North brought a definite change to the domestic political scene, and the group most directly affected was the Soviet Koreans. Kim Il Sung still obediently parroted the usual adulation of Stalin, and he was profuse in his thanks for Soviet assistance in the war and reconstruction efforts. However, the Soviet advisors, including Ambassador Shtykov, were replaced, and his close friends, such as a Colonel Ignatiev, died in the war. Kim accused many Soviet Koreans of various crimes that he would not have dared to mention if the original Soviet occupation team that put him into power had been directing affairs in the North.

One of the first to be cited was Pak Yŏng, the chairman of the Hamnam Party Committee. Pak had been assigned the task of increasing agricultural production, but instead of executing the instructions given him by the party, he had tried out a "multiplication campaign," a "creative idea" of his own to increase production. Pak had apparently given fertilizers to more productive farmers to multiply production, but his campaign was a dismal failure. Pak was accused of "individual heroism," and of failing to make the party's directives known to the farmers.[26]

Pak survived this initial reproach, but others who followed him were less fortunate. Kim Ung, for example, was criticized at length by Kim Il Sung. Ridiculing him for his mistrust of the party, Kim Il Sung asked Kim Ung, "Why are you so suspicious? You are the chief of staff and you were our frontline commander. Why do you always ask whether our party trusts you or not."[27] Kim Il Sung said that the party trusted Kim Ung, but that Kim Ung suspected the party and was not candid with the party because he was egoistically obsessed with greed for power.

He supported the party while playing tricks behind the scenes. "A faint rustle nearby was enough to make his eyes round with suspicion," Kim Il Sung said. He added that Kim Ung's behavior was always prompted by self-interest and personal ambition.

Other Soviet Koreans accused of antiparty activities were immediately dismissed. Kim Yŏl, for example, was reported to have been sentenced to eight years in prison by a criminal court in Sariwŏn while he served as chairman of the Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee. Pak Yŏng-bin was also accused of having conducted the party's organization work as if it were a detective agency. In addition, those Soviet Koreans who were in charge of the State Construction Commission that administered Soviet aid after the war, such as Pak Ŭi-wan and Kim Sŭng-hwa, were summarily condemned for their inefficiency.[28]

In addition to Hŏ Ka-i, Yi Il-gyŏng was also reported to have committed suicide when his foreign trade record came under severe criticism. Only Nam Il seems to have died of natural causes in the North, while most Soviet Koreans have returned to the Soviet Union. Only Pang Hak-se remains in North Korea today.

V. Anti-Soviet Stance of Kim Il Sung

The removal of Soviet Koreans from their high-ranking positions in the party and government had a profound ideological justification to Kim Il Sung. In his effort to build an independent socialist state, Kim wanted to domesticate communism into a Korean-style, patriotic socialism, and he made an effort to extricate North Korea from Soviet influence. The first step in this direction was his pronouncement of the *chuch'e* idea in December 1955. Closer examination of this idea of self-reliance reveals that it is basically anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese. The idea has developed into an exclusively Korean form of nationalism glorifying only Kim Il Sung, but it had its origin in Kim's effort to curb Soviet influence in North Korea. All examples in his original speech in 1955 were directed against Soviet influence in North Korea. Kim said that North Korea should learn from the Chinese experience and mount a Chinese-style rectification

campaign. This phrase was, of course, omitted in later editions of his speech, but his original intent is unmistakable.[29]

The first example of Kim Il Sung's anti-Soviet stance was his accusation of Pak Ch'ang-ok.[30] Kim claimed that Pak had belittled the Korean proletarian literary movement. Kim had asked Pak about the reasons for his disapproval of the Korean literary tradition, and Pak was reported to have said that most Korean literary figures were former Japanese collaborators. Kim replied that the Koreans from the Soviet Union, who may not have collaborated with the Japanese, should not belittle such literary figures as Yi Ki-yŏng.

Kim denounced the overwhelming influence of the Soviet Union in North Korea. For instance, he took exception to a picture of the Siberian steppes hung in a vacation home of the People's Army, saying that such a picture might please Russians, but not Koreans. Koreans, he said, would prefer the beautiful scenery of Kŭmgangsan and Myohyangsan. For Korean soldiers vacationing in Korea, the scenes of gentle rolling hills, clear streams, and fields of golden crops would incite more patriotism for their country than any scene from the Soviet Union.

Kim Il Sung condemned a local official who hung up a diagram depicting the Five-Year Economic Plan of the Soviet Union while failing to display a diagram of North Korea's Three-Year Economic Plan. Lack of self-reliance could also be found, Kim said, in an elementary school that displayed portraits of Mayakovsky and Pushkin. These were not Koreans but foreigners, and there were many equally important Koreans to be admired by school children. It was also ridiculous for Koreans to imitate, for example, the Russian practice of putting the table of contents at the back of a book.

Kim pointed out that the Central Party School, which had been headed by a succession of Soviet Koreans, such as Hŏ Ik and Kim Sŭng-hwa, had neglected the study of Korean history, allocating more time to the study of foreign countries. The school had also shown a tendency to overlook the accomplishment of Korean revolutionaries in favor of foreign heroes.

In regards to North Korea's international relations, Kim said that Pak Yŏng-bin was wrong in supporting the Soviet position in favor of easing tensions between East and West. "On

returning from the Soviet Union, Comrade Pak said that since the Soviet Union was following the line of easing international tension, we should also drop our slogan against U. S. imperialism. Such an assertion . . . would dull our people's revolutionary vigilance. The U. S. imperialists scorched our land, slaughtered our innocent people. . . . They are our sworn enemies. . . . It is ridiculous to think that our people's struggle against the United States is in conflict with the efforts of the Soviet people to ease international tension."

The propaganda departments that were headed by Koreans returned from the Soviet Union, such as Ki Sŏk-bok, Yi Mun-il, and T'ae Sŏng-su, had committed a grievous error in copying mechanically from the Soviet example. The headlines of *Nodong sinmun* often resembled the headlines of *Pravda*. Korean newspapers, Kim argued, must reflect special Korean characteristics and report on events in Pyongyang rather than Moscow. In general, Kim said that the Soviet Koreans had failed to break away from their past in the Soviet Union. He chided Kim Chaeuk over his insistence on following the path trodden by the Soviet Union. Kim said that "there can be no principle that we must follow the Soviet pattern."[31]

Kim said in December 1955 that it was already too late to criticize such returnees as Pak Ch'ang-ok and Ki Sŏk-bok, and that the misguided Soviet Koreans should be reeducated and rehabilitated. They should be reindoctrinated to serve the cause of Korea and not that of the Soviet Union. There were only a few takers, however, and most of those who were criticized by Kim returned to the Soviet Union.

VI. Conclusion

There were many reasons why the Soviet Koreans failed in their quest for power in Korea. Basic lack of domestic suport, as well as lack of support from the Soviet Union, contributed to their demise, but the majority of returnees themselves were not as competent as the revolutionaries they found in Korea. The returnees were few in number and had no cohesive organization or revolutionary record by which they could claim to be part of Korean tradition. Also they were citizens of the Soviet Union

first, and felt obliged to defend it; in a sense they were adventurers who were seeking their political fortune in Korea. Their failure in the North was not unique, considering that all other groups except for the one led by Kim Il Sung have met similar fates.

Compared to other groups, however, the Soviet Koreans were fortunate to have a country they could return to when their political careers ended, though it was their identification with the Soviet Union that ultimately brought an end to their participation in North Korean politics. After the first decade, when Kim's stance became clear, the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union went from bad to worse. The worsening Sino-Soviet dispute forced North Koreans to reveal their anti-Soviet stance. Most Soviet Koreans were purged by 1956, but the few who lasted into the 1960s were merely prolonging their misery, because open vituperation against the Soviet Union was routine between 1962 and 1964.

In a lengthy article appearing on October 28, 1963, the North Koreans condemned the Soviet campaign to isolate China and accused the Soviet Union of manipulating economic aid in order to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. They said that the issue of the cult of personality should be confined to the Russians, and that the Soviet Union should stop forcing erroneous ideas, such as peaceful transition and the cult of personality, on others. Kim Il Sung was tired of the de-Stalinization campaigns.

The North Koreans acknowledged that North Korea had received aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union after the war and that the Soviet Union had helped rebuild textile mills and fertilizer plants, but they also revealed that the Soviet Union had sold them the building materials and sundry Russian goods at prices much higher than the prevailing international market prices and in return had carted off tons of gold bullion and large quantities of nonferrous metals at prices much lower than the international market prices.

North Korean scholars have attacked Soviet scholars for their Russianized interpretation of Korean history, accusing them of indiscriminate copying of Korean history books written by Japanese scholars of the colonial period. The Soviet scholars

have curtailed publication of books and articles praising North Korea, and it has became an easy matter to distinguish Korean-language books published in Moscow from books published in Pyongyang. Koreans in the Soviet Union no longer read Korean language books from North Korea, and when North Korea launched a frontal attack on the Soviet Union, the attitude of Koreans in the Soviet Union seems to have changed from indifference to consternation. Kim Il Sung seems to have succeeded not only in expelling the Soviet Koreans, but also in alienating Koreans in the Soviet Union, from North Korea.

NOTES

1. *Ssoryŏn e kŏju hanŭn Chosŏn inmindŭl ŭi saenghwal hyŏngp'yŏn e taehan pogo* (Ch'ŏngjin: Chosŏn kongsandang, ch'ŏngjinsi wiwŏnhoe, 1946), pp. 1–17.

2. M. T. Kim, *Koreiskie internatsionalisty v borbe za vlasti sovetov na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1918–1922* (Moskva: Nuaka, 1979), pp. 49–65.

3. Kim Ha-il, *Pan cheguk chuŭi chŏnjaeng e issŏsŏ ŭi Chosŏn kongsan chuŭija dŭl ŭi immu* (Moskva: Oeguk nodongja ch'ulp'anbu, 1935), pp. 1–24.

4. *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961). In this study by the United States Department of State, the Soviet Koreans and Kim Il Sung's partisans are grouped together as one unit constructing a Soviet satellite state.

5. Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," *Asian Survey* 8, no. 4 (April 1968), p. 274.

6. *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover*, pp. 100–105.

7. For the roster of members of the Central Committee from the first to sixth Party congresses, see Dae-Sook Suh, *Korean Communism, 1945–1980* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981), pp. 309–359.

8. For clarification of their positions in the Central Committee, see Dae-Sook Suh, "Communist Party Leadership," in *Political Leadership in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), pp. 159–191.

9. Nam Il died on March 7, 1976, at the age of sixty-four. See the notice in *Nodong sinmun*, 8 March 1976.

10. The Korean Writers' Association, Chosŏn kija tongmaeng, was established on March 10, 1946, and the Korean Writers' Association, the so-called *Munyech'ong* (Chosŏn Munhwa Yesul Ch'ongtongmaeng), was established on March 25. Both of these organizations were soon taken over by active writers and reporters in Korea.

11. The vita file of the College of Liberal Arts of Kim Il Sung University has become available as part of the Records Seized by the United States Milit-

ary Forces in Korea, Record Group 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized; Shipping Advice 2011, Box 7, Item 35. This record is most revealing.

12. Ibid. Professor To Yu-ho, for example, had studied in Korea, Japan, Peking University, and Frankfurt, earning his doctorate in anthropology in Austria.

13. Every revolutionary who had returned to Korea from abroad had to choose an electoral district; Nam Il, for example, was elected from Hamgyŏng Pukto. Nam was born and raised in the Soviet Union, but claimed Kyŏngwŏn, Hamgyŏng Pukto, as his hometown.

14. Vice Ministers included Chang Ik-hwan, Chŏng Yul, Han Il-mu, Ki Sŏk-bok, Kim Yŏl, Kim Ung, Pak Yŏng-bin, Yi Hŭi-jun, Yi Sin-p'al, and Yi Tong-gŏn.

15. See the complete roster of cabinet ministers in Suh, *Korean Communism, 1945–1980*, pp. 444–494.

16. Yi Sang-jo, a general who returned from China, was implicated in a plot to overthrow Kim Il Sung and was granted political asylum in the Soviet Union, where he still lives.

17. The Workers' Party of Korea had its beginning in North Korea as the Workers' Party of North Korea, and subsequently in South Korea as the Workers' Party of South Korea. The two merged on June 13, 1949, to found the Workers' Party of Korea, and its first joint plenum was held on June 24, 1949. North Korean party histories claim that Kim Il Sung was elected chairman of the joint Central Committee as early as August 1948. *Chosŏn nodongdang yŏksa kyojae* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1964), p. 228.

18. *Kim Il Sung sŏnjip*, first edition, vol. 3 (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1953), pp. 122–173.

19. Kim Il Sung, *P'yŏngan pukto tang tanch'e dŭl ŭi kwaŏp* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1956), pp. 2–66.

20. Kim Il Sung, *Tang tanch'e dŭl ŭi chojik saŏp esŏ ŭi myŏtkaji kyŏlham dŭl e taehayŏ* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa,1951), pp. 3–85.

21. Kim Il Sung, *Sasang saŏp esŏ kyojo chuŭi wa hyŏngsik chuŭi rŭl t'oech'i hago chuch'e rŭl hwangnip halte taehayŏ* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa,1960), pp. 1–29.

22. Kim Il Sung, *Nodongdang ŭi chojikchŏk sasangjŏk kanghwanŭn sŭngni ŭi kich'o* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1953), pp. 2–73.

23. Kim Il Sung, *Chosŏn nodongdang chesamch'a taehoe esŏ han chungang wiwŏnoe saŏp ch'onggyŏl pogo* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1956), pp. 2–171.

24. *Kim Il Sung sŏnjip*, second edition, vol. 6 (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1960), p. 269.

25. Pak Chŏng-ae reported on August 4, 1953, at the sixth joint plenum of the Central Committee that Hŏ had committed suicide after performing acts against the people and the party.

26. *Kim Il Sung chŏjak sŏnjip*, vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1967), p. 375.

27. Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), pp. 123–124.

28. For Kim Il Sung's condemnation of Pak Yŏng-bin, see Kim's speeches of 28 December 1955, 7 April 1956, 7 March 1958, 25 August 1960, and 23 January 1961. For Pak Yŏng, see Kim's speech of 15 December 1952. For Pak Ŭi-wan, see Kim's speeches of 6 March 1958, 25 December 1958, 23 January 1961, and 22 January 1964. For Kim Sŭng-hwa, see Kim's speeches of 19 October 1957 and 25 December 1958.

29. Compare the edited version with the original. For the original, see Kim Il Sung, *Sasang saŏp esŏ kyojo chuŭi wa hyŏngsik chuŭi rŭl t'oech'i hago chuch'e rŭl hwangnip halte taehayŏ* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1960). For the edited version without the reference to the rectification campaign, see *Kim Il Sung chŏjak sŏnjip*, vol. 1, pp. 560–585.

30. For accusations of Pak, see numerous references in Kim's speeches of 28 December 1955, 19 October 1957, 18 February 1960, 23 January 1961, 8 March 1962, and 9 January 1964.

31. Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, p. 591.

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